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Preface
This Ph.D.–thesis studies issues in the area of construction informatics. Con-
struction informatics is the theoretical study of formal and conceptual aspects
in the domain of civil engineering and design.
The thesis is a collection of papers which each treat a specific subject within
domain analysis and conceptual modelling of civil engineering and design.
Due to the interdisciplinary content, the first half of the study has been carried
out at Department of Civil Engineering (BYG•DTU), The Technical University
of Denmark; whereas the second half has been carried out at Informatics and
Mathematical Modelling, The Technical University of Denmark. Supervisors
have been Prof. Dines Bjørner (IMM) and Per Galle (BYG•DTU).
The idea was to initiate the study at a place where engineering issues are dis-
cussed on a daily basis, and where the practical and theoretical knowledge of
the domain is present.
With origin in civil engineering and design issues, the study was directed towards
computer science oriented theories in an attempt to introduce such theories
in modelling and clarification of the domain. This strategy turned out to be
a strength for the study and this thesis. However, it also discovered some
problems in carrying out such a truly interdisciplinary Ph.D.–study. Per Galle’s
and Dines Bjørner’s common background in computer science has been essential
for the success of this study.
The original title of the Ph.D. project was “Design and application of a civil
engineering ontology However, it became clear that there were going to be two
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main streams in the thesis, and that an actual monograph was not an appropri-
ate format for the thesis.
The main streams are both rooted in civil engineering ontology, and they are
bound together by the overall issue of how civil engineering concepts relate.
The issues of the thesis are treated from three angles: from computer science,
from civil engineering and design theory, and from philosophy. It is characteris-
tic for the thesis that these angles are all present in analysis and argumentation.
The philosophical aspect is a natural ingredient as construction informatics pri-
marily concerns the fundamental conceptual structures, and how models of these
relate to engineering and design practice and reality.
The aspect of design has been given high priority because this subject concerns
the relation between representation and artefacts — a subject which is also
essential in computer science, and which is deeply rooted in philosophy.
Asger Eir
Lyngby, February 2004
Forord
Denne Ph.d.–afhandling studerer emner inden for byggeinformatik. Byggein-
formatik er det teoretiske studie af formelle og begrebsmæssige aspekter i gen-
standsområdet byggeri og design.
Afhandlingen er en samling af artikler, som hver behandler et afgrænset emne
inden for domæneanalyse og begrebsmodellering af byggeri og design.
Grundet studiets tværfaglige indhold, er første halvdel udført på BYG•DTU
og anden halvdel på Informatik og Matematisk Modellering (IMM) med Prof.
Dines Bjørner (IMM) og Per Galle (BYG•DTU) som vejledere.
Ideen var at starte studiet der, hvor de ingeniørmæssige problemstillinger blev
dagligt diskuteret, og hvor man havde den praktiske erfaring og teoretiske vi-
den om genstandsområdet. Fra de bygge– og designteoretiske studier drejede
studiet sig til de mere formelt datalogiske emner i et forsøg på at indføre disse i
modellering og afklaring af genstandsområdet. Dette forløb har vist sig at blive
en styrke for studiet og denne afhandling, men det har også afsløret problem-
stillinger i at gennemføre sådanne virkelig tværfaglige Ph.d.–studier. Per Galles
og Dines Bjørners fælles baggrund inden for datalogi har været essentielt for
studiets succes.
Den oprindelige titel på Ph.d.–projektet var “Design og anvendelse af en byggeon-
tologi. Det viste sig imidlertid hurtigt, at der tegnede sig individuelle hovedlinier
og en egentlig monografi ville derfor ikke være en naturlig form for afhandlingen.
Hovedlinierne har dog alle rod i det byggeontologiske og er bundet sammen af
den overordnede problemstilling om, hvorledes byggebegreber relaterer.
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Emnerne i afhandlingen behandles med udgangspunkt i tre vinkler: en data-
logisk, en bygge–design teoretisk, og en filosofisk. Det er kendetegnende for
afhandlingen, at disse tre vinkler er til stede i analyse og argumentation. Det
filosofiske aspekt indgår som et naturligt element da byggeinformatik først og
fremmest omhandler basale begrebsmæssige strukturer, og hvorledes modeller
af disse relaterer til den ingeniør– og designmæssige virkelighed. Designaspektet
har ligeledes fået stor vægt, da dette emne særlig handler om relationen mellem
repræsentationer og artefakter — et emne, som både er centralt i datalogien og
dybt rodfæstet i filosofien.
Asger Eir
Lyngby, Februar 2004
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Opening
Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis studies issues in the interdisciplinary area between civil engineering
and computer science. The formal aspects of this study, we call “Construction
Informatics”. As the name indicates, we are concerned with the domain of
construction (civil engineering and design) and approach it in an informatic
way. Informatics is the convergence of computer science, mathematics (including
mathematical modelling), and applications. Thereby, construction informatics
is the theoretical study of the mathematical abstractions which can be taken to
model construction domain concepts. It is an interdisciplinary field which roots
in the problems of civil engineering and design, as well as in the problems of
representation and computation.
Today, information technology (IT) is commonly used in several areas of con-
struction and lately it has become a fast growing research topic as well. The
last ten years of research has drawn on results from computer science theory
and practice. Such efforts include defining classification systems or ontologies ,
introducing databases for collaborative design, defining core product models
for tool integration, constructing and applying project web services, and in-
troducing portable communication facilities. We call this line of work “IT in
construction” in order to emphasize its focus on technology. As opposed to this,
“construction informatics” is the theoretical study of foundations and is based
on mathematics, abstraction, and philosophy.
4 Introduction
Industry and research have emphasized a number of major challenges to future
information technology in the construction sector. One can be formulated as
the motto of “getting information, wherever you are — whenever you want”.
This challenge concerns communication, integration, and standardisation. An-
other challenge is how to better support the work of practitioners. This is an
issue which is rooted in the nature — the intrinsics — of the domain of civil
engineering and design.
Construction informatics is the formal study which investigates the do-
main of construction and its conceptual foundations by introducing com-
puter science concepts of theoretical kinds. In this thesis, we shall do so
by focussing on the very basic structures — the intrinsics — of certain
facets of civil engineering and design. The thesis is a series of papers
which treat specific construction informatic issues.
What governs our approach is partly the principle of specifying domain con-
cepts as formal models, and partly the philosophical considerations on which
domain clarifications are founded. Thereby, we believe to touch issues which
are essentially important when facing future challenges in civil engineering and
design — practical as well as research oriented.
Construction of buildings is a traditional and conservative industry which differs
from other production businesses on the amount of information, the complexity
of organisations, and the uniqueness of the products. Construction projects in-
volve a large number of stakeholders who often use different tools, conventions
for representation, rules & regulations, and means for communication. Fur-
thermore, the amount of information in the construction industry is enormous
and many–sorted. It includes construction specifications, drawings, contracts,
schedules, budgets, information for facilities management, etc. The meaning
and significance of such information is not uniquely defined and often depend
on the rôle of the given stakeholder.
With todays distributed trades, the area of construction is going from being
product–oriented to be service–oriented . The reason is that focus has moved
from the building as a product, to the information and services in the building
project. This means that notions like classification, design, project manage-
ment , etc., need to be founded on much more fundamental conceptual structures
than previously. Such structures are rooted in the intrinsics of the domain; not
in syntactical conventions or currently convenient practice.
From an engineering perspective, the domain of civil engineering and design is
interesting because it comprises notions like language, description, representa-
5tion, and communication; and these notions relations to physical or possible
artefacts.
From a perspective of computer science and informatics, the domain is inte-
resting because it comprises huge amounts of information in documents that
seem to be related semantically. Some documents describe the artefact — the
building — to be built. From a semantic perspective, the descriptions in such
documents are not simple, as they refer to things or phenomena which may or
may not exist. In general, dealing with information in civil engineering may lead
to considerations of ontological and philosophical kinds. It does so by including
notions like properties , representation, mereology, and the meaning of language
constructs.
Thus, an investigation of the domain of civil engineering contributes to: (i)
a conceptual clarification of the domain in general, (ii) an understanding of
the domain as a foundation for developing information systems, (iii) an under-
standing of and experience with the computer science methodology applied in
the process, and (iv) an awareness of the significance of formal models.
The present thesis aims at reaching a clarification on certain facets of the domain
of civil engineering and design. This clarification process is constantly flavoured
with: (i) domain intrinsics and problem issues, (ii) computer science concepts
and principles, and (iii) philosophical and ontological considerations. Thus, our
analysis and treatment is constituted by three angles: Civil engineering and
design, Computer science and Philosophy:
• A domain clarification of civil engineering and design, is necessarily rooted
in observations and conceptions of what is going on, the problems occur-
ring, and the approaches taken to accommodate them. It is a study deeply
rooted in the notion of representation and the relation between representa-
tion and the represented. In this context, notions like physical entities and
mental ideas of buildings are important. So are the process of designing,
the complexity in managing construction information, etc.
• The computer science angle is rooted in computer science and mathematics
which in this thesis means that we use well–known concepts like formal
models, orderings, lattices, formal semantics, etc. It is essential to the
study that we strive towards full formalisation of the domain concepts
considered. This, we take as a criterion for the conceptualisation of the
domain to be useful as foundation for advanced software systems.
• All domain considerations are based on conceptions of the world. Philo-
sophy is, however, not a solution schema which makes things “run”. It is
an exploration process which may introduce more questions than answers.
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Therefore, philosophy is often considered too theoretical for actual appli-
cations in or solutions to theoretical issues. Still, philosophy is the study
of foundations and is thereby essential in everything we do. In this thesis,
we have put quite an emphasis on philosophical considerations. We are
interested in arguing why things are as they are and thus we shall not
be content with explanations which refer to conventions. The pragmatic
question of why is what drives the philosophical considerations and thus
it should deliberately drive the domain clarification process as well.
1.1 Audience and prerequisites 7
1.1 Audience and prerequisites
The work presented in this thesis is aimed at people who work in research or
with industrial treatment of computer science application domains. Primarily,
it is aimed at people working in the interdisciplinary field of construction and
informatics. We hope that the thesis may be appreciated as an approach which
formally investigates this field. We see it as a contribution, both to research
of civil engineering ontologies and of information systems for various purposes
within the field. Although we do not present an actual ontology, we believe that
the methodology and formal theoretical foundation presented may be beneficial
to research and development in the area of civil engineering ontologies, classi-
fication systems, standardisation, tool integration, and information systems in
general. Studies of the foundation for information systems includes the study of
computer aided design. In this area, we believe that the thesis contributes with
important considerations, clarifications, and solutions.
In the area of computer science, the thesis can be considered an example of
domain engineering. Thereby, it is a collection of studies in a large series which
collectively aim at reaching clarifications on and experience with the method-
ology for domain acquisition. Also, the thesis may be relevant to computer
scientists who are interested in the rôle played by philosophy in this context.
The philosophical aspects may be of interest and relevance to people working
with similar ontological problems in civil engineering, in design, or in other
domains. However, the way we use philosophy is quite specialised towards civil
engineering and design. The contributions on the philosophical front should
therefore be seen as contributions with respect to the given domain. They
may not be actual contributions to philosophy themselves, and thus may not
interest philosophers who are experts on the areas being touched. What may
be of interest is, however, the way we utilize philosophy as an actual beneficial
foundation study for solving technical problems.
In the thesis we take a so–called language–oriented approach to modelling. This
approach is based on the distinction among the semiotic notions of pragmatics,
semantics , and syntax . It is strongly recommended to have an understanding
of this distinction for reading the thesis.
Throughout the thesis, we make use of formal specifications, primarily in The
RAISE Specification Language (RSL [134, 135]). Such specifications are precise
mathematical formulations of the ideas being presented. The specifications refer
to notions like sets, maps, functions, types, etc. A basic understanding of such
notions may be needed in order to fully understand the contributions. However,
we have made an effort to make our presentations such that the formal specifi-
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cations are supplementary. Still, it is advisable to read the presentations with
some background knowledge of mathematical abstraction, types and functions,
and of logic. A deeper understanding of formulae and proofs requires knowledge
of specification languages like RSL, VDM, or similar.
In the paper presented in Chapter 7, we use direct denotational style for spec-
ifying the semantics of some languages. Thus, it is advisable to have a good
understanding of this notation, as well as of denotational semantics in general
(we refer to [161, 127, 148]).
Often, we shall refer to notions like objects , properties , concepts , and relations .
We consider it essential for the understanding, to have a basic understanding of
these notions.
The papers in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 are of philosophical kind. Hence, they
differ from the other chapters with respect to style and background knowledge
required. The two papers can be read with some basic knowledge of syntax
and semantics. It is advisable to have some experience with reading philosophy,
though. For a real benefit of the papers, we recommend that these are read with
some background knowledge of the classical problem issues concerning objects,
properties, descriptions, meaning, and language.
1.2 Hypothesis (scientific statement)
We shall make a distinction between the term “hypothesis” and the term “thesis”.
The former we take to name the formulation of the scientific statement with
which we shall be concerned. The latter we take to name this work which
describes the approaches, solutions, and results of investigating the hypothesis.
The hypothesis is defines such that it with most certainty can be refuted. The
overall contribution of the thesis is then the results of exploring to what extent
the hypothesis is valid.
We base the thesis on two convictions or dogmas ; one from computer science
and one from cognitive science in civil engineering and design:
1.2 Hypothesis (scientific statement) 9
A dogma in computer science
Domain engineering is the theoretical study which — with origin in observation
and considerations of a domain — establishes models of that domain. Domain en-
gineering is a prerequisite to requirements and design of software systems. Making
models of a specific application domain, provides the basis for a better understand-
ing of that domain and thus for making software systems rooted in the nature of
the domain.
A dogma in civil engineering and design
The domain of civil engineering and design is a domain of communication pro-
cesses going from needs and ideas for solutions, via requirements and design, to
construction, maintenance, and demolition.
The overall hypothesis of our thesis is now the following:
Hypothesis
Civil engineering concepts can — as formal computable models — be bound
together by relations which explicitly specify how information is created, used,
and how it evolves through stages of civil engineering projects.
From the hypothesis, we derive our overall motivation:
Motivation
Establishing such relations between civil engineering concepts adds conceptual
transparency and clarity to domain models, such that these models make solid
foundations for civil engineering information systems.
In the thesis, we shall exercise the hypothesis from four different angles:
À Relating concepts of different incomparable kinds.
Our focus will here be how the notion of Galois connections can be used to
relate two different concepts. We approach from this angle in Chapter 3.
Á Relating representations of increasing cognitive significance.
Our focus will here be design processes and design representations. We
approach from this angle in Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6.
Â Conceptual design models versus perspectives (views).
Our focus will here be design tools and their software architectures. We
approach from this angle in Chapter 4 and Chapter 7.
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Ã On the relation between descriptions and artefacts.
Our focus will here be on the relation between descriptions and part–
whole relations, and on the notion of properties and meaning in context
of important design related problems. We approach from this angle in
Chapter 8 and Chapter 9.
These angles represent the subjects into which the papers of this thesis are
categorised. In Chapter 11, we shall compare our overall results for each of these
angles with the hypothesis. The papers constituting the thesis, individually
define specialisations of the hypothesis and motivation. Thereby, they can be
read as separate research contributions as well.
1.3 Contributions (English) 11
1.3 Contributions (English)
The primary research contributions of the work in this thesis are:
1. A principle for relating civil engineering domain concepts. This contribu-
tion is a result of exercising the hypothesis from angle À.
2. A formal foundation for incremental design and the introduction of the
concept: design lattices . This contribution is a result of exercising the
hypothesis from angle Á.
3. A principle of semantic parameterised interpretation as a new software
architecture for conceptual design systems. This contribution is a result
of exercising the hypothesis from angle Â.
4. A suggestion of a metaphysical notion: object aspects . This contribution
is a result of exercising the hypothesis from angle Ã.
5. A clarification on the philosophical foundations for design. This contribu-
tion is another result of exercising the hypothesis from angle Ã.
The items 1.–3. consider the practical problems of handling civil engineering
information and the theoretical problems of design. Theories and concepts from
computer science are applied in solving these problems.
The items 4.–5. consider the practical and philosophical problems in context of
civil engineering and design. Philosophical analysis and theory are here applied
in approaching clarifications on the subject matter.
In the following, we describe the contributions as brief introductions to the
individual papers of the thesis. For each contribution described, we state the
relevance to industry and to other research.
1.3.1 Relating civil engineering domain concepts
The two civil engineering concepts cost frame and project plan — which can
be modelled and understood individually — are related by the mathematical
notion of Galois connections . Given mathematical models of the two concepts,
it is possible to determine which project plans are executable within a given
cost frame, and which cost frames apply to a given project plan. Specifying
how two such civil engineering concepts relate, implies specifying how knowledge
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is built through stages of a building project. In trying to specify the relation
between two civil engineering concepts, we may discover that these cannot be
related directly. There may be interrelating concepts which bind them together.
The principle of relating concepts by means of Galois connections thus includes
investigation of what notions tie the concepts together. This is done for the two
concepts: cost frame and project plan.
Relevance to industry and research: The principle can be used as
a method with which we can model the relations between various
civil engineering concepts. Thereby, information in different project
stages and of different kinds, can be linked. That is, we can link
information about needs and ideas, requirements and design, pro-
cess planning and execution. Often documentation is written on the
basis of various sorts of knowledge. The principle described tries to
make such knowledge explicit and precise by means of formal — i.e.
mathematical — specifications. In order to write a project plan we
need to know the cost frame, and in order to find a suitable location
of a building we need to know the approximate size of the build-
ing, etc. Here, computer aided knowledge management in building
may benefit from modelling the relations between civil engineering
concepts, explicitly. Thereby, we have a method for testing various
decisions taken. The main idea is thus: The knowledge necessary for
documenting a civil engineering project should be made explicit and
precise such that this knowledge can contribute to the management
and control of the given project.
1.3.2 Design lattices
The design process can be considered as an exploration and configuration pro-
cess which can be captured as spanning a lattice structure. This means that
it is possible to define an ordering relation between design representation on
various stages of development. In a sense, a design process can be considered
as a collection of choices and design compositions. E.g. in the design of a
load–bearing beam, we may choose among different dimensions and materials,
and combination of the properties which are necessary for the beam to pos-
sess a certain strength. We have developed a mathematical model of design
representations and specified an ordering relation between such representations.
Thereby, we have the ability to express that one design representation is more
precise than another. Being more precise here means that it contributes with
more knowledge of the artefact in mind; i.e. it is cognitively more sufficient. The
idea is called design lattices . Design lattices are adequate for supporting what
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is known as incremental design. By incrementality, we understand that objects,
properties of objects, and relations between objects, alternately can be added to
a design representation. The notion of design lattices, and its application as a
foundation for conceptual design tools, is presented in the two papers Chapter 5
and Chapter 6.
Relevance to industry and research: By recording design processes
and representing these as design lattices, we are able to browse be-
tween tentative designs and previous designs stages. In a sense,
we also have the opportunity to structure the design process bet-
ter, although this is not the primary aim. In today’s design tools,
the design process is considered a sequence of object instantiations
and removals. The structured designer may want to be aware of
the design changes being made, as well as know when one design is
more specialised than another, whether two designs are in conflict,
can be combined, etc. The notion of design lattices facilitate such
functionality without obstructing the creative process of designing.
1.3.3 Semantic parameterised interpretation
The principle of semantic parameterised interpretation is introduced as a new
software architecture for tools aimed for conceptual building design.
The idea is to make it possible to specify the meaning of terms representing pro-
perties which are referred to by names in design models. Such a specification is
here called a semantics . Design models are now expressed in a special modelling
language. If new names for properties are needed in order to express the design
idea in mind, the meaning of these names are to be specified in the semantics.
A semantics is written in a specially designed specification language. A design
model can be interpreted according to the semantics specified. The result is one
of many presentations of — views on — the model. Examples of such views
could be representations of visualisation commands for displaying the object
from various angles, or expressions used in stress analysis of the artefact being
modelled.
Relevance to industry and research: Within research of incremental
design, the design process is considered as a process in which ob-
jects, properties of objects, and relations between objects are added
incrementally to a design representation. In the paper Chapter 4,
we argue that tools for conceptual modelling of buildings must sup-
port such incrementality, and that it should be possible to introduce
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names for properties when these names are needed in order to ex-
press the design idea in mind. Such functionalities are not supported
by today’s commercial design tools. If we wish the sort of dynam-
ics without having to restructure the type system repeatedly, we
need to specify the meaning of the names separately from the design
program (including its type structures). The principle of semantic
parameterised interpretation investigates the possibilities for doing
so.
In addition to the theoretical study, a prototype tool has been developed. This
tool demonstrates the principle of semantic parameterised interpretation. The
tool has been programmed in Moscow ML.
1.3.4 Object aspects
References to physically or potentially existing objects like buildings can be
found many forms of building documentation. Words and phrases, which are
taken to refer to such objects, do so in two ways. One way is by referring to
concepts of which the object in question is considered to fall under. The terms
referring to the concepts, plays the rôle of characterising that object. The other
way is by referring to another object to which the object in question stands
a certain relation. An important one of such relations is the relation between
part and wholes. The formal–philosophical theory of part–whole relations is
known as mereology. In order to solve a number of reference problems, when
considering objects which do not have physical presence (like in designing), the
notion of object aspects is introduced. The existence of the notion — being a
special kind of the mereological notion of parts — is defended against standard
criticisms directed towards mereology.
Relevance to industry and research: The work is a contribution to
the understanding of the possibilities and limitations related to doc-
umentation and other descriptions of physical things.
1.3.5 Metaphysical theories as foundation for design
A theory of design necessarily needs clarification on three issues: (i) what it
means to describe, (ii) how we can describe objects which have no physical
presence, and (iii) on what basis we can predict the behaviour of artefacts being
designed. We show how a collection of philosophical theories concerned with
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language, meaning, and properties, contribute to an understanding of design.
In essence, we dig into the aspects of semantics in relation to descriptions of
objects.
Relevance to industry and research: In the development and appli-
cation of design tools and methods, we may often ask the question
of whether the knowledge being expressed is merely a collection of
commonly agreed symbols. The issue becomes important in con-
text of interoperability between applications as a common language
or model is needed. The question is now on what ontological basis
such a language or model is to be established. New philosophical
theories in metaphysics connect the notion of properties tightly with
the notion of causation. From the knowledge of a set of proper-
ties we can usually say something about the behaviour of the object
possessing these properties; e.g. that pylons for a bridge can take
a certain tension. We may apply similar kinds of judgements over
objects which are being designed and thus ascribed a set of pro-
perties. Imagine that such knowledge was built into computerized
design tools; including a large set of natural laws. Thereby, we are
able, not only to verify designs against their requirements, but also
to simulate the artefact’s behaviour when put in certain situations.
Special programs can do something like this. We suggest that it all
is merged in a conceptual design tool.
Common for all contributions is the problem of how information relates and how
it evolves and is used as foundation for documentation through all the stages of
a civil engineering project. Thereby, the work is a study in ontology and how
to apply ontology as foundation for new technology.
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1.4 Bidrag (Danish)
De vigtigste forskningsmæssige bidrag i denne afhandling omfatter emnerne:
1. Et princip for relatering af byggebegreber. Dette bidrag er et resultat af
at udforske hypotesen from vinkel ¬.
2. Et formelt fundament for inkrementalitet i designprocessen samt introduk-
tion af begrebet: designgitre. Dette bidrag er et resultat af at udforske
hypotesen fra vinkel ­.
3. Princippet semantisk parametriseret fortolkning som en ny software–arki-
tektur for begrebsmæssige designværktøjer. Dette bidrag er et resultat af
at udforske hypotesen fra vinkel ®.
4. En introduktion af det metafysiske begreb: objektaspekt. Dette bidrag er
et resultat af at udforske hypotesen fra vinkel ¯.
5. Afklaringer af en række filosofiske fundamenter for design. Dette bidrag
er ligeledes et resultat af at udforske hypotesen fra vinkel ¯.
Punkterne 1.–3. tager udgangspunkt i praktiske informations–håndteringsmæs-
sige og designteoretiske problemstillinger, og anvender datalogiske teorier til
løsning af disse.
Punkterne 4.–5. tager udgangspunkt i praktiske såvel som videnskabsteoretiske
/ filosofiske og såkaldt ontologiske problemstillinger, og anvender filosofien til
analyse af praktiske problemstillinger.
I det følgende beskriver disse bidrag, idet begrundelser mht. industri– og forsk-
ningsmæssig relevans er givet i kursiv efter hver beskrivelse.
1.4.1 Relatering af byggebegreber
De to byggebegreber udgiftsramme og projektplan — der kan forstås og mod-
elleres hver for sig — spiller sammen vha. det matematiske begreb Galois con-
nection. Givet matematiske modeller af de to begreber, er det muligt at afgøre,
hvilke projektplaner, som kan udføres inden for en given udgiftsramme, og
hvilke udgiftsrammer, som kan anvendes på en given projektplan. At speci-
ficere, hvorledes byggebegreber relaterer, vil desuden sige at specificere, hvor-
dan viden opbygges gennem stadierne i et byggeprojekt. I specificering af re-
lationen mellem to byggebegreber vil man ofte opdage, at disse ikke altid kan
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relateres direkte. Der kan være begreber, som binder dem sammen. Princip-
pet består således i dels at modellere de involverede begreber, dels at afgøre,
hvilke størrelser der binder begreberne sammen. Dette er gjort for begreberne
udgiftsramme og projektplan.
Relevans for industri og forskning: Med princippet i hånden, kan
man begynde at modellere relationerne mellem andre byggebegre-
ber således, at information på de forskellige stadier kædes sammen;
dvs. fra behov og idé via krav og design til procesplanlægning og
udførelse. Når byggedokumentation nedskrives, gøres det oftest på
baggrund af viden på en lang række områder. Det beskrevne prin-
cip søger at gøre denne viden tydelig og præcis vha. formel — dvs.
matematisk — specifikation. For at kunne nedskrive en projekt-
plan er det nødvendigt at kende udgiftsrammen, og for at finde
en passende lokalisering, er det nødvendigt at kende til eventuelle
bindinger til omgivelserne, byplanlægning, ledige byggegrunde, osv.
Datamatunderstøttelse af videnhåndtering i byggeriet kan derfor
have gavn af at udtrykke relationerne mellem forskellige byggebegre-
ber. Herved fås desuden værktøjer til at teste de forskellige beslut-
ninger, som tages. Baggrunden for princippet er altså: Den viden,
som er nødvendig for at dokumentere et byggeprojekt, bør gøres ty-
delig og præcis, så denne viden kan bidrage til bedre at styre det
pågældende projekt.
1.4.2 Designgitre
Designprocessen kan opfattes som en søge– og konfigurationsproces, der kan
repræsenteres som en gitterstruktur (mat. eng: Lattice). Det vil sige, at det er
muligt at definere en ordningsrelation mellem forskellige designstadier. En de-
signproces består således både af valg mellem forskellige alternativer og af sam-
mensætning af forskellige midlertidige designs. Eksempelvis kan designprocessen
for en bærende bjælke omfatte valg mellem forskellige alternative dimensioner og
materialer, og sammensætning af de egenskaber, der skal til for, at bjælken får
den bæreevne, som er tiltænkt. Der er blevet specificeret en matematisk model
for designrepræsentationer samt en ordningsrelation mellem sådanne. Herved
kan vi udtrykke, at éen designrepræsentation er mere præcis end en anden; dvs.
den bidrager med mere viden om det pågældende artefakt, end den forrige.
Princippet kaldes designgitre (eng. Design Lattices). Designgitre er født til at
understøtte det som kaldes design–inkrementalitet, hvilket vil sige, at objekter,
egenskaber for objekter, og relationer mellem objekter, successivt kan tilføjes en
designrepræsentation. Princippet om designgitre præsenteres og specificeres på
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to forskellige måder i hver sin artikel (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6).
Relevans for industri og forskning: Ved at “fange” designprocesser
og designtrin og relatere dem i et gitter, bliver det muligt at “bladre”
(eng: browse) mellem forskellige designtrin. Yderligere giver det mu-
lighed for bedre at strukturere designprocessen, om end dette ikke er
det primære formål. I nutidens designværktøjer, betragtes design-
processen som en sekvens af tilføjelser og sletninger af objekter. Den
strukturerede designer bør gøre sig sine designtrin bevidst; dvs. vide
hvornår et design er mere specialiseret end et andet, om to forskellige
designløsninger er i konflikt med hinanden, kan kombineres, osv. De-
signgitre tilbyder muligheden for at indbygge dette i designværktøjer
uden at begrænse designerens kreative proces.
1.4.3 Semantisk parametriseret fortolkning
Princippet semantisk parametriseret fortolkning introduceres som en ny software–
arkitektur for begrebsmæssige værktøjer for eksempelvis design og projektering
af bygninger. Idéen er at gøre det muligt at specificere betydningen af egenska-
ber, der refereres til med navne i designmodeller. En sådan specifikation kaldes
her en semantik. Designmodeller udtrykkes nu i et særlig konstrueret modeller-
ingssprog. Ved indførelse af nye navne for egenskaber, specificeres betydningen
af disse i en semantik, som udtrykkes i et dertil konstrueret specifikationssprog.
Der kan nu udføres en fortolkning af begrebsmodellen i henhold til den seman-
tik, som er specificeret. Resultatet er et af mange forskellige præsentationer —
eng: views — af modellen. Eksempler kunne være, visualisering fra forskellige
synsvinkler, beregningsudtryk for stressanalyse, osv.
Relevans for industri og forskning: Inden for forskningsområdet
inkremental design opfattes design som en proces, hvor objekter,
egenskaber for objekter, og relationer mellem objekter tilføjes succes-
sivt til en designrepræsentation. I artiklen Chapter 4 argumenterer
vi, at værktøjer til begrebsmæssig bygningsmodellering skal under-
støtte en sådan inkrementalitet samt, at nye navne for egenska-
ber skal kunne introduceres under designprocessen, efterhånden som
disse er nødvendige for at udtrykke den pågældende designidé. Så-
danne funktionaliteter understøttes ikke af nuværende designværk-
tøjer.
Denne artikel udgør Chapter 4. Hvis egenskaber skal kunne introduc-
eres løbende, uden for megen restrukturering og omprogrammering
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af selve designprogrammet, skal det være muligt at specificere betyd-
ningen af de nyintroducerede egenskabers navne separat. Princippet
om semantisk parametriseret fortolkning udforsker mulighederne for
dette.
Udover det teoretiske arbejde er der udviklet et prototypeværktøj, som demon-
strerer princippet semantisk parametriseret fortolkning. Værktøjet er program-
meret i Standard ML.
1.4.4 Objektaspekter
Reference til fysiske og tænkte objekter som eksempelvis bygninger findes i
mange forskellige former for byggedokumentation. Ord og sætninger, som tænkes
at referere til sådanne objekter, gør dette på to fronter. Den ene front er i form
af de termer, som anvendes. Disse termer kan stå for begreber, under hvilke et
objekt hører. Derved er termen med til at karakterisere og identificere objektet,
baseret på vores normale forståelse af, hvad termen dækker. Den anden front er
at referere til et andet objekt, der står i relation til det pågældende objekt. En
vigtig blandt sådanne relationer er relationen mellem del og helhed. De formelt–
filosofiske teorier har fællesbetegnelsen Mereologi. Imidlertid er Mereologi udsat
for en lang række kritikpunkter.
Begrebet objektaspekt introduceres som en lettere form for reference til fysiske
objekter. Således introduceres relationen mellem objektaspekter som en min-
dre forpligtende relation end den i Mereologi. Begrebet defineres gennem en
filosofisk diskussion, hvori begrebet objektaspekt forsvares imod de vigtigste kri-
tikpunkter af Mereologi.
Relevans for industri og forskning: Arbejdet er et bidrag til forståelsen
af de muligheder og begrænsninger, der ligger i forbindelse med doku-
mentation af fysiske ting såsom bygninger.
1.4.5 Egenskabsteori som fundament for design
Det vises, hvorledes en række filosofiske egenskabsteorier bidrager til forståelsen
af begreberne design, designrepræsentation og designrationalitet. Ved designra-
tionalitet forstås her, hvorledes man kan afgøre om et design opfylder en række
krav; dvs. om designbeslutninger er rationelle i henhold til kravene. Der søges
en filosofisk doktrin, som giver det bedste fundament for at forstå ovenstående
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begrebsdannelser. Klassiske teorier om begreber, egenskaber og semantik tages
her op til vurdering med designbegrebet som udgangspunkt.
Relevans for industri og forskning: I mange anvendelser af design-
repræsentationer og designværktøjer kan man stille sig det spørgsmål,
om den viden, som udtrykkes, kan forstås som mere end en række
(muligvis underforståede) symboler. Nyere filosofiske egenskabste-
orier kæder begrebet egenskab sammen med begrebet kausalitet (dvs.
teorier om årsag–virkning). Udfra en række egenskaber kan man ofte
sige noget om et objekts mulige dispositioner; dvs. hvad det kan. Ek-
sempelvis kan en bropille modstå en vis vægt, hvis den er opbygget
af visse materialer og har visse dimensioner. Man kunne forestille
sig, at en sådan viden (som dagligt udtrykkes eller forudsættes i in-
dustripraksis og gennem forskning) kan indbygges i datamatbaserede
designværktøjer. Herved kunne det blive muligt at udtrække mere
information af de designmodeller, som opstilles.
Ens for ovenstående bidrag og derved en gennemgående rød tråd i afhandlingen
er, hvorledes forskellige former for viden relaterer, og hvordan den bearbejdes og
anvendes som baggrund for dokumentation gennem byggeriets faser. Arbejdet er
derved både et studie i hvilke størrelser, som findes og hvordan de relaterer (dvs.
ontologi), og hvorledes vi kan anvende sådanne erkendelser som fundamenter for
værktøjer og ny teknologi.
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1.5 What this work is not about
We want to emphasize a number of issues which otherwise might lead to a
misunderstanding of how to read this thesis.
Several ideas and concepts — primarily from computer science — are utilized
and introduced in this thesis. That, however, does not mean that the thesis
is about these subjects specifically. They are only to attract attention to the
extent that they serve as inspiration and solutions to the problems considered.
An example is the notion of Galois connections. The notion has been utilized
as a theoretical foundation for relating civil engineering concepts based on set–
theory. However, drawing more attention to the theories surrounding the notion
— like algebra and advanced lattice theory—may remove focus from the subject
in question. We use the concepts in our solutions, but on the individual fields
in which the concepts usually belong, we are not experts. This goes for notions
like denotational semantics, abstract interpretation, term rewriting, etc. These
theories are used in various ways throughout the thesis, but we shall not be
concerned with the research areas of these as in computer science.
Similar holds for the approaches of philosophical kind. Here we have a subject
of which we are certainly not experts. Therefore, we do not intent to present
thorough philosophical arguments which relate to all standard criticism as would
be the proper way in philosophy. We do so, only to the extent that our knowledge
reaches. The thesis is not a philosophical study, but does take philosophical
approaches.
In other words, the thesis may be seen as amateur work on the three fields indi-
vidually. The professionalism — we believe — appears from our combination of
concepts from the three fields. More important, the professionalism comes from
seeing the relations in the domain and how to introduce the various concepts
for its clarification.
In the area of civil engineering and design, the thesis may be criticized for not
considering more empirical examples from civil engineering projects and real
designing. Also, it may be criticized for not relating closely to common civil
engineering practice on the conceptual front. We believe that we relate strongly
on the intrinsic front, but we have made an effort of not founding our analysis
and conceptualisation on existing conventions. That might have destroyed our
possibility to see things clear and from new angles. In addition, our approach
may be criticized for focusing too much on computer science terms. However,
recall that this is our aim and origin.
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1.6 On the use of “we” and “I ”
In the thesis, we shall follow a general principle and write in first person pluralis.
This is ordinary praxis in research, and it indicates that scientific achievements
usually cannot be credited to just one person. In the case of the present the-
sis, inspiration, suggestions, and guidance are due to supervisors, researchers,
philosophers, and authorities in industry. Also, writing in first person pluralis
seems to better motivate the reader to feel involved in the presentation which
is given.
However, another tradition exists in philosophical writings. Most philosophical
literature is written in first person singularis or in some special cases as fictional
conversations. By writing in first person singularis, it is often possible to be
more precise in a presentation or discussion. The tradition may be due to a
consideration of philosophy as a quest in which contributions appear as ideas
and beliefs due to persons as individuals. As individuals, philosophers state their
ideas and relate these to the ideas of other philosophers. Thereby, philosophy
— as a comprehensive study of foundations — is a conversation between the
contributors. For the papers in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9, we have followed the
tradition and written in first person singularis.
1.7 Reading guide
The thesis is a collection of papers which are presented in individual chapters.
After a presentation of related work in Chapter 2 — which may be skimmed
or skipped — we present the papers grouped into parts. The parts are named
by the overall notion of which the papers are concerned. That is: Concepts
(Part II), Design (Part III) and Philosophy (Part IV).
Part II contains Chapter 3, in which we models of two civil engineering concepts
and relate these by means of the mathematical notion of Galois connection.
Part III covers widely and contains Chapter 4, Chapter 5, Chapter 6, Chapter 7,
which all concern design, the process of designing and the foundation for design
tools. We go from some early considerations in Chapter 4 which outlines ideas
for the notion of design lattices and semantic parameterised interpretation. The
notion of design lattices is defined and explored in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
The chapters present two different approaches to defining that same notion and
making a mathematical foundation for incremental design. The foundation for
incremental design tools is further explored in Chapter 7where we suggest a
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new architecture for such tools. This architecture is based on a language– and
semantics–oriented approach. The paper in Chapter 4 has been presented on a
conference on IT in construction. Therefore, formal aspects are not emphasized
in this paper. The papers in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 consider similar issues.
The former has a long introduction to the problem and people who are most
interested in the formal aspects may want to skip some of the first sections. In
the latter, Section 6.2.2 concerns philosophical issues and can be skipped. The
paper in Chapter 7 mixes domain issues, formal aspects and tool considerations.
It can be read with focus on various subjects, but the rather long introduction
may be elementary.
Part IV contains Chapter 8 and Chapter 9. In the former, we are concerned with
the mereological aspects of objects being described as in requirements and design
documents. In the latter, we are concerned with three philosophical problems
in context of designing. The paper in Chapter 8 is best read thoroughly. The
paper in Chapter 9 treats three different design related problems. The sections
dealing with these can be read almost independently.
Part V contains a short presentation of a prototype software system for concep-
tual, incremental design. The implementation is made in order to demonstrate
ideas and principles presented in Chapter 7.
Part VI sums up on the overall thesis results in Chapter 11 and presents general
ideas for future work in Chapter 12.
Appendix A is a short introduction to The RAISE Specification Language (RSL)
which is used throughout the thesis.
Besides reading the papers in the given order, there are two other ways to read
the thesis.
In the former, the philosophical papers are read last and thus considered addi-
tional to the other papers. Here, we can follow two different paths: An ontology–
orientation path which focuses on Chapter 3 and a design–orientation path
which focuses on Chapter 7. Figure 1.1 shows the corresponding dependency
graph.
In the latter way, the philosophical papers are read first as prerequisites to
the other papers. Again, we can follow the two different paths of ontology–
orientation and design–orientation. Figure 1.2 shows the corresponding depen-
dency graph.
As it appears from the figures, Chapter 2 can be read in any sequence with the
other chapters.
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Figure 1.1: Having philosophy as additional.
Models of two civ. eng. concepts...
Chapter 3
From rough to final designs...
Chapter 4
Incremental building design as lattices
Chapter 5
An algrebraic specification...
Chapter 6
Semantic parameterized 
interpretation...
Chapter 7
Object aspects
Chapter 8
Properties and design
Chapter 9, Section 9.4-9.5
Design-orientationOntology-orientation
Properties and design
Chapter 9, Section 9.1-9.3
Chapter 2
Related work
Figure 1.2: Having philosophy as foundation.
Chapter 2
Related work
Research in the area of construction informatics is fragmented in the sense that
many different approaches to handling building information are explored with-
out following strict guidelines. The reason is that we here have a field without
many previous studies. In computer science, we stand on the shoulders of giants
in the areas of logic, theory of computation, mathematics, and philosophy. In
building, we can base research on a long tradition and on much experience. In
the area of construction informatics, this is not so as this field is immature.
Thus, there is no specific works which take the same approaches and treat the
same subjects as we shall do in this thesis. However, there are several important
works which relates to the individual approaches and subjects treated. In the
following, we give a broad overview of some of these works.
2.1 Domain engineering
Domain engineering is the activity of establishing models (i.e. descriptions) of
“real–world” things and phenomena, and it is considered an important founda-
tion for stating requirements to software systems. Early definitions of the notion
of “domains” are due to Arango and Iscoe [4, 104]. Clarification of the rôle of
domain engineering and its description based approach is due to Jackson and
his distinction between machine and environment [108, 109, 106, 107]. Further
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work in the methodology and epistemology of domain engineering as well as
its relation to requirements acquisition and software design is due to Bjørner.
Arango, Jackson and Bjørner have individually claimed a need for intensive re-
search in the methodology of domain engineering, as well as for exploration and
conceptualisation of various domains. The latter, in order for future software
systems to be well founded.
The original motivation for domain engineering is that in order to state require-
ments, a solid understanding of the application domain is necessary. Just as
requirements and design of mechanical systems are expressed using terms and
rules from physics and chemistry, so may software requirements need to be ex-
pressed using terms denoting concepts and objects of the application domain.
Requirements and design specifications may be formal and informal, and effort
should be made for reducing ambiguity and making the specifications ratio-
nal. Domains, on the other hand, are informal and may often be irrational.
In domains, trains crash, people make design mistakes, and protocols disagree.
A description — a model — of a domain should therefore try to capture the
essence of the domain; leaving space for phenomena to appear freely as they do.
An initiate step to grasp and find a structure of complexities in domains, is
to simply describe them. That is, we need to designate and relate fundamen-
tal concepts of the domain. These concepts may represent information to be
processed, entities to be described, and agents operating in the domain.
However, besides being a prerequisite to requirements engineering, domain en-
gineering also has a right of its own. Studying a domain conceptually is like
when biologists study animals in nature. Through observation, describing, and
modelling, the behaviour and characteristics of animals are captured. The es-
tablished models make it possible — to some extent — to predict behaviour and
tendencies.
Models in general have similarities to scientific theories. They contain concepts
references and rules for deducing properties and behaviour of the things or
phenomena modelled, and of the model itself. In computer science, a study of a
domain is an informatic way to establish such a theory. It is so, as mathematical
concepts and principles — together with informal (but systematic) methods of
describing — are applied in the formulation of the model. That is, domain
entities may be modelled as functions, graphs, mappings, sets, lists, etc. A
result of a modelling process may be that a business needs to be rearranged
(business–process reengineering) or even that no software/hardware system will
be of any benefit.
The kernel subject in domain engineering is how to acquire knowledge of domain
entities, how to describe them and how to analyse the descriptions. Hence,
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with its focus on conceptual modelling, the discipline of domain engineering is
intimately related to philosophical notions related to language and semantics.
In domain and requirements engineering, there appears to be at least two distinct
paradigms. The first paradigm focus on capturing the basic structures of a
domain. Such structures are called “the intrinsics” by Bjørner. The second
paradigm is rooted in the notion of goals and aims at establishing agent–oriented
models which capture the individual agendas of agents. It is a paradigm which
is only on the sketch board for domain engineering, but has been a front row
agenda in requirements acquisition for years.
In both paradigms, capturing the individual perspectives of agents is evident.
Still, the two paradigms seem to differ in how much focus these aspects are
going to have. In the first, they assist a common structure which strives to-
wards a fundamental core–model which (ever–)lasts. This, however, is not to
say that there is always one true and correct model. In the second, the notion
of objectivity is degraded in favour of the subjective perspectives and personal
agenda of agents. Following the second paradigm to its extreme, we may con-
clude that the only common structures of a domain appears from negotiation
and compromises between agents.
In the following, we present some early perspectives on domain engineering
due to Arango. Then we shall present Jackson’s and Bjørner’s contributions
representing the first paradigm, followed by the goal–oriented approach of KAOS
representing the second. However, it is important to state that introducing the
notion of goals in domain engineering is quite an unexploited idea. Approaches
like KAOS relate to requirements engineering. Thus, our discussion of the second
paradigm is merely a discussion of prospects for the area of domain engineering.
2.1.1 Arango: some early definitions
Arango and Iscoe consider domain engineering to be indispensable in context of
software reuse. According to Arango, it is the desire for reusable and well–tested
general software components which calls for a thorough study of an application
domain [4, 104, 5].
The central issue of domain engineering is that of domain analysis . It com-
prises the processes of (i) domain characterisation, (ii) data collection, (iii) data
analysis, (iv) classification, and (v) domain model evaluation. The domain char-
acterisation initiates the process of domain analysis. The result is a classification
of domain descriptions and via abstraction, a taxonomical concept structure is
built together with a vocabulary.
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After domain analysis follows the process of conceptual analysis and construc-
tive analysis. The former aims at identifying suitable concept names with which
systems in the domain can be characterised. The latter aims at identifying suit-
able concept names for implementing such systems. Thus, the former concerns
external while the latter internal issues for systems.
The definition of domain engineering outlines a general principle of knowledge
acquisition based on conceptualisation. That is, it is based on observation, data
collection and analysis. However, it is not clear how the moves from stage
to stage (e.g. from data collection to classification) are made nor after what
principles domains are characterised.
2.1.2 Jackson: the machine–environment distinction
Jackson claims that a sharp distinction between domain and requirements must
be made in order for specifications in software development to be clear and
concise [106, 107, 108]. Usually, we cannot tell from a formal specification
whether it is the requirements or design of some system, or whether it describes
the environment in which such a system may be introduced.
Jackson draws a line between system related problems and environment related
problems, which leads to a definition of the notion of domain. Since any kind
of system seems to exist for the purpose of interaction with its environment,
the environment may be of special interest when acquiring knowledge for the
requirements to the system. Jackson uses the term domain in order not to de-
grade its importance. Domain engineering is now a prerequisite to requirements
engineering. The essential domain concepts to which requirements specifications
may refer, exist independently of whether any system is considered.
In order to acquire proper domain descriptions Jackson’s defines the notions of
designation, definition and refutable assertion:
Designations with which we name domain concepts. E.g. “There are doctors,
patients, and medical records”.
Definitions with which delimitation and conventions are made. Else, we may
not be able to capture domain aspects at all. E.g. “A medical record
consists of . . .”
Refutable assertions which are important as only description being refutable
are informative concerning the domain. E.g. “Illnesses are cured ”. If an
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assertion about a domain is not refutable — not falsifiable — we have said
nothing of importance.
What we strive at in a domain engineering process is to increasingly contribute
with knowledge about the domain. Descriptions of such knowledge must be
informative which means that they need to carry significant cognitive knowledge.
We need this such that we intensively can investigate the border which divides
the scopes where a model holds and where it does not.
On the technological side, a domain description D has the rôle that together
with the software design specification and software S it serves as foundation for
judging whether requirements R are met:
S,D ⊢ R (2.1)
2.1.3 Bjørner: language–orientation
The present thesis draws on Jackson’s principles and concepts, but methodolog-
ically it is closest to Bjørner’s work. Bjørner has contributed to the research on
domain engineering by building on Jackson in studying how various domains can
be formally modelled in an informatic way. The results are important contribu-
tions to software engineering methodology as well as conceptual and ontological
clarifications within the areas studied.
The treated domains include the domains of financial systems [24], logistics
[26], health–care [25], railways [31], e–commerce [20, 21], project, production,
planning, monitoring and control [28], and air traffic control [14].
Furthermore, works which in general study the computer science methodology
for domain acquisition, includes: [15, 23, 30]. Bjørner has developed a paradigm
for systematic, semi–formal software development which goes from domain via
requirements to software design. The paradigm is called TripTych [16, 22].
When making models, there appears to be two types: prescriptive models and
descriptive models. A prescriptive model is a model which is associated by an at-
titude indicating the model is normative. A descriptive model is not associated
by such an attitude. Bjørner — following Jackson — takes prescriptive models
to belong to requirements and software design, whereas descriptive models are
the essence of domain engineering. Bjørner makes intensive use of formal spec-
ifications in VDM and RSL, whereas Jackson keeps to simple formalisms like
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predicate calculus.
The primary focus for Bjørner is the “basic stuff” which he calls the the intrinsics
of the domain. The intrinsics of the domain of freight and logistics may be that
of having goods stored in different places and transporting goods from place to
place such that demands and deadlines are met.
Thus, the intrinsics consists of the concepts and structures without which the
domain considered would literally fall apart. If we exclude goods and means
for transportation, we do not have the domain of freight and logistics anymore.
However, we can exclude such notions as trains and trucks for transportation,
as we may simply carry the goods in our bare hands.
The existence of domain concepts and structures may not depend on who is
taking the perspective nor what domain agent to consider. What we strive at is
to put on an objective perspective on the domain and simply describe what is
going on. Thus, we strive towards the common structures of the domain before
looking at tendencies which may be in conflict. At this point, the approach
is distinct from goal–oriented approaches (see Section 2.1.4). The intrinsics of
a domain is modelled as types, and values of these types can be observed by
means of observer functions. Observer functions are the most abstract ways of
formally defining recognition rules for domain concepts.
E.g. we may write an observer function which gives the GPS position of some
goods, or we may write an observer function which gives the set of travels
possible within the restrictions of a time table. Only the signatures of these
functions are specified. The former function may in addition be defined in
requirements by introducing new technology; the latter may not be possible to
define explicitly.
Beside the intrinsics, Bjørner identifies other domain facets like support tech-
nologies , rules & regulations , and management and organisation [29].
The domain descriptions lead to conceptualisation which tries to answer ques-
tions like what does it mean to have a medical record, what is a railway net, etc?
Thereby, we strive towards a clarification of the basic terms and the concepts
they denote. The concepts are modelled in formal specification languages; pri-
marily RSL (The RAISE Specification Language1) [134, 135]. The connection
between the model terms and our understanding is established by various de-
scriptions (rough sketches, narratives, definitions, etc.). Each of these refer to
domain model terms. That is, they designate domain concepts.
1RAISE stands for Rigorous Approach to Industrial Software Engineering.
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One of the important elements in Bjørner’s approach to domain modelling is
the language–oriented understanding of systems [27]. This understanding puts
language and semantics in focus, and the notion of abstract interpretation in
front row. The understanding has been of crucial inspiration for the thesis and
for our treatment of civil engineering and design.
The language–oriented approach utilizes a special way of modelling which is
called semantic modelling. It aims at associating certain domain concepts in a
denotational way. The meaning (denotation) of a time table could be the set
of all possible travels. The value of the time table type is considered a piece of
syntax and the semantic values are travel. The interpretation is here abstract,
and there may be many such abstract interpretations of time–tables. Each of
these present one way of seeing time tables.
The notion of abstract interpretation is here broadened compared to how the
notion is understood in areas like program analysis. In program analysis, ab-
stract interpretation is taken to be an interpretation which is alternative to the
usual denotational or operational definition of the meaning of language con-
structs. Instead of defining the meaning of an assignment sentence as a function
overriding the variable environment, we may define it as a function adding the
variable name to a list of “touched” variables. This list can be used in analysis
of the current program; e.g. for optimisation purposes.
However, in the broad picture, we can not really say that one formally defined
interpretation is more alternative than another, so we might as well cover them
all with the common notion of abstract interpretation.
The principle of linking domain concepts by means of abstract interpretation,
is the very basis for our principle of relating concepts using the Galois approach
(see Chapter 3). Also, it has served as great inspiration to the principle of
semantic parameterized interpretation (see Chapter 7).
2.1.4 Goal–orientation
The second paradigm is that of goal–orientation which originally focused on
requirements acquisition. Ideas now suggest similar approaches for domain ac-
quisition and modelling. Goal–orientation has been a subject in various works
on requirements acquisition, including Lamsweerde’s KAOS2 [117, 166], Castro
and Mylopoulos’ Tropos [44], and Yu’s I∗ notation [174, 173]. In the following,
we shall focus on the KAOS approach.
2KAOS is an acronym for Knowledge Acquisition in autOmated Specification.
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Goal–driven modelling is based on the conviction that goals of agents should
govern the elaboration of systems. The notion of goals is mostly used in context
of requirements, where intentions of agents are analysed and structured into con-
junction and disjunction goal trees [50, 166, 118]. Goals are designated as either
supporting or contradicting in a process aiming at evaluating the importance of
goals against each other.
Bunge defines the notion of goals in context of problem solving [40]. A goal is
an intended state or behaviour of a system. When a goal is an intended state,
we must assume that this means a state relatively to some current state. For
goals that indicate requirements to a system, the current state does not include
the system. A goal of the latter kind is an intended world state in which a
system with certain features is introduced, or it is simply a structure change of
the world. In either case, we can define the notion of goal as a function from
state to state. When a goal is a desired behaviour of a system, we have a similar
structure besides that the function from state to state is the denotation of the
properties of that system. For a clarification on this subject matter, we refer
Chapter 9.
In KAOS, goal trees are used as foundation for assigning responsibilities to
agents. Agents can be software components, autonomous software agents, hu-
man agents, support technologies, etc. By assigning responsibilities to agents,
software architectures for solving overall goals, arise. The idea is that goals in
an organisation lead to requirements in the sense that goals explain and jus-
tify the requirements to a system. The transition from identification of goals
(overall and for each operating agent) to the definition of requirements is per-
formed through a sequence of steps. Each step is governed by three sorts of
pragmatic questions: The What, Why, and How. The steps in KAOS are as
follows [117, 166]:
1. Acquire goal structure and identify concerned objects.
2. Identify potential agents and their capabilities.
3. Operationalize goals into constraints.
4. Refine objects and actions.
5. Derive strengthened actions and objects to ensure constraints.
6. Identify alternative responsibilities.
7. Assign responsibilities to agents.
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The KAOS method has been argued useful in a number of requirements acqui-
sition processes (we refer to papers on goal modelling in general). Its strength,
we believe, is not so much the set of precise steps but the idea of assigning
responsibilities to agents.
However, it seems that applying a goal–oriented method like KAOS in domain
modelling leave us in a dilemma. Focussing on goals makes it difficult to main-
tain a pure descriptive relationship to the domain as such goals are necessarily
captured in a prescriptive way. Forcing goals to be of primary concern and deny-
ing there to be a common conceptual structure turns domain modelling into a
pure negotiation process between conflicting goals. The basis on which goals
are measured in the solution must be rooted in some common domain structure
or in the modellers own intentions. In both cases, steps away from the domain
are taken.
We did try to model aspects of civil engineering by taking a goal–oriented ap-
proach. The scope considered was that of civil engineering projects. Three
incomparable perspectives — quality, economics and time — were identified.
The identification of these three concepts as three different sorts of values with
which to measure project decisions, were hardly any contribution. The solution
of finding a domain model took shape of a quite general negotiation process,
and the informative, discovering process of domain conceptualisation was lost.
Another problem is that in KAOS there is no step in which domain concepts
are designated. Simply, we cannot start with the goals in domain engineering,
as these need to be formulated in terms of domain concepts. If we insist in
formulating goals for each identified agent, these goals may be formulated in
terms which are not cooperative; i.e. different terms may turn out to refer to
the same concept, or the same term may have different meanings in different
goal formulations. We could follow the terminology by Opdahl et al and call
the former construct redundancy and the latter construct overload 3 [132].
Goal–oriented approaches like KAOS were originally and mainly designed for
requirements acquisition. Applying a sharp distinction between requirements
(including early requirements) and domain engineering, seems to make it difficult
for goal–oriented approaches to succeed in domain engineering. The problem,
we believe, is that goal–oriented approaches are highly prescriptive, whereas
domains can only be captured in a descriptive way4.
Still, we cannot deny the fact that there are two aspects of goals or intensions
3However, note that these terms are used in an analysis between ontological concepts and
object–oriented concepts in UML. In our case we have a similar relation, but between terms
and domain concepts.
4according to verbal discussion with Michael Jackson.
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in any domain engineering process. The first is that we do domain modelling
for a reason. That reason may influence our modelling approach and thus shape
the domain model in a certain way. The second is that agents operating in the
domain indeed have personal goals, needs, desires, agendas, etc. The question
is now whether we should root the domain engineering process in a knowledge–
believe–goal orientation, or whether we should try to incorporate agents per-
spective without letting these overwhelm the common domain structure being
modelled. We hold the latter.
2.1.5 Object–orientation
The essence of object–orientation is to work taxonomically with data. By taxo-
nomically, we understand that datatypes can be related by a kind–of relation5.
From this notion, the concept of inheritance is derived. To object–orientation
is also associated certain language features which facilitate data–hiding (encap-
sulation) and parameterized datatypes. The taxonomical aspect and the notion
of parameterized datatypes are dynamic aspects of the semantics, whereas no-
tions like hiding are most often static. The notion of parameterized datatypes
has been successfully incorporated in languages which are not usually considered
object–oriented. Thus, the taxonomical issue seems to be the best characteristic
of object–orientation.
Object–orientation can also be seen as an attempt to simulate the real causal
world (or part of it) in the machine6. Hence, physical objects and phenomena
become objects in a program. However, the analogy does not dictate any use of
classes in favour of types. Neither does it dictate any use of objects in favour of
values. Often a distinction between objects and values is made. In this sense,
objects have names which rigididly distinguish them even though they have the
same properties. Values, on the other hand are identical if the meaning of their
representations are identical. In this sense, there is only one value 7. However,
with abstract types — as in the highly abstract approach in RAISE — it is
possible to model physical objects and phenomena simply by using types and
values. Bjørner and Haxthausen intensively use abstract types this way; e.g. see
[98].
Basically, we see object–orientation as a way of thinking. The more organiza-
tional issues of programs are not really of interest in domain modelling. Thus,
we shall in this thesis not make such distinctions as between types and classes,
or values and objects.
5Also called an is–a relation.
6The first object–oriented programming language was named Simula for this reason [1].
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A deep and thorough study of the formal foundations for object–orientation
and programming languages has been presented by Abadi and Cardelli [1]. The
work goes through basic as well as advanced notions of object–orientation. The
aim is to model object–oriented language features by means of mathematical
calculi. It is argued that many concepts in object–oriented languages root in
similar mathematical abstractions. Modelling object–oriented language features
by means of fundamental calculi, may clarify such issues.
Both functional calculi and object calculi are presented, although the focus is on
object calculi. The object calculi take the notion of objects as primitive, whereas
the functional calculi take the notion of function as primitive. The calculi are
presented in order of increasing complexity starting with the untyped object cal-
culus ς and the corresponding functional λ–calculus. The most advanced object
calculus presented is Obω<:µ which provides features like subtyping, variance,
quantified types and type operations. The most advanced functional calculus
presented is F<:µ.
The papers in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 utilize the fundamental understanding of
objects as records which underlies most of the treatments by Abadi and Cardelli.
Furthermore, a notion like subsumption — formally defined in [1] — is used in
Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, but we assume anti–symmetry to hold as
is the case for sub–classing is sub–typing.
2.1.6 A few words on UML
A trend in the object–oriented area suggests modelling using the Unified Mo-
delling Language (UML) [33]. In the present thesis, The RAISE Specification
Language (RSL7) is primarily used as we find this language suitable for the
designation process applied. It would be messy to use the graphical notation of
UML together with the domain descriptions which designate domain concepts.
The result would necessarily be a separation of UML diagrams and domain
descriptions, in which case the idea of applying one modelling language seems
lost.
A number of problems with UML has been stated. E.g. Opdahl and Henderson–
Sellers claim that the ontological basis of UML has certain problems of ambiguity
and inconsistency [132]. Another, more general problem is that domains are
not always object–oriented. The way we have approached the domain of civil
engineering and design, is not of taxonomical kind. A large number of such
approaches have already been taken. Many of these are of technological and
7A short introduction to RSL is given in Appendix A.
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conventional kind and does not contribute with any real ontological clarification.
Examples are the classification systems of SfB, CBC, BSAB 96 and IFC (see
Section 2.2.4.1–2.2.4.4).
Another reason for not using UML is that language and semantic aspect are
simply not nicely expressed in UML, and for notions like well–formed predicates,
we need to use a formal language like OCL8 anyway.
2.1.7 Other domain studies
Beside the domain studies of Bjørner, several other works have applied RSL or
similar languages for modelling.
An interesting study of RSL and RAISE in domain modelling can be found
in the case study [165]. Among the cases, we found the specification of spatial
concepts relevant to space requirements in civil engineering. Also, the case study
which models object–orientation and design patterns is interesting as it shows
the strength and generality of RSL.
Furthermore, RSL has been used to model railways and public transportation by
Satchok [146], and verification and security systems of railways by Haxthausen
and Peleska [98].
2.2 Relating civil engineering concepts
One of the main contributions of the thesis is the approach of relating domain
concepts by means of Galois connections. Thus, related work to this subject
matter includes other Galois approaches in computer science, other approaches
for relating civil engineering concepts, and classification systems in the construc-
tion industry. A large number of contributions fit into the second category, but
we shall concentrate on Galle’s notion of artefaction and Ekholm’s conceptual
treatments.
8OCL stands for Object Constraint Language.
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2.2.1 Galois connections applied
The notion of Galois connections is a general mathematical notion which is
defined as pair of dual, monotonously decreasing mappings [85].
Between a set of objects and a set of properties there is a Galois connection
which binds sets of objects to their common properties and sets of properties
to the sets of objects possessing them. The connection hierarchically orders
object sets and property sets and thus has been the foundation for theories of
types and classes in computer science. The orders define complete lattices [13].
Thus, the notion of Galois connections and the notion of lattices are fundamen-
tal to the definition of programming languages [161], Formal Concept Analysis
[85], object–oriented modelling [124], and knowledge representation [158]. Other
work which relate to the notion of lattices, includes work on the foundation for
knowledge representation [131, 129] and connections to databases [128]. Gen-
eral principles of and foundations for conceptual modelling are presented in
[158, 48]. More deep ontological considerations focus on notions like identity
[92, 91, 94, 93].
Philosophically, the notion of Galois connections are rooted in the idea that
some objects have common properties and that this common “thing” is a meta–
physical entity. This idea is also known as the idea of “one–over–many” (see
[143] or Section 9.2.2.1 in Chapter 9).
The notion of Galois connections gives the mathematical means for classifying
objects according to their kinds. This way, a set of objects is partitioned into
powersets which are closed under set–inclusion. Similar goes for properties. A
hierarchical structure appears from set–inclusion of objects and the ordering
spans a complete lattice with Top represented by the empty set and bottom
represented by the full set being partitioned. A dual lattice from the ordering
of set–inclusion of properties will always exists.
Haav has worked with the classification possibilities offered by Galois connec-
tions and lattices [96, 130]. The work shows how dynamic classification can be
done without breaking the order consistence of the lattice.
The notion of Galois connections has also been applied in areas which do not
directly relate to knowledge representation and classification. An example is
Ingleby’s attempt to reduce the complexity of model–checking of railway control
and security systems [103]. By assigning properties to railway lines, a Galois
connection is defined. The connection is instantiated and is represented as a
matrix (a formal context) where rows list routes of the railway and columns list
line segments. The application of the Galois connection is now as follows. From
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a formal context stating which routes overlap which lines, a classification can
be made [85]. The result is a complete lattice in which the Top is the set of all
routes and the bottom is the empty set of routes. Analysing the lattice, we can
identify complementary sets of routes. Two sets are complementary if and only
if no node in the lattice represents a set of routes which contains routes from
both, and which is not the empty set.
Model–checking is a task which is likely to explode in complexity. However, the
complexity can be reduced by making a partition of the problem at hand. The
Galois connection and the analysis described above makes it possible to split up
the space of combinations.
Other work which utilizes or explores the application of Galois connections,
include approaches to automatic concept formation [95, 101],
2.2.2 Galle’s notion of artefaction
Galle has described the process of “artefaction” as a process of communication
going through the stages of briefing, designing and making. Through stages
of development, building ideas are expressed and interpreted by agents working
constructively in the domain. Representations include sketches, CAD–drawings,
database schemes, and the results of interpretations lead to productions of re-
vised representations, representations belonging to the next stages of develop-
ment (like from requirements to design), and the artefact itself. The represen-
tations are bound together by means of what Galle calls a relevant successor . A
given design is a relevant successor of a design brief if an only if the agent who
has specified the design brief considers the design to “contain” what has been
expressed in the design brief. For the relation between design and requirements,
we may say that the relevant successor — as a predicate — states that the design
satisfies the requirements. However, it is crucial to Galle, that such judgement
cannot always be based on universal agreement. Rather, the communication
process involves interpretation of symbols, and the notion of relevant successor
is defined ranging over the ideas which are conceived by agents performing the
interpretation. For a more detailed presentation and for a description of how the
work of this thesis relates to Galle’s work in this field, we refer to Section 2.3.2.3.
2.2.3 Ekholm’s treatments
Ekholm has worked intensively with the foundation for conceptual building de-
sign [64, 67, 68, 69] and his work has been published in relation to classification
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projects in building as well as in relation to the BAS•CAAD project [66, 65].
The work is special in that it aims at approaching conceptual building modelling
on the basis of well defined philosophical and ontological notions, mostly due to
Bunge [40, 38].
The works include clarifications on the theoretical foundation for BSAB 96, as
well as studies on construction concepts like work [64] and space [69]. Central
in these studies are the notions of objects, properties, activity, and semantics.
2.2.4 Classification systems in building
We shall consider a number of the most important classification systems: SfB,
CBC, BSAB, and IFC. However, we shall not here consider the important work
of Gielingh, as this work is described in Section 5.2.1, Chapter 5.
2.2.4.1 SfB
SfB stands for Samarbetskommittén for Byggnadsfrågor (eng: Co–ordination
Committee for the Building Trade9). The commitee has contributed to a para-
digm shift in classification of elements, processes, and information in the building
sector [90].
In the middle of the 1940’s, a confusion in construction information and ma-
nagement, was recognized. This confusion was due to the lack of generally
accepted codes for identifying building elements, processes, and information.
New paradigms and patterns of trade were replacing old ones. SfB noticed
that trade could not be the main class in future classification of elements, pro-
cesses, and information. Basically, the sharp borders between disciplines like
HVAC, Electrics, etc. were becoming “blurred’, and a classification paradigm
which could accommodate cross–discipline knowledge were needed. This led to
a focus on a distinction between “what ” and “how ”.
The result of a construction process is a building component; i.e. a part of a
building or a complete building. However, such components may not depend on
“how ” they are constructed. Thereby, a dichotomy between building elements
(“what ”) and construction works (“how ”) was introduced. Also, an additional
class of material was introduced. This class served as a sub-division of construc-
tion works.
9Thanks are due to Prof. Anders Ekholm for clarifying this issue.
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Three tables of concepts were developed and each concept was represented by
a code: Large letters for construction works, small letters in combination with
numbers represented material, and numbers in parentheses represented building
elements. E.g. “Ce4(21)” represents the concept of ground works with sandstone
for external walls. “C” stands for ground work, “e4” stands for the material of
sandstone, and “(21)” stands for external walls.
It is essential that the notion of materials is related as a sub–class to the notion of
construction works and not elements. Material is usually an important factor in
the identification of a construction work; e.g. wood work and steel construction.
Even though the SfB system appears to be simple and not conceptually sophis-
ticated, its development today stands as one of the major break through in the
conceptualisation of construction and construction information. It does so basi-
cally by its distinction between process and product. The way of combining two
incomparable classes — one of construction work and one of building element
— gives a certain flexibility. The fact that we combine two incomparable con-
cepts means that we are in fact performing a kind multiple inheritance, though
only between the two incomparable classes. However, that principle may be
applied thoroughly as suggested by the CBC and in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and
Chapter 6.
Another contribution worth mentioning is that the SfB facilitates multiple view
(multiple interpretations) on the same code. Since classification and codes are
not grouped by trade; the building owner, the architect, and the constructor
have the freedom to put individual “eyes” on the same code. This freedom has
been utilized in CAD programs where the SfB coding system has been used
intensively as foundation for layering systems. A layering system — in CAD —
splits up drawing information using filters.
However, the SfB system does not specify any well–formed conditions for what
combinations of the three tables make sense. The reason may be that it is
defined for non–exclusive classification and is not rooted in natural laws or
Boolean algebra. Simply, if an element does not fit into any given category, a
new category can be created. This process characterises the way in which the
categories in SfB have been developed.
Also, it is clear that SfB and variants have been developed with a focus on syntax
for the representation of codes — a focus the computer science and informatics
disciplines have left long ago. In computer science, it is a growing opinion that
focus in modelling should be on the semantic values and not on syntactical nor
representational [27].
2.2 Relating civil engineering concepts 41
2.2.4.2 CBC
The CBC — mostly due to Bindslev (a presentation of CBC is given in [90])
— draws intensively on the work and experience from SfB. CBC stands for
Co–ordinated Building Communication. Bindslev argues that set theory and
Boolean algebra should be the mathematical foundation for building classifica-
tion system. That is, the ad hoc way of classification in SfB is not satisfactory.
To Bindslev it was non–sense that a code like “Ff” arbitrarily could mean dif-
ferent things depending on in what context it was interpreted. A more strict
approach— focusing only on two different ways of interpreting — was the result.
CBS— as SfB — emphasises the dichotomy of “what ” and “how ” in classification
and in coding. Each double code represents a class of “activity types”. Each
type is a set of activities which produce the same sort of building element and
by the same sort of construction. The types are not further partitioned into
sub–classes but additional numbers are taken to do this job. The numbers are
introduced ad hoc in order not to restrict the necessary distinctions of activities
to be defined in a standard set of classes. As in SfB, different interpretations can
be made of the same code. However, in CBC, the only two ways of interpreting
codes, exist: as activity and as result .
The main contribution of the CBC is its arrangement of concepts within each
of the tables. This arrangement strives towards a real classification based on
Boolean algebra, although it does not put effort on multiple inheritance. As
in SfB, CBC identifies three facets of building: elements, construction and re-
sources. This is the viewpoint of the architect; the reverse order is the viewpoint
of the contractors.
The perspective seems logical, but also unnecessary complicated from a mereo-
logical point of view. We may simplify things by saying that elements consist
of parts and that each part is an element as well. We thus end up with the
mathematical founded and flexible notion of bill–of–material as in [61, 17, 18].
Also, the distinction between element and resources is context–dependent. From
the view point of the supplier, a pre–cast concrete wall is an element to be
produced, whereas from the view point of the contractor on the building site,
it is a resource. We believe that a more flexible perspective — hence, better
principles for classification — can be found in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5.
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2.2.4.3 BSAB 96
The BSAB 96 system is a successor of the SfB and CBC systems, although it
is considered the “not–SfB system”. The system is an approach to classification
as well as system definition of buildings, and it is theoretically rooted in a more
thorough study of meta–physics than its predecessors [35].
BSAB 96 defines a number of main categories for classification:
construction complex. By a construction complex is understood a “a collec-
tion of adjacent construction entities, serving one or more user activities
or functions”.
construction entity. By a construction entity is understood “an artefact, per-
manently attached to the ground, which independently enables a user ac-
tivity or function”.
element. By an element is understood “a part of a construction entity, which
fulfills a predominating function in the construction entity.
designed element. By a designed element is understood an “element ” seen as
something providing functionality to the surroundings. In BSAB terms:
“a technical solution of an element ”.
work result. By a work result is understood an “element ” seen as the physical
result of production or maintenance. In BSAB terms: “a result of an
activity on the construction site for the production of [a] part of or a
whole construction entity”.
space. By a space is understood “a three dimensional material construction
result which can be used for a certain purpose and has a defined extension
within, or in connection to a construction entity”.
resource. By a resource is understood the things or services consumed in a
construction activity. Examples aremanpower, construction products, ma-
chines, etc.
construction product. By a construction product is understood “a product
intended for incorporation in a construction entity”.
The definition of construction entity as something attached to the ground we
believe is weak. It is hardly a sufficient criteria, and the distinction between
entity and complex also seems to be confusing. A similar problem of ambiguity
seems to exist between the notions of construction entity and element. Also,
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notice that the notion of construction product, being a resource, is not defined
as a kind of element.
Common to SfB, CBC and BSAB 96 is a kind of confusion between the rôles
played by parts in a building. The confusion appears in BSAB 96 in that several
concepts seem to denote the same; namely the concept of a physical thing ha-
ving spatial extension. In BSAB, we have the distinctions between construction
complexes, construction elements, and elements. However, we believe that this
distinction is made on weak ontological grounds; primarily for mereological rea-
sons. Certainly, a construction complex like a university consists of a collection
of buildings, and certainly these buildings consist of walls, ceilings, doors, etc.
But where exactly should we draw the distinctions? A building being part of
a university complex may as well be considered a construction complex. Even
a single exterior wall can be considered a construction complex as it consists
of parts which again consist of parts, etc. The confusion, we believe, is rooted
in two problems. The first is the mereological problem of universally making
a distinction between parts and wholes conceptually. This issue has been dis-
cussed in Chapter 8. The second problem is that the hierarchy of parts (from
construction complexes to elements) is not defined recursively, as suggested in
Chapter 5.
2.2.4.4 IFC
The Industrial Foundation Classes (IFC ) is a conceptual framework and classi-
fication system aimed for achieving interoperability between different software
applications in different industries. A technical presentation of IFC is given in
[123]. Discussions on application of IFC in Sweden is given by Ekholm et al
in [70]. The IFC is developed and maintained by the International Alliance of
Interoperability (IAI ). This organisation out springs from AutoDesk c©.
The IFC is a collection of base classes divided into four layers. The idea is
to offer a collection of standard classes to which applications can refer, and
thereby get a common basis for interoperability. The idea is distinct from that
of founding all applications on the same conceptual structure. Each application
can have its own conceptual structure and then “derive” common classes from
IFC. These classes can be specialised within the current application following
the common principles of class inheritance in object–orientation. The four layers
of IFC are: the resource layer, the core layer, the interoperability layer, and the
domain layer.
The resource layer offers a set of classes which are considered to be general
characteristics of objects in industrial software applications. It includes classes
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for geometry, actors, date and time, measures, etc.
The core layer offers classes which are fundamental for knowledge representa-
tion like objects, properties, and relations. The three classes have one superclass
which is called the Root. The Root contains attributes for storing general ad-
ministrative information like owner history, name, and descriptions. The object
class is specialised into the classes of: product, control, actor, project, process,
and resource. The resource class is, however, not to be confused with the re-
source layer; nor with the classes on this layer. The sub–classes of the object
class are further specialised and decomposed.
The interoperability layer serves as connection point between applications of
different disciplines and working differently with data of equal kinds.
The domain layer can be seen as a layer on which base classes of the other layers
are specialised to fit conventions of a certain application domain. Application
domains include HVAC, Electrical, Architecture, or Facilities Management.
IFC has been subject to various criticism. Ekholm states that IFC is established
on a foundation which lacks of basic philosophy [70]. In general IFC lacks of
precise definitions of the individual classes, and each class seems too general
to be of much use. It is argued that IFC focus too much on CAD application
even though notions like actors and project are included. Also, it is not clear
how the interoperability principle is going to work. As an example, Ekholm
states that the notion of property sets are included in IFC. However, there is no
specification of how to introduce new kinds of properties and how these are to
be linked to the IFC class of property sets, if this can be done at all within the
framework of IFC.
We shall, however, emphasize some other issues on which we find IFC weak and
not satisfactory as a framework for our study of civil engineering and design.
The first issue is that IFC does not seem to be founded on a sound ontological
and philosophical basis. This reflects in some inconsistencies and confusion on
terminology. In the following, we list (in random order) some of these.
• Defining notions like properties and relations as classes introduce a con-
fusion as it is then uncertain how to understand the instances of these
classes. Are they objects?, and in what sense do they differ from instances
of the object class? Also, what is the connection between instances of a
property class and the attributes of the object class? Ontologically, they
both aim at characterising the object in question.
• The class of properties are partitioned into several sub–classes. One is
for so–called single value properties; another is for so–called enumerated
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value properties. It seems like a structuring of properties based on Boolean
algebra might clarify this distinction by applying restrictions on the value
sets of a property. This is to some extend the approach taken in Chapter 5,
Chapter 6, and Chapter 7.
• IFC makes a distinction between products, actors, and resources. How-
ever, this distinction seems to be conventional rather than ontological.
Basically, all instances of the three classes are resources; hence, the class
of products and actors might as well have the resource class as super–class.
• Furthermore, the generality of the class definitions yields trouble for the
class of decomposition. Decomposition is considered a sub–class of rela-
tions. However, there is not restriction which permits cycles.
• It seems like we with IFC have a lot of classes and that many of these
have been introduced when they have been needed. Thus, the hierarchy
of classes seems not to be founded on considerations of the ontological com-
mitments the classes induce. E.g. we have five different sorts of relations.
Among these, we have a definition–relations which is hardly relations in
the ontological sense.
The second issue is that IFC defines the relations between concepts (funda-
mental like geometry as well as domain specific) by convention. Concepts are
not related because they can be justified to satisfy ontological rules like sub-
sumption, or similar rules over the structure of concept models. Thereby, the
conceptual system becomes more a political and conventional contribution than
a technological one. In Chapter 3, we have outlined a way of relating domain
models using a semantic approach. The approach is based on the notion of Ga-
lois connections which mathematically bind models of concepts together. The
predicate on which a Galois connection is based specifies how the two concepts
relate. Applying this kind of analysis — rooted in good modelling methods, in
mathematics, and in philosophy — we believe would benefit the IFC.
2.2.4.5 Other
Other works on product models and frameworks include the STEP approach [6],
the application of the language Prolog in design and manufacturing [56], and
studies of the dynamics of data in civil engineering and design [57].
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning studies of the foundation for conformance
checking [52], conceptualisation of civil engineering with computational perspec-
tives by Rezgui, Cooper, Björk, Froese, and Paulson [138, 162], and approaches
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in general for coupling civil engineering project information by Turk, Bjök, et
al [163, 32, 89].
2.3 Design
Our work on design relates to philosophical, operational and representational
issues. In the following, we shall consider related work in these areas.
Furthermore, general concepts and principles for systematic and successful re-
quirements and design acquisition, and communication has been presented by
Cherry [45] and Salisbury [145].
2.3.1 Philosophy and fundamentals
In this thesis, we have partly turned philosophy of design into philosophy of lan-
guage and metaphysics. Thus, an actual survey on design from a philosophical
perspective, and with contributors on the field of design, has been limited works
by Schön, Galle, Ekholm, and Alexander.
Work which indirectly has been of inspiration, includes Gärdenfors’ notion of
conceptual spaces [86] and various selected sections in the works of Bunge [40,
38, 39, 37, 36].
2.3.1.1 Schön
Schön’s work stands as one of the main contributions to design and architectural
thinking. The work of Schön spans broad and covers practical issues, epistemo-
logical aspects as well as issues relevant to the philosophical area of scientific
discovery. In some sense, his notion of seeing–as , has served as inspiration to
the papers in Chapter 7 and Chapter 9. Still, the connection to Schön is in
these papers is quite loose. Schön’s work, definitions, principles, and perspec-
tives have influenced many design researchers. One is Valkenburg and Dorst’s
analysis of design teams [164].
Schön favours a perspective on design as a process of communication; not a
target–oriented problem solving process [149]. In traditional problem solving,
all information needed is present from the beginning. The process of reaching a
solution (e.g. a design configuration) can be described as variable assignments
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such that the design constraints — derived from the requirements — are satis-
fied. Schön rejects this as a proper understanding of most design processes. It
is hardly a fruitful approach when designing complex artefacts like buildings as
the number of constraints and dependencies may be huge, and some constraints
even impossible to define explicitly. Also, we may not succeed in approaching
a design in a strictly compositional way. What might seem badly at first may,
taking another view, turn out to contribute positively to the solution.
The classical Petra–Smith conversation illustrates this. Through iterations of
design elaboration, a solution is approached. The essence is this. We need to
focus on one aspect (a discipline) and work that through; ignoring its relation
to the surroundings and other constraints. We then rewind and start over again
by putting on another perspective or taking up another discipline. The process,
Schön says, is a kind of conversation with the situation. This conversation aims
at contributing to the awareness of problems and possible solutions in each
iteration. Schön also calls it a reflective conversation with the situation. It is
reflective because the design is iteratively revised based on ideas conceived when
reviewing the design iteratively.
The knowledge of the practitioner is not entirely something prerequisite to the
design process. There are knowledge which is conceived during the reflection
process and there are knowledge which is tacit. By tacit knowledge, we un-
derstand knowledge of which we may be unaware or which may be difficult to
describe or explain. An example is the knowledge of how to ride a bike.
A practitioner like a designer makes many judgements about the quality and
correctness of representations, products, and decisions. But it may be without
any clear and explicable criteria. And the practitioner may display skills of
which there are no explicitly defined algorithms. We act on the situation as we
reflect on that situation and the actions we are performing: reflection in action.
An example of reflection in action is jazz musicians playing and improvising.
Sometimes reflection makes them collectively increase in volume or tempo; other
times they get inspiration from each other to turn the music in certain directions.
Through listening they feel where the music is going. Knowing the music score
intimately, its variations, and their own abilities, makes it possible to perform
a kind of top–down approach, but along the way things happen, which require
adjustments to the situation in a bottom–up manner.
The idea of focusing on a discipline has been adopted (modelled) in the notion
of design lattices (see Chapter 5) where a design process can go in various
directions which can be combined.
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2.3.1.2 Alexander’s patterns
Alexander’s contributions to the area of design, and especially architectural
design, has been tremendous. We shall not cover all aspects of his contributions
but merely focus on the notion which mostly relates to the work in this thesis
— the notion of patterns [3].
Alexander is concerned with the structure of buildings — not the mereological
aspects — but the intentional perspective on objects and the many problems
that arise in that area. He recognizes that the world — and especially the
world of architecture — is filled with things repeating again and again. Curves,
dimensions, combinations of materials, etc. are like patterns that we see every-
day. If every church is different in the sense that they occupy distinct extensions
in space, how come are they all considered to be churches. Certainly, notions
like use, rôle and conventions may be part of the definition of what it means
for something to be a church, but such notions may be insufficient for proper
and precise definitions. There may be such things as objective and universal
patterns which repeat themselves in things we consider to be alike; an episte-
mological perspective shared with realists on properties like Russell. At this
point, Alexander’s considerations relates to our study of properties in design
(see Chapter 9).
The notion of pattern is defined by “morphological laws of the form:
X → r(A1, A1, . . .)
The law reads: in a context of type X , between the elements Ai there is a
relation r. Recursion is now introduced such that a law itself can be a pattern.
Thereby, Alexander avoids having to separate elements from relations.
On defining patterns explicitly, three things need to be identified: the sorts (the
what), the pragmatics (the why) and placement in space and time (the where
and when).
Here, Alexander works quite intentionally and suggests questions to be asked
in the reflection process. Such questions could be: “What is solved by putting
a door here?”, or “what does it for a room to raise the ceiling?”, etc. One of
the examples considers a living room which on the one hand must satisfy the
requirement of letting members of the family be together, and on the other hand
allow members to work separately on their individual hobbies and being able to
leave things from day to day. Finding a solution to this design problem needs
clarification on the various needs.
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The solution defines a room with a number of large alcoves. The solution is an
example of a pattern which can be applied whenever the mentioned intentional
forces are present. The work [3] is Alexander’s, Ishikawa’s, and Silverstein’s
suggestions to a series of patterns going from development of towns to design of
interieur.
The idea of patterns — even though normative — seems similar to the notion of
intrinsics in domain engineering (see Section 2.1.3). More precisely, our models
of domain intrinsics may follow Alexander patterns as certain concepts are best
modelled as graphs and other as sets. Furthermore, the definition of a semantics
for interpreting conceptual design models — as suggested in Chapter 7 also
brings the notion of patterns to mind. What appears again and again may not
be the various semantics, but the specification of sorts due to the limitation in
language (see argumentation in Chapter 7).
2.3.1.3 Galle
Galle often claims a commitment to Platonism in context of design [81, 83].
However, as argued in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9, a possible worlds perspective
is often just as good and in some cases better. Galle identifies an ontological
dilemma when it comes to the notions of design and design representation: What
are the entities that designers describe and what do they mean? The question
is called the problem of the absent artefact and is defined by Galle in [80]. We
treat this problem in Chapter 9.
The ontological space suggested by Galle defines a dichotomy between abstract
entities and concrete entities. The abstract space is divided into that of concepts
and ideas (platonic objects). Concrete entities include such objects as physical
buildings, digital design databases, drawings, scale models, etc. Concrete enti-
ties have abstract counterparts. The link between abstract and concrete space
is established by a two way relation. From abstract to concrete, we have the
relation (or the act) of production. From concrete to abstract, we have the re-
lation (or the act) of interpretation. It is essential in Galle’s ontology, that the
result of an interpretation is an abstract entity. Often in computer science we
use the notion of interpretation (or abstract interpretation) to mean the process
of interpreting as well as the representational result of such a process. In this
sense, a document can be considered an interpretation of another document.
To Galle, that would be comprising of three actions: interpretation (giving an
abstract entity), getting the meaning (as an act going from one abstract entity
to another), and production (projecting the latter abstract entity into the causal
space).
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A design model like a drawing has a meaning as interpreting it yields an abstract
counterpart. The meaning of this counterpart is the counterpart of an artefact.
This artefact may or may not exist physically, but it can be brought into being by
means of production. The abstract counterparts of physical entities fall under
concepts which are abstract as well. E.g., we have the concepts of drawings,
drawing databases, etc. There may be a whole hierarchy of such concepts. The
counterparts are said to be examples of drawings, drawing databases, etc. The
concepts of drawings, drawing databases, etc. are rooted in the common concept
of models. In a sense, we may say that model–concepts are propositions. The
abstract counterparts of physical entities like buildings do not fall under the
concept of models. Here, Galle makes a distinction — a distinction, we try
to break in Chapter 9. The abstract counterpart of a certain building, falls
under the concept of buildings, and the concept of buildings is a sub–type of
the concept of artefacts.
2.3.1.4 Ekholm
Ekholm’s work has influenced theoretical as well as practical areas of design;
especially the areas of classification and the ontological foundations for design
tools. As in other areas, Ekholm’s work is rooted in the philosophy and ontology
of Bunge. Ekholm draws— as Bunge— a sharp distinction between two kinds of
properties: Intrinsic properties and extrinsic properties. The former are the kind
of properties which are solely connected to the object. These are the properties
an object possess independently of any relation it may have to the environment.
The latter are the kind of properties an object has in virtue of its relation to
its environment. Ekholm suggests that extrinsic properties are what makes an
object offer certain functionality. Thus, the extrinsic properties are interesting
when modelling the interface between the object and its environment. Contrary,
intrinsic properties concern the internal structure of an object; e.g. shape and
material.
A system — like a designed artefact — is a collection of parts composed in a
certain way. The functional view on a system emphasizes the extrinsic properties
and thus the systems ability to interact with an environment in certain ways.
The compositional view emphasizes the intrinsic properties, the parts, and the
internal structure of the system.
In the thesis, we have followed the ontology of Shoemaker in excluding extrinsic
properties in favour of relations. We believe that in fact such notions as shape
and material properties are what makes an object offer certain functionality.
The relation to which an object stands to its environment is — besides its
spatio–temporal position — to be seen as the causal dispositions possessed by
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the object. A more detailed study on this subject can be found in Chapter 9.
2.3.2 Operational issues of design
The operational issues of design are centred on the notion of design moves as a
means for going from stage to stage. In the following, we consider related work
contributing to the clarification of the design process and of the cognitive and
concrete moves performed in these.
2.3.2.1 Schön’s notion of design move
The changes made by the design practitioner when in action, Schön calls the
moves. A move may be sketching something, starting all over again, etc. In
our thesis, we have adopted Schön’s notion of design moves as those made in
design processes. Where our view significantly differ from Schön’s is in our aim
of defining such moves explicitly. This aim is, however, not to be seen as an
attempt to restrict the free reflective process of designing. The aim is to capture
the moves being made and the elaboration of designs in a systematic way. Still,
we endeavour that the designer is aware of the moves being made which is a
view supported by Schön when he focus on the problem naming stage and the
reflection aspects of design.
In addition, Schön argues that the collection of moves spans a kind of web with
many branches. This idea seems compliant with what we call design lattices in
Chapter 5.
2.3.2.2 Ekholm’s principle of incrementality
Ekholm understands design as a problem solving process. A problem — fol-
lowing Bunge — is defined as “[a] lack of solution knowledge” [40]. The design
process is considered an iterative process. From the formulation of a problem,
we identify the interface between the environment and a potential system. Via
synthesis, a tentative design solution is sketched and through analysis it is ver-
ified against the problem at hand. Synthesis may be regarded as going from a
functional view to a compositional view, while analysis may be regarded as going
the opposed way. The analysis aims at identifying the properties of the system
needed. The result of the analysis is added to the knowledge already present
and further iterations can be made based on a revised problem definition. The
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analysis also indicates whether a satisfactory design solution has been reached
in which case no more iterations are needed. This cyclic process is also called
the Generator–Test Cycle by Simon [154].
The principle of incrementality is fundamental to Ekholm’s understanding of
design and it is a principle that to a large extent has been adopted for this
thesis.
The paper presented in Chapter 4 is the result of collaboration with Ekholm.
The collaboration also motivated for the elaboration of ideas for the kind of
conceptual design systems outlined in Chapter 7.
2.3.2.3 Galle’s notion of artefaction
Galle considers — as Schön — the design process to be a process of commu-
nication. He defines the notion of artefaction which is a process of specifying,
designing, and producing artefacts [79]. An artefaction process goes through
stages in which ideas and solutions are communicated between agents. Self–
communication is here a special case.
For artefaction to be successful is for the communication to be successful. To
illustrate this, Galle has made a generic model of communication between two
agents, and stated a condition for successful communication.
The model relies heavily on what Galle calls a relevant successor denoted c1 ⇒
c2. It is a two–argument predicate which applies if and only if whatever a
certain agent interprets from c1 it will also interpret from c2. In this sense, it is
a special version of implication ranging over representations being interpreted
by agents, or simply over agent ideas. We shall here override ⇒ for both. The
communication between an agent A and an agent B can now be described as
follows10:
1. A conceives an idea IA and expresses this idea to an agent B by a symbol
s1.
2. B interprets the symbol s1 and conceives an idea IB.
3. B conceives another idea I ′B which (to B) is a relevant successor of IB.
4. B expresses the idea I ′B to A by a symbol s2.
10The number of steps can be reduced if A=B.
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5. A conceives an idea I ′A according to the symbol s2.
The communication is successful if and only if A considers I ′A a relevant suc-
cessor of IA.
Figure 2.1 is similar to the figure given in [79], except that we state two possible
failure situations instead of one.
IA IA IB IA
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I ′B
s1
s2
IB
I ′B
IA
IA
I ′A
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I ′B
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I ′A
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I ′B
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A B
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Figure 2.1: Communication Model
The model is instantiated into a part of the domain of civil engineering by
introducing three types of agents: the client , the designer , and the maker . The
process of artefaction now goes as follows. The client expresses a need in a design
brief. The brief is interpreted by the designer who makes a design. If the design
is a relevant successor of the design brief, this communication is successful. The
design is further interpreted by the maker, and so on.
The essence of the model is that between representations, there are relevant
bindings which relate knowledge and things through stages of building projects.
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Galle’s notion of relevant successor and the model of communication has been an
important inspiration source for the development of the notion of design lattices.
In such lattices, a partial order between design representations is explicitly and
formally defined. The design representations are called artefact models and
correspond to the bubbles in Galle’s diagram.
However, we had to freely interpret how to understand the bubbles in the di-
agram. The diagram was meant to be a pictorial intuitive presentation, not a
very formal one. Bringing on the formal “machinery”, demands an answer to
the question of what the bubbles in the diagram represent. It cannot be objects
as in a possible worlds semantics. That would lead to the mistake that a set of
objects is a relevant successor of another if the former subsumes the latter. The
implication must go the other way. The Galois connection between objects and
common properties, reversing the ordering, calls for understanding the bubbles
as sets of properties of an object. This is a consistent model, but it is insuffi-
cient if several individual objects are considered part of the same artefact. A
solution is to introduce representations which comprise both taxonomical and
part–whole information as is the case with artefact models presented in Chap-
ter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.
2.3.2.4 Operationalisation of needs
Alexander and Poyner make some fundamental definitions concerning needs in
the process of building design [2]. The foundation is the idea that there are no
such thing as objective truth and that it therefore is not possible to write an
objective and “correct” programme which yields some actual physical geometry
of the building in mind.
The elaboration of a design program must start by identifying the needs of the
users of the building. The problem is now that the notion of needs is not a
well defined concept. Alexander and Poyner therefore replace the seemingly
static notion of needs with an operational notion of tendencies . By a tendency
they understand something which users would usually do, like moving closer
to the window or turning up the heat. Tendencies can be tested by means of
observation; needs cannot. A similar observation turns goals into intrinsics in
domain engineering (see the discussion of the two paradigms in Section 2.1.3
and 2.1.4).
The design problem — the programme — is now to find a physical environment
which meets the needs in shape of tendencies. The aim of that environment,
and thus the aim of introducing a system like a building, is to open up for
the possibility that people can act as they like. There will always be multiple
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conflicting needs but to Alexander and Poyner these are due to the conditions
under which the needs are considered. In general, they believe that there can
always be a design which solves all conflicts without putting on priorities. At
this point, we disagree. To us, design includes defining priorities in order to
solve certain unavoidable conflicts.
In both cases, conflicts are solved by introducing geometrical or topological
relations between objects. We begin with the empty set of relations (assuming
no conflicts) and then add relations alternately in order to solve the conflicts
when discovered. However, we only want to state a minimal set of such relations.
Adding more relations than necessary may yield unnecessary restrictions.
The design approach which is presented is — concerning the incremental ap-
proach — similar to the one taken in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. We share the
idea of starting with the empty configuration, although we have not explicitly
incorporated the notion of needs nor tendencies in our work. In essence, there
is no concept of activity or observation of behaviour in the models presented in
the thesis. In this sense, we have not as Alexander and Poyner aimed at model-
ling the design process in its intrinsics, but in its representational and step–wise
aspects.
2.3.2.5 Refinement in software engineering
The notion of refinement in systematic software specification and development
has a special connection to the ideas of building design and design lattices
presented in this thesis. The connection is the analogy of relating specifications
in an order–theoretic way.
The overall idea of refinement is as follows. We consider specification languages
to be special programming languages having features which are not all com-
putable. These features makes it possible to easily express requirements and
designs of software systems. However, in order to reach a software specification
which can be implemented, the use of the special features need to be elimi-
nated. Thus, the use of the features need to be substituted with corresponding
computational constructs.
The process can be done step–wise and is called refinement [9, 10, 126]. An
underlying calculus is called a refinement calculus. A refinement of a statement
S into a corresponding statement S′ via a command α should satisfy certain
conditions to ensure semantic consistency. We write S ≤α S′ to denote that S′
is a refinement of S. This means that whatever S means, so does S′. In practice,
the partial order is applied on predicates that applies to S and S′. Thus, the
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partial order on predicates (P ≤ Q) is logical implication (P ⇒ Q).
The refinement principle and the partial order ≤ is quite similar to the principle
of design lattices, and the partial order of design stages, presented in Chapter 5
and Chapter 6. However, we take the ordering symbol ≤ to apply in the opposed
way as we take a ≤ b to mean that a is more specialised than b because the
space of interpretation is restricted.
In refinement, a predicate P usually states the weakest pre–condition. That is,
at least P must hold after the execution of a statement from the initial state. A
similar philosophy founds the notion of design lattices and the notion of lattices
is present in research on software refinement as well [168]. Each design stage
ascribes a certain set of properties, relations, objects, and decompositions, to a
model. These can be seen as predicates ranging over artefacts (abstract or con-
crete) which satisfy the criteria of having (at least) these properties, relations,
objects and decompositions.
2.3.2.6 Other
In addition, several other works provide important perspectives on the process of
design and on design moves. A prominent of these is Roozenburg’s and Eekels’
definition of the design process as an iterative process involving sketches and
evaluation according to values [139]. The desire for certain values is the reason
for making changes. Such values could be to relax by sailing on the ocean in
weekends. The means for doing so is what Roozenburg and Eekels calls the
function. Sailing on the ocean requires a boat, and certain properties are then
necessary for reaching this functionality for an artefact. These are the properties
which make it possible for an artefact to sail, and from the properties we derive
a certain form for the artefact. Thus, the process of designing is a goal–oriented
process of reasoning going from values in life via function and properties to form.
2.3.3 Representational issues of design
The representational issues of design are centred on how to represent models of
artefacts. We shall consider approaches for object representations, the notion of
complex objects, and core–models aimed at facilitating smooth communication
and knowledge sharing.
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2.3.3.1 Objects as records
A common model of objects is to consider these as records of attribute–value
pairs. This model has been suggested and thorougly explored by Cardelli [42].
The model reduces the complexity of handling objects to a minimum. Further-
more, it emphasizes the notion of subsumption of types, and orders object types
in lattice structures. The notion of subsumption is important to the notion of
design lattices as presented in Chapter 5. It is so in the sense that it is the
mathematical foundation for incrementally ascribing properties to objects. The
notion of subsumption is defined in Chapter 7 as well as in [1]. Also, the notion
of multiple inheritance has been of inspiration to the papers in Chapter 5 and
Chapter 6. The notion has in these papers been carried out thoroughly in the
sense that the type–structures of objects form complete lattices. Furthermore,
the understanding of objects as records has been borrowed for the design of the
modelling language presented in Chapter 7.
However, the general model of objects as records does not facilitate a distinc-
tion between properties that are intrinsic and properties that extrinsic. Neither
does it facilitate a distinction between taxonomic information and part–whole
information. Thus, attribute–value pairs are used in the same way for represent-
ing colour information of cars and the wheels of cars. The three ontologically
distinct sorts of information are not distinguished by the notation. In Chap-
ter 6, we have made effort making such a distinction, extrinsic properties are
excluded in favour of relations. A discussion of the distinction between intrinsic
and extrinsic properties is also given in context of the problem of prediction in
Chapter 9.
2.3.3.2 Complex objects
Many different approaches have been taken to represent objects in a mathema-
tical way. In focus is the problem of representing and handling what is called
complex objects . A complex object is an object which may be composed by
several other objects. That is, complex objects introduce a part–whole relation.
The problem is that the attractive lattice representation — which is useful for
representing taxonomic class relations — may not be attractive if also part–
whole relations are to be incorporated.
Bancilhon and Khoshafian have suggested a calculus for complex objects which
puts a focus on part–whole representation in favour of taxonomic relations [12].
Objects are defined recursively as records of attribute–value pairs where values
are objects too. An object can also be a single value of a base type like integer.
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A partial ordering is now defined on object in the way that an object x1 is a sub–
object of an object x2 if and only if x2 (at least) has the attribute–value pairs
of x1. The definition of partial order is defined recursively over the hierarchical
structure of objects.
The approach is fundamentally distinct from ours (see e.g. Chapter 6) and from
Cardelli’s. The difference is that for complex objects the order is reversed such
that having more attribute–value pairs and sub–objects means less specialised.
That is, [a : 1, b : 3] ≤ [a : 1, b : 3, c : 4] holds. This leaves us with a dilemma
concerning specialisation. The problem, we believe appears from structuring
according to taxonomic and part–whole information in the same lattice. Sepa-
rating values of properties from objects solves this problem, as shown in Chap-
ter 6.
2.3.3.3 Core models and knowledge sharing
The notion of core models is an approach to product modelling which is rooted
in the idea that various perspectives and applications of data need a tidy and
common conceptual structure. Various works built more or less on the notion
of core models. The problem of having common models is central to that of
knowledge sharing.
Important work on product modelling and foundations for data exchange has
been done by Eastman [60].
Hendricx has recognised that computers usually do not come into play in design
until the late stages [99]. At these stages, most of the design of the building
in question has been completed. The work of Hendricx aims at establishing
a so–called core–model which facilitates design through the various stages of
design. The model facilitates that design can be split up i abstractions suitable
to the designer. Thus, we may have a masterplan level in which buildings are
simply solid blocks; we may have a type level in which rooms and spaces are
identified; etc. At each level, the practitioner can use the sort of information
he or she is familiar with. The aim of the underlying core–model is to “glue”
all pieces of information together; thereby, relating the stages consistently. An
inspiration for the work has here been de Waard’s contribution of conformance
checking in civil engineering and design [52]. The work uses the methodology of
M.E.R.O.D.E (Model–driven Entity–Relationship Object–oriented Development
[53]).
Ekholm, Fridqvist, and van Leeuwen identify the need for reducing the number
of concepts such that context free design systems can be made. They draw on
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ideas from Hendricx, and Fridqvist’s doctoral thesis on the BAS•CAAD system
is one example of an application (see Section 2.4.3).
Galle rejects that design communication is to be based on a large, complex, in-
ternational classification standard. Rather formal notations close to the way we
use natural language should be used [82]. Jacobsen’s doctoral thesis suggests
that small inter–application models may solve such problems as consistency
when different applications have to manage different aspects of designs or other
building information [110]. The models, we understand as point–to–point pro-
tocols which maintain consistency of building information by a set of updating
and translation rules.
2.4 Design tool considerations
The science of computer aided design (CAD) is the study of how to express
forms and features with finite sets of characteristics. As a sub–problem, we
have the problem of visualising designs using a finite set of properties. The
science of CAD emerged from this sub–problem but has expanded as a science
to a conceptual level. At this level, models of artefacts are objects to which
properties are ascribed and behaviour defined.
2.4.1 Turk
Turk has worked intensively in the interdisciplinary area in which computer
science and civil engineering merge. The study is broad and range over areas
like conceptual product modelling [170], philosophy, and the foundations for
computer aided design (CAD) [169]. Technological aspects and clarifications on
standards are also part of the study [163].
In the study of CAD foundations, Turk takes the position that there are prob-
lems in considering language as the foundation for exchange of information.
In [169] a version of hermeneutic constructivism is analysed. The perspective
suggests that language is a form for social behaviour and that the meaning of
expressions and statements can only be established if the context of these are
considered. The problem with CAD and data exchange is — it is argued — that
justifying the correctness of conceptual models as we do not have an objective
reference against which they can be verified. Similar considerations — but with
a different conclusion — are presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 7.
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Furthermore, Turk claims that static type structures, as in object–oriented CAD
systems, restrict the practitioner and imply a sort of blindness for alternative de-
sign solutions. To this we agree, and the paper in Chapter 7 aims at establishing
a new foundation for design systems free of such static structures.
2.4.2 Hakim and Garrett
Maher and Hakim have investigated the distinction between class–centered and
object–centered approaches in conceptual modelling of buildings [97, 87]. The
object–oriented paradigm is highly class–centered which makes it inadequate
for handling the dynamical aspects of incremental design. Instead, Hakim and
Garrett suggest an object–centered approach which is free of static class systems.
Implementation is sketched using the description language KL–ONE.
The distinction between class–centered and object–centered modelling has great-
ly influenced our work on foundations for incremental design; primarily the work
presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 7. However, we recognize in Chapter 7
that a model using an object–centered approach lacks of semantics as the type
system is weak. Therefore, a semantics which defines the meaning of property
and relation terms, is needed in addition to the model.
2.4.3 BAS•CAAD
The BAS•CAAD11 system is a prototype design tool for conceptual design,
aimed at covering all stages of the design process. Its kernel is a small collec-
tion of base types from which generic objects can be made. To these objects,
properties (intrinsic and extrinsic) can be ascribed incrementally. In a sense,
this means that the BAS•CAAD system breaks the barrier between objects and
classes.
BAS•CAAD is centred on the notion of ThingClass which is a class of generic
objects; i.e. objects to which any set of properties and relations may be as-
cribed. It is recognized that in order for a design system to offer certain kinds
of dynamics, it must be free of what is called contexts . That is, it must be in-
dependent of what kinds of artefacts we usually design. Such a context is often
reflected in the taxonomic structure established for design systems. The dynam-
ics can be only be achieved if we move notions like properties and relations to a
dynamic instance level. That is, properties and relations are considered values
11BAS•CAAD is an acronym for “Building and User Activity Systems Modelling for Com-
puter Aided Architectural Design”.
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and not static parts of class definitions. Only then can the system support the
design process which may search for new ways of understanding the universe of
discourse — a primary goal of designing.
The principle of moving properties and relations to a dynamic level is by chance
similar to the pre–study for the paper in Chapter 4 [62]. The similarities of ideas
with those of BAS•CAAD, became clear when working on this paper. The paper
in Chapter 7 goes further and studies the foundation for making design tools
completely free of contexts and in which conceptual design models can be given
different interpretations.
The BAS•CAAD system has been developed as a prototype by Fridqvist as
part of his doctoral thesis [75]. The theoretical foundations are due to Ekholms
studies of concepts in civil engineering and design; primarily [67, 66, 63], which
also study the incrementality of design processes. In addition, expiriences with
BAS•CAAD have been documented [65].
2.4.4 Partial evaluation and compiler generators
Partial evaluation and program transformation have had a tremendous impact
on computer science. Thorough presentations on theory and practice include
[113]. The first step was to construct interpreters being programs for evaluating
(i.e. run) other programs according to some input data. The next step was to
construct compilers being programs able of translating a programs written in a
source language S into program written in a target language T . The Futamura
projections show the correspondence between source and target, and they show
how compiler generators can be the result of partial evaluation. A programmix
performs the mixed computation by interpreting the source language code (s:S)
according to input data (d:D). It turns out that the level of compiler generators
is a fix–point. This means that the mix program and its semantics are the only
things needed for making target programs, compilers, and compiler generators.
The Futamura projections are (see [76] and [77]):
[[ [[ mix ]] P D ]]S = [[ P ]] D S (2.2)
T = [[ mix ]] I S (2.3)
C = [[ mix ]] mix I (2.4)
CG = [[ mix ]] mix mix (2.5)
The theory of partial evaluation and compiler generators induced the idea of
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whether a similar mix program could be made for design systems. It was nec-
essary then to clearly split the design language from the language specifying
the meaning of model terms. Combined with the aims of establishing a formal
foundation for incremental design systems, the idea of programs for generat-
ing design programs lead to the idea of Semantic parameterized interpretation
presented in Chapter 7. Input data are here design representations on a concep-
tual form. Interpretation of such models can be made according to a semantics
and the result is a target — a view of the model. In a sense, the software
architecture suggested in the paper, corresponds to a design system generator.
However, effort has not been put into showing that this can be a mix program
generating itself. The focus has been on accommodating the requirements for
design systems supporting incremental design.
2.5 Philosophy
The two papers of philosophical kind — Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 — serve them-
selves as surveys of related philosophical work. In addition to the philosophical
theories treated in these papers, a number of other theories are related to the
work of this thesis in general.
Examples are the notion of necessary connection in causation and the broad area
of philosophy of language. The main issue in the latter is the foundation for
learning and communication, and it covers areas like use–theories of meaning,
tacit knowledge, how we can acquire knowledge of new language, and how we can
learn to use languages correctly. We shall not mention any contributions here
as we necessarily would have to leave out important ones. However, Chapter 9
serves as a good introduction to the philosophical theories which relate to our
study of the domain of civil engineering and design.
Part II
Concepts
Chapter 3
Models of two civil
engineering concepts and
their Galois connection
Abstract: Civil engineers operate with such notions as tree–structured
cost frames and graph–structured project plans. We show how a cost
frame denotes a possibly infinite set of project plans and, vice–versa, how
a project plan denotes a possibly infinite set of cost frames.
The civil engineer, we claim, operates freely in a domain where cost frames
determine project plans, namely the project plans which can be executed
within the financial restrictions defined by the given cost frame, and vice–
versa.
In this paper, we model this two–way connection and show that it forms
a Galois connection. We thus believe that our contribution, in its math-
ematics, captures an everyday concern of civil engineers in planning, ma-
nagement, and control of building projects.
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3.1 Introduction
In the domain of civil engineering, much of the knowledge necessary for con-
structing a building is stored and managed as a collection of documents. If
we insist in storing and managing such knowledge by computer systems, it is
essential to talk of documents which express building knowledge. Each docu-
ment contains a description of a certain aspect the building organisation, the
processes, or the artefact (the building) to be built. Even though documents
contain different kinds of knowledge, they may relate, as the knowledge ex-
pressed in one document is necessary for expressing knowledge in another.
When we talk of semantic relations, we usually mean a relation between terms
and what such terms stand for; what they denote. It seems, though, that
there exists another sort of semantic relation. This relation stands between
values of certain domain concepts. An example is the relation between financial
documents like budgets and management documents like project plans.
Here, it is important to state that the field of civil engineering can be vague con-
cerning terminology1. The notion of budget is often used to mean a hierarchical
structure of expense designations. However, it may also include revenues, esti-
mated profits, etc. When the information concerns only expenses, the term cost
breakdown is used. The concept often consists of the sub–concepts of unit costs
(concerning material) and unit rates (concerning work2). However, these names
are not uniform. The meaning of the term cost breakdown may be misleading.
It is not just the costs as numbers which are divided but also the items, which
are expanded to sub–structures of the financial frame. Therefore, we suggest
the terms cost frame instead of cost breakdown, and cost item to designate the
individual items of expenses. That is, cost frames group cost items. If a cost
frame is part of a larger cost frame in the hierarchical structure, we shall refer
to it as a sub–frame. In the domain of civil engineering, the decision whether
to break down a cost item is a matter of convention and convenience.
Intuitively, a cost frame and a project plan relate to each other: We can check
whether the project plan can be executed within the cost frame, and we can
check whether a cost frame covers the expenses for resources which are consumed
by operations in a project plan.
Preben Scheutz, architect, writes (translated from Danish, [147]):
1Thanks are due to Prof. Stephen Emmitt for clarifying these terms.
2In the contract documents for The Øresund Link [137], the term applied is: “Schedule of
Unit Rates” . We thank Leif Sjøgren, The Øresund Consortium, for providing the documents.
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“To define the cost frame and adhere to it through all phases, requires that
project solutions are verified according to the cost frame, using a partition
into well–arranged cost items.”
The epistemological question which is sketched is thus: How do the expressed
knowledge of a cost frame contribute to the knowledge necessary for making a
project plan?
This paper presents formal models of two civil engineering concepts and show
how a semantic relation between their values can be defined. We consider the
concepts of cost frame and project plan. A generalisation of the relation maps
between sets of values of the two concepts. We show that the maps defining this
relation explicitly, satisfies Galois criterion3.
Relating two concepts by a Galois connection means that the concepts are related
by the mathematical structures which models them. This is a stronger and more
rigour relation than a relation only holding between the names of the concepts.
Our argumentation for bringing on the notion of Galois connections goes as
follows. Often we define that certain concepts relate without explicitly specifying
the pragmatics behind the relation. That is, the concepts relate by convention
and we can then only assume that the relation is rooted in the intrinsics — i.e.
the basic and fundamental structures — of the domain considered. Relating two
concepts based on a Galois connection has the benefit that the relation which
is claimed is also justified in set–theory. This means that we from values of the
one concept can predicate values of the other and vice versa.
Satifying Galois criterion implies a number of mathematical properties. By
expressing the relation in its mathematics, we believe to capture an everyday
concern in civil engineering project planning and management. Furthermore,
the relation makes the foundation for software systems supporting such activi-
ties. In more strong words: If we cannot make this relation explicit, we have no
chance of rationalising such civil engineering activities; especially not to intro-
duce computer based supporting tools.
We use The RAISE Specification Language (RSL) to express the formal models,
their relations and conditions [134, 135]. However, effort has been made to
informally express intuitions behind the relation and the models of the concepts
considered.
3See the axioms of Definition 3.5.
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3.2 Domain concepts
In the following sections, we model the two domain concepts; cost frame and
project plan.
3.2.1 Cost frames
A cost frame (cf:CF) is a mapping from cost items (ci:CI) to a pair of which the
first component is the cost (cost:Cost) of that cost item and the second is the
sub–frame. A sub–frame is a cost frame as well. Each cost item in a cost frame
(including sub–frames) uniquely identifies a record of expenses concerning work,
material, man–hour payment, etc. That is, it designates the maximum amount
of money that is allowed to be spend. From a cost item and cost frame, we
can observe the corresponding frame name (fn:Fn) which is the name it is given
in the same cost frame. Such labels are, however, not unique but can appear
several places in the same cost frame.
A cost frame is wellformed if and only if each cost is non–zero (we assume that
costs are not negative) and that it is equal the sum of costs in the corresponding
sub–frames. Furthermore, it is required that all cost items are indeed unique
(i.e. the number of cost items is equal the length of the list of frame names).
Also, all sub–frames must be wellformed.
type
CF′ = CI →m (Cost × CF′),
CF = {|cf:CF′ • wf(cf)|},
CI,
Cost
value
zero : Cost,
wf: CF′ → Bool
wf(cf) ≡
(∀ ci:CI • ci ∈ dom cf ⇒
let (cst,cf′)=cf(ci) in
non_zero(cst) ∧
cst=total(cf′) ∧ wf(cf′)
end) ∧
card frames(cf) = len frame_names(cf),
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frames: CF′ → CI-set
frames(cf) ≡
if cf = [ ] then {}
else
let ci:CI • ci ∈ dom cf,
(cst,cf′)=cf(ci) in
{ci} ∪ frames(cf \ {ci}) ∪ frames(cf′)
end
end,
frame_names: CF′ → Fn∗
frame_names(cf) ≡
if cf = [ ] then 〈〉
else
let ci:CI • ci ∈ dom cf,
(cst,cf′)=cf(ci) in
〈obs_Fn_Frm(ci)〉 ̂ frame_names(cf \ {ci}) ̂
frame_names(cf′)
end
end,
total: CF → Cost
total(cf) ≡
if cf = [ ] then zero
else
let ci:CI • ci ∈ dom cf,
(cst, )=cf(ci) in
cst + total(cf \ {ci})
end
end,
+: Cost × Cost → Cost,
=: Cost × Cost → Bool,
non_zero: Cost → Bool,
obs_Fn_Frm: CI × CF → Fn,
axiom ∀ c,c′,c′′:Cost •
[ addition ]
c+c′ ≡ c′+c,
c+(c′+c′′) ≡ (c+c′)+c′′,
[ zero element ]
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zero+c ≡ c,
The functions iterating on sets are exhaustive because all sets are finite and
elements are iteratively removed.
In empirical material like [137] we recognize the pattern that a cost frame divides
into sub–structures which are also cost frames.
Let fijk range over values of CI, and cij range over values of Cost. Values of
CF thus have the general form (here only expanding part of it):


f1 7→


c1,


f11 7→ (c11, [ ])
f12 7→ (c12, [ ])
...
f1n 7→

c1n,


f1n1 7→ (c1n1, [ ])
f1n2 7→ (c1n2, [ ])
...
f1nm 7→ (c1nm, [ ])








f2 7→ (c2, [ ])
...
fp 7→ (cp, [ ])


An example of a value of type CF is:
Example 1
value
workitems, foundations, exc_limestone, exc_quaternary, stone_bed,
underbase_grouting, backfill, concrete, tremied,
foundation_in_situ_reinforced, foundation_precast_reinforced,
ballast_fill, piers_pylons, pp_in_situ_reinforced,
pp_precast_reinforced, labouritems : CI,
cf : CF =
[workitems 7→ (20005300,
[ foundations 7→ (17964800,
[ exc_limestone 7→ (2000000,[ ]),
exc_quaternary 7→ (400000,[ ]),
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stone_bed 7→ (1080000,[ ]),
underbase_grouting 7→ (44800,[ ]),
backfill 7→ (400000,[ ]),
concrete 7→ (12200000,
[ tremied 7→ (1200000,[ ]),
in_situ_reinforced 7→ (3000000,[ ]),
precast_reinforced 7→ (8000000,[ ]) ]),
ballast_fill 7→ (1840000,[ ]) ]),
piers_pylons 7→ (2040500,
[ concrete 7→ (2040500,
[ in_situ_reinforced 7→ (185500,[ ]),
precast_reinforced 7→ (1855000,[ ]) ]) ]) ]),
labouritems 7→ 6700500 ]
⋄
3.2.2 Object aspects
We introduce the notion of object aspects (x:X). These are different from building
components and material in the sense that an object aspect (x:X) denotes a
certain aspect of an artefact to be built. In this paper it is not considered
something consumed by an operation. By an object aspect, we understand a
reference to a proper part of an object existing in a possible world equal or
succeeding to the actual world. However, in this paper the notion of possible
worlds is not important.
Examples of object aspects are: a certain wall, the collection of all exterior walls
in a building, the foundation, and the top surface of the foundation. Object as-
pects are referred to in construction specifications, building codes, conceptual
models, requirements, and (perhaps most important) in general talk, e.g. at
the construction site. We introduce this notion and distinguish it from physical
resources consumed by operations. Thereby, we claim to avoid certain mereo-
logical problems. In this paper, we shall not dig into the mereological aspects
here, but refer to Chapter 8 which presents a study of the notion.
3.2.3 Resources
Resource types (rn:Rn) denote resources which are consumed by operations. Re-
sources can be components like pre–cast concrete walls or materials like sand.
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The amount of resources are measured and represented by natural numbers.
Furthermore, resources can be personnel and tools. We do not, however, apply
a principle of tool reuse (usage with replacement). The way such resources are
managed in most civil engineering projects opens up for a solution, which is dif-
ferent from the obvious computer science one. This obvious solution would be to
order operations based on their input–output types. This ways, all components
“flow” through the project plan. However, there are a number of problems in
this solution which mostly root in some mereological problems of which we shall
not be concerned here.
Instead, what is measured for personnel and tools are the hours of work. Per-
sonnel and tools are considered resources but are counted as man–hour and
use–per–hour, respectively. After an operation has been performed, such re-
sources has been consumed as it is the time of use that counts. A personnel
resource is counted as a multiplication of the number of persons and the hours
of use. Similar goes for tools. Thereby, we avoid optimisation issues and we are
still true to the domain.
Definition 3.1 For an operation to “concern” an object aspect, we under-
stand that the operation is or includes the construction of or the work on that
object aspect.
2
We assume that resources consumed by operations concerning one object as-
pect are distinct from those consumed by operations4 concerning other object
aspects. The types and numbers of resources may be the same but the physical
resources are not.
The distinction comes from the definition of which resources are consumed in
what operations. Let xi be object aspects. On Figure 3.1, the concrete resources
for casting x2 and x3 are distinct resources from the resources consumed by
operations involving x1; e.g., paint for painting x1. Similar, the resources for
preparing the surfaces denoted by x4 are distinct from the resources consumed
by the operation which casts x4. Also, the latter set of resources do not include
the former set of resources.
This trick of not having set–based resource inclusion downwards the order of
object aspects, solves the problem of uniqueness when quantifying over these.
4possibly the same.
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x1
x4 (x4 < x2, x4 < x1)
x3 (x3 < x1)
x2 (x2 < x1)
Figure 3.1: Aspects of a bridge pier object.
3.2.4 Project plans
By a project plan (pp:PP) we understand a directed, acyclic graph (DAG) in
which nodes (g:Γ) correspond to operations and the set of edges defines a partial
ordering on operations.
g1
g2-1
g3-1
g4
g5
g2-2
g3-2
g6
g1) Foundation molding (x1)
g2−i) Piers mounting (x2 = {x3, x4})
g3−j) Slabs mounting (x5 = {x6, x7})
g4) Structural steel arms (x8 = {x9, x10})
g5) Pylons mounting (x11 = {x12, x13})
g6) Slabs waterproofing (x14 < x5)
Figure 3.2: Project plan.
Figure 3.2 illustrates a project plan where the nodes are named gi and xi names
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object aspects. E.g. g6 names the node in which the waterproofing operation on
both slabs is performed. This operation thus concerns the object aspect, which
is the top surfaces of both slabs (named x14).
We have applied the same symbol < for orderings of object aspects as used for
part–whole relations by Simons [155]. x < y — used illustratively in figure texts
only — means that x is an object is a proper part of the object of which y is
an aspect. E.g. this holds for y being a pier and x being the surface of that
pier. Figure 3.3 shows the high bridge of The Øresund Link in section view, and
Figure 3.4 shows an aspect partition on such a bridge section.
Figure 3.3: The Øresund High Bridge in section view.
From a node in a project plan we can observe the associated type (on:On) of the
operation to be performed, as well as the concerned object aspects (xs:X-set).
A project plan is wellformed if and only if it satisfies the criteria of being a
directed acyclic graph.
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Foundation (x1)
Piers (x2={x3,x4})
Slab (x
5
={x6,x7})
Structural steel arms (x8={x9,x10})
Pylons (x11={x12,x13})
Slab surfaces (x14< x5)
Figure 3.4: Aspects of The High Bridge.
type
PP′ = Γ →m Γ-set,
PP = {|pp:PP′ • wf(pp)|}
Γ,
On,
X
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value
obs_On_Γ: Γ → On,
obs_Xs_Γ: Γ → X-set,
wf: PP → Bool
wf(pp) ≡
(∀ gs:Γ-set • gs ∈ rng pp ⇒ gs ⊆ dom pp) ∧
(∀ g:Γ • g ∈ dom pp ⇒
∼ is_before(g,g_succ)(pp)),
is_before: Γ × Γ → PP → Bool
is_before(g,g′)(pp) ≡
g′ ∈ pp(g) ∨
(∃ g′′:Γ • g′′ ∈ pp(g) ∧ is_before(g′′,g′)(pp))
In the model of project plans, we have not expressed how nor when resources
(humans or machines) are or can be available. Such scheduling issues are not
directly related to cost frames. However, they are important issues in civil
engineering when involving concepts likemanning tables and resource allocation.
In this case the model of project plans must be extended.
3.3 Mediating ties
In order to relate cost frames to project plans, we present models of additional
concepts. These represent the information (often assumed or being background
knowledge) necessary for making project plans and verifying these financially.
We call these additional concepts mediating ties5.
The mediating ties, relevant for relating cost frames and project plans are the no-
tion of price index and the notion of work index . A price index (prcidx:PrcIdx)
maps resource types to a unit cost function (ucm:UCF). A unit cost function
map units of measure (u:U) of material, man–hour, or use–per–hour, to their
5Sowa has defined the notion of mediation in [158] as a kind of special relation holding
between entities of first order (things) and entities of second order (relations). Concepts
being mediating belong to a third ontological level. Sowa thus proposes a special hierarchy
of concepts. This hierarchy makes a distinction between concepts denoted by predicates like
marriage which applies to instances of marriages, and concepts denoted by predicates like
married_to which applies to pairs of individuals (persons). The discussion of whether the two
predicates really denote distinct and genuine concepts is similar to the discussion in [136]. We
shall use the notion of mediating tie in a different sense.
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costs. We assume that such units of measure are natural numbers. A unit cost
function is a function and not a map, as it may be continuous. A work index
(wrkidx:WrkIdx) maps pairs of operation types and concerned objects to the
cost items to which the works belong. In civil engineering the term work indi-
cates that it denotes more than just the type of operation; it also denotes what
object aspects are concerned.
The pragmatics behind the work index is as follows. It seems reasonable to
assume that given an operation type (on:On) and a designator of an object
aspect (x:X), we can determine to what cost item that work belongs. More
precisely, the costs of the resources consumed by the operation concerning the
object aspect, belongs to a certain cost item. We cannot, however, directly
relate types of resources to cost items as the cost of the same sort of resources
may belong to different cost items; e.g. costs for painting different parts of
a building. Neither can we relate operation types directly to cost items as
the same type of operation may consume resources belonging to different cost
items, when concerning different object aspects; e.g. molding may be performed
several distinct places for a building, and the costs for these works may belong
to distinct cost items.
In the domain, work indices are background (sometimes almost tacit) knowledge.
However, it often becomes explicit in civil engineering contracts. If we cannot
express this structure, we have no way of expressing how cost frames and project
plans relate. The concept thus appears to be crucial in the definition of the
Galois connection.
Formally defining the mediating ties which tie together two domain concepts, adds
clarity and transparency to the model which represents the relation between the
two concepts.
As an extention of the model of project plans, we introduce a number of observer
functions on nodes. We can observe the types of the resources consumed by the
operation of the node. A specialisation of this function states, in addition, the
amount (units) of each type of resource.
type
PrcIdx = Rn →m UCM,
UCM = U →m Cost,
WrkIdx = (On × X) →m CI,
Rn,
On,
U = Nat
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value
obs_Rn_Γ: Γ → Rn-set,
obs_Rm_Γ: Γ → (Rn →m Nat)
axiom ∀ g:Γ, rn:Rn, n:Nat •
obs_Rn_Γ(g) ≡ dom obs_Rm_Γ(g),
Note, that both mediating ties go from values related to cost frames, to values
related to project plans.
A work index (wrkidx:WrkIdx) can be verified according to a cost frame (cf:CF).
All cost items in a cost frame should be defined in the given work index. That
is:
value
consistent: CF × WrkIdx → Bool
consistent(cf,wrkidx) ≡
frames(cf) ⊆ rng wrkidx
Similar, we can verify a project plan according to a work index. For a project
plan, all observable operation–aspect pairs must be present in the given work
index. That is:
value
consistent: PP × WrkIdx → Bool
consistent(pp,wrkidx) ≡
(∀ g:Γ, on:On, x:X •
g ∈ dom pp ∧ on=obs_On_Γ(g) ∧ x ∈ obs_Xs_Γ(g) ⇒
(on,x) ∈ dom wrkidx)
The two functions ensure consistency between cost frames and work indices, and
between project plans and work indices, respectively.
3.4 Relevant nodes and resources
We now have models of the two concepts and of the mediating ties. We define
a mapping structure from so–called relevant nodes to relevant resource usage.
First, we need a few definitions.
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Definition 3.2 By a resource usage (re:Rn →m Nat), we understand the
resources which are consumed by an operation.
2
Definition 3.3 By a relevant resource usage, we understand the part of a
resource usage of an operation, which concerns6 a given object aspect.
2
A relevant resource usage can be observed:
value
obs_rel_res: Γ × X → (Rn →m Nat)
The relevant resource usage for a node is given by adding together the resource
usage for each the work concerning each object aspect involved in the operation:
axiom
obs_Rm_Γ(g) ≡
meets({rm|rm:(Rn →m Nat) •
(∃ x:X • x ∈ obs_Xs_Γ(g) ⇒ rm=obs_rel_res(g,x))}),
meet: (Rn →m Nat) × (Rn →m Nat) → (Rn →m Nat)
meet(rm,rm′) ≡
[ rn 7→ n|rn:Rn,n:Nat •
(rn ∈ dom rm ∧ rn ∈ dom rm′ ∧ n=rm(rn)+rm′(rn)) ∨
(rn ∈ dom rm ∧ rn 6∈ dom rm′ ∧ n=rm(rn)) ∨
(rn 6∈ dom rm ∧ rn ∈ dom rm′ ∧ n=rm′(rn)) ],
meets: (Rn →m Nat)-set → (Rn →m Nat)
meets(rms) ≡
if rms = {} then [ ]
else
let rm:(Rn →m Nat) • rm ∈ rms in
meet(rm,meets(rms \ {rm}))
end
end,
6See Definition 3.1.
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The same resource cannot be consumed in operations of different work, as argued
in Section 3.3.
Definition 3.4 A node in a project plan is relevant to a given cost item, if
and only if there exists an object aspect of the node such that the work given
by the operation of the node and the object aspect, belongs to the cost item.
This membership is defined by a given work index.
2
The set of relevant nodes of a project plan, given a cost item and a work index,
is thus:
value
rel_nds: PP × CI × WrkIdx → Γ-set
rel_nds(pp,ci,wrkidx) ≡
{g|g:Γ •
g ∈ dom pp ∧
(∃ x:X • x ∈ obs_Xs_Γ(g) ∧ ci=wrkidx(obs_On_Γ(g),x))}
The mapping from relevant nodes to relevant resource usage is defined as a
variant of rel_nds:
value
rel_map: PP × CI × WrkIdx → (Γ →m (Rn →m Nat))
rel_map(pp,ci,wrkidx) ≡
[ g 7→ rm|g:Γ,rm:(Rn→m Nat) •
g ∈ rel_nds(pp,ci,wrkidx) ∧
(∃ x:X • x ∈ obs_Xs_Γ(g) ∧ ci=wrkidx(obs_On_Γ(g),x) ∧
rm=obs_rel_res(g,x)) ],
It is argued in Section 3.2.3 that the quantified x is unique.
3.5 Connecting the two concepts
The predicate which binds cost frames and project plans — our Galois predicate
— is thus:
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value
φfp: CF × PP → (PrcIdx × WrkIdx)
∼
→ Bool
φfp(cf,pp)(prcidx,wrkidx) ≡
(∀ ci:CI • ci ∈ dom cf ⇒
let (cst,cf′)=cf(ci) in
sumcost(rel_map(pp,ci,wrkidx),prcidx) ≤ cst ∧ φfp(cf′)
end)
pre consistent(cf,wrkidx) ∧ consistent(pp,wrkidx),
sumcost: (Γ →m (Rn →m Nat)) × PrcIdx
∼
→ Cost
sumcost(gm,prcidx) ≡
if gm = [ ] then zero
else
let g:Γ • g ∈ dom gm in
sumcost′(gm(g),prcidx) + sumcost(gm \ {g},prcidx)
end
end,
sumcost′: (Rn →m Nat) × PrcIdx
∼
→ Cost
sumcost′(rm,prcidx) ≡
if rm = [ ] then zero
else
let rn:Rn • rn ∈ dom rm in
prcidx(rn)(rm(rn)) + sumcost′(rm \ {rn},prcidx)
end
end
pre (∀ rn ∈ dom rm ⇒ rn ∈ dom prcidx),
The predicate φfp defines the relation between cost frames and project plans.
In Formal Context Analysis [85], the relation is known as a context7. Note,
that the predicate is defined using quantification over cost items (ci:CI). The
reason is that usually it is the cost frame, which restricts the project plans.
Project plans are made in a constructive way having cost frame knowledge in
mind. The restrictions which project plans make on cost frames are given by
the consistency predicates.
By means of the predicate φfp, we can define the set of valid project plans, as
the project plans which each can be executed within a given cost frame (cf:CF);
assuming the mediating ties:
value
7Usually meant to hold between orderings of objects and their common properties.
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valid_plans: CF × PrcIdx × WrkIdx ∼→ PP-infset
valid_plans(cf,prcidx,wrkidx) ≡
{pp|pp:PP • φfp(cf,pp)(prcidx,wrkidx)}
Similar, we can define the set of applicable cost frames which are the cost frames
which each apply financially, given a project plan (pp:PP); assuming the medi-
ating ties:
value
appl_frmexps: PP × PrcIdx × WrkIdx ∼→ CF-infset
appl_frmexps(pp,prcidx,wrkidx) ≡
{cf|cf:CF • φfp(cf,pp)(prcidx,wrkidx)}
3.6 Galois connection and a theorem
In the following, we show that the defined connection between the two considered
concepts, satisfies Galois criterion.
3.6.1 Galois connection
Let P and Q be ordered sets. Further, let pi and qj be elements in the sets
(P,≤) and (Q,≤), respectively. From [85] we have the following definition8 of
the notion of Galois connection:
Definition 3.5 A pair of mappings (ϕ, ψ), with respect to the ordered sets
(P,≤) and (Q,≤), is a Galois connection if ϕ and ψ are monotonously decreas-
ing:
∀pi(p1 ≤ p2 ⇒ ϕp2 ≤ ϕp1) (3.1)
∀qi(q1 ≤ q2 ⇒ ψq2 ≤ ψq1) (3.2)
∀p(p ≤ ψϕp) (3.3)
∀q(q ≤ ϕψq) (3.4)
8The definition is slightly reformulated; as we explicitly express the quantifications.
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The two mappings are then called dually adjoint.
2
We are interested especially in orderings given by set–inclusion. That is, P and
Q are powersets and pi and qj are subsets of these powersets, respectively.
Figure 3.5–3.8 depicts the four Galois axioms (where we rename ϕ to F and ψ
to G, respectively).
F
Figure 3.5: Galois connection axiom 1.
G
Figure 3.6: Galois connection axiom 2.
3.6.2 A theorem
We now define a mapping pair (F ,G) between ordered sets of cost frames and
project plans. The ordering is by set–inclusion. F maps sets of cost frames to
the set of project plans which are valid within each cost frame in the given set.
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G
F
Figure 3.7: Galois connection axiom 3.
G
F
Figure 3.8: Galois connection axiom 4.
G maps sets of project plans to the set of cost frames which are applicable for
each project plan in the given set. I.e.:
value
F : CF-set → (PrcIdx × WrkIdx) ∼→ PP-infset
F(cfs)(prcidx,wrkidx) ≡
{pp|pp:PP • (∀ cf:CF • cf ∈ cfs ⇒ φfp(cf,pp)(prcidx,wrkidx))},
G: PP-set → (PrcIdx × WrkIdx) ∼→ CF-infset
G(pps)(prcidx,wrkidx) ≡
{cf|cf:CF • (∀ pp:PP • pp ∈ pps ⇒ φfp(cf,pp)(prcidx,wrkidx))}
Theorem 3.6 The mapping pair (F ,G) is a Galois connection.
Proof: The proof is by inspection using Theorem 2 in [85] (first half of this theo-
rem is repeated in the appendix of this paper). The functions F and G correspond
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to ϕR and ψR, respectively. The binary relation R ⊆ M × N is the binary re-
lation between cost frame values (cf:CF) and project plan values (pp:PP). The
binary relation is defined by the predicate φfp; assuming ∀–quantification over
the mediating ties (prcidx:PrcIdx) and (wrkidx:WrkIdx). X and Y correspond
to finite sets of values having type CF and type PP, respectively; x and y are
values in these sets.
2
The functions F and G are order–reversing. The connection is thus incrementally
decreasing as shown on Figure 3.5–3.8.
In the following we analyse the meaning of the connection looking at what
knowledge the two domain concepts represent.
3.7 Analysis of the connection
What is first recognized in Theorem 3.6 is that neither the definition nor the
content of the predicate φfp have influence on whether the mapping pair satisfies
Galois criterion. E.g. reversing the order of the sumcost comparison in the
predicate would not have changed this. However, it would have changed the
extension of the predicate. Instead of applying to project plans which can be
executed within cost frames, the predicate would apply to project plans which
cannot be executed within cost frames. The result of this paper is thus more
than showing that Galois criterion is indeed satisfied. It also illuminates the
meaning of the extension of the predicate. In this sense, the notion of Galois
connection is a framework which forces us to be explicit about a denotational
relation between concepts and between models. Defining a relation explicitly
adds clarity and trasparency to the claimed connection.
The essence of what it means for two domain concepts to satisfy this criterion is
to be found in the extension of the predicate; given the same mediating ties. In
the following we explain what each Galois axiom means in the context of cost
frame and project plans.
• each set of cost frames maps to a set of project plans; namely the project
plans that each can be executed within each cost frame. Let us call this
map F .
• each set of project plans maps to a set of cost frames; namely the cost
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frames within which each of the project plans can be executed. Let us call
this map G.
3.1 for all sets of cost frames, if one set p1 is a subset of another p2, then the
set of project plans F(p2) should be a subset of the set G(p1).
3.2 for all sets of project plans, if one set q1 is a subset of another q2, then the
set of cost frames G(q2) should be a subset of the set G(q1).
3.3 for all sets of cost frames p, the set is a subset of G(F(p)).
3.4 for all sets of project plans q, the set is a subset of F(G(q)).
For the two functions F and G to be a Galois connection, shows that there is
truly a denotational relation between the two concepts considered. This basi-
cally means, that the the relation has strong mathematical ordering properties,
that it is sound and consistent, and that it is based on set–theory.
However, the most important result is that the relation satisfying Galois cri-
terion complies with an ordering intuition. This intuition is that if we raise
cost amounts, more project plans are executable, and breaking down cost items,
makes less project plans executable. The essence here is that there is a concept
of classification which defines the duality between the ordered sets falling under
the two concepts respectively.
3.8 Conclusion
We have presented models of two civil engineering concepts: cost frames and
projects plans. We have shown that these two concepts, which can be modelled
and analysed in isolation, can be related by introducing what we have called
mediating ties. The relation between the two concepts considered satisfies Galois
criterion. Thereby, we have the possibility of checking whether a project plan can
be executed within the financial restrictions of a cost frame, and vice versa. We
thus believe to have captured an essential concern of civil engineers in practice,
and — by the mathematical strength of the models and the principle — to have
contributed to a foundation for advanced planning tools in civil engineering.
Relating domain concepts by means of a Galois principle, we believe is applica-
ble for a large set of civil engineering domain concepts. Thus, we may wish to
relate concepts like conceptual designs and requirements, city plans and location
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plans, etc. Thereby, we apply a Galois principle to built an ontology of civil engi-
neering concepts. Such an ontology is, contrary to many other civil engineering
ontologies, founded on a mathematical relation between concepts which again
is founded on set–theory. The concepts considered thus relate mathematically,
and not by convention.
Appendix
The following is a reprint of a theorem from [85]:
Theorem 2. For every binary relation R ⊆ M ×N , a Galois connection (ϕR, ψR) between
M and N is defined by
ϕRX := X
R (= y ∈ N |xRy for all x ∈ X)
ϕRY := Y
R (= x ∈M |xRy for all y ∈ Y ).
⋄
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Part III
Design
Chapter 4
From rough to final designs
by incremental set–inclusion
of properties
Prof. Anders Ekholm, Lund Institute of Technology, is co–author of this pa-
per, which appeared in Turk Z. and Scherer R. (eds.) eWork and eBusiness in
Architecture, Engineering and Construction. Swets & Zeitlinger Publishers.
Abstract: Design of buildings is a complex task in which ideas are
sketched and communicated, by representations that are incrementally
elaborated from the early rough sketches to the final design. We claim,
that today’s model–based design tools are restricted from fully supporting
this process as they are founded on the principle that objects are instances
of static types. Such systems do not offer work with objects being incre-
mentally specialised according to their properties, and neither do they
offer dynamics of the underlying type system.
The present paper elaborates on a property–oriented approach as a foun-
dation for design tools facilitating incremental design based on set–inclusion
of properties. We emphasize the formal foundation for incorporating such
dynamics, and we specify requirements for tools facilitating incremental
design and offering improved semantic support.
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4.1 Introduction
The introduction of computer–aided design (CAD) using model–based tools has
revolutionized many industries such as the automobile industry, the computer
hardware industry, and the building industry. However, in building design, the
notion of creativity has suffered in favour of efficiency. One reason may be
that most model–based design tools do not support incremental design; i.e. a
process in which objects of the current model are being incrementally specialised
according to their kinds.
In civil engineering and architecture, design is a creative process in which ideas
are sketched and communicated, by representations that are incrementally elab-
orated from early rough sketches to the final design. In order for a model–based
design tool to support (or at least not obstruct) creativity in this way, it should
facilitate dynamics on four levels: (i) on the parts of the building, (ii) on the
properties of parts, (iii) on other binary relations between parts, and (iv) on the
underlying type system. Most design tools facilitate the first, whereas they lack
of functionality facilitating the three succeeding.
In this paper, we elaborate on a property–oriented approach as a foundation
for design tools facilitating incremental specialisation of designs, based on set–
inclusion of properties. We do so by offering a framework for dynamic manage-
ment of objects and properties. This framework is well–founded in mathematical
and computer science theories and disciplines like Formal Concept Analysis, Lat-
tices, and Galois connections. Furthermore, it strongly relates to formal meth-
ods and domain modelling as research disciplines of computer science [19, 15].
We sketch requirements for design tools facilitating incremental design and of-
fering improved semantic support.
4.1.1 The conceptual level
Traditionally, CAD tools were made to create artefact descriptions like drawings,
and for speeding up the design process by ensuring consistency, facilitating
reuse, etc. With the introduction of 3D modelling and visualisation, graphical
presentations like drawings (in a wide but still syntactical sense), are more
important than ever.
However, there is more to a design process than the graphical entities of some
presentation. Such a presentation can be seen as piece of syntax (i.e. a mean-
ingful sequence of symbols) that certainly stands for something and is made
according to some idea of an artefact. Cognitively, we understand artefact de-
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scriptions like drawings as presentations of some conceptual model. In computer
science, we would say that artefact descriptions are computerized interpretations
or evaluations of the conceptual design model. Such a model is present in all
stages of any design process and necessarily precedes any presentation-aimed
syntax.
In order to develop design tools, we need to establish a conceptual understanding
of the process of designing and of design ideas.
4.1.2 Survey
Design as an incremental process is not a new concept. As an opposition to de-
sign tools focusing on the late stages of design, the Swedish BAS•CAAD project
was initiated [64, 67, 75, 167], suggesting a computerized tool supporting design
in the early stages. Also, the notion of schema evolution has been emphasized in
context of design. For example, Hakim and Garrett propose an Object–Centered
approach to modelling as a contrast to Class–Centered modelling, aiming the
same as we, but using an informal reference frame [97, 87].
4.1.3 Suggested framework
In this paper, we elaborate on the property–oriented approach presented in
the BAS•CAAD project. We see design as a process of exploration, which in-
cludes choosing among alternatives, and incrementally adding parts, properties
of parts, and other relations between parts. In the work mentioned in this paper,
we focus the discussion on incremental property determination. What separates
it from other work on incremental design is, that we intend to put on a logico–
computer science perspective. Thereby, we go back and investigate the formal
foundations for CAD. Especially, we focus on the notion of multiple inheritance
of properties as a fundamental issue in design.
We claim that the (apparently) natural process of going from rough sketches to
more and more precise designs is not entirely supported by today’s commercial
CAD tools. Rather, such tools emphasize the facility of incrementally adding
objects (parts) of pre–defined static types, thereby focussing on partonomic
(part–whole) relations [7] and not on taxonomic (kind–of ) relations [94]. The
latter sort, we claim is as important to design as the former.
We agree with Turk et al [169], that static type structures in the object–oriented
paradigm restrict the practitioner and imply some sort of blindness. Though,
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we seek to approach the problem without issuing it as for or against hermeneutic
constructivism. In our approach, we could say that incrementally stating the
properties of objects in a design model, makes it possible for the designer to
reflect on the design. Actually, making local, temporary restrictions like deter-
mining properties and even constraints, certainly offer a foundation for deciding
how the design should be — or should not be. Total blindness in a design pro-
cess may appear if we along the way keep too many open ends — we may not
get anything done at all.
The framework, suggested here, sees properties as the primary ontological en-
tities being referred to in descriptions of artefacts. Concerning representation,
we consider properties to exist on a dynamic run–time level rather than on a
static. Thereby, we obtain the dynamics mentioned above.
We rely on formal theories like Formal Concept Analysis, Lattices, and Galois
connections from knowledge engineering [85, 96, 95] to establish this framework.
Furthermore, we use The RAISE Specification Language (RSL) [134, 135] to
specify requirements for design tools facilitating incremental design and offering
improved semantic support, thus being suitable for distributed design. The
formulae in RAISE are mathematically precise descriptions of the presented
ideas, and aim to add a computer science perspective. However, the formulae
are supplementary in the sense that they are not crucial for the understanding
of this paper. For simplicity, formal specification of so–called well–formedness
has be omitted.
4.2 The design process
Design may be seen as a problem solving process similar to problem solving
in everyday life or in science. Such a process starts by expressing a problem
definition. In order to recognize a problem one usually need some sort of goal,
but not necessarily knowledge of how to reach that goal. Thus, the notion of a
problem can be defined as lack of solution knowledge in relation to background
knowledge and goal [40]. A goal can be defined as an intended state of a system;
i.e. the properties of the system at a certain time. In design, a goal could be
understood as a satisfactory behaviour of an artefact.
Stating the problem definition is followed first by synthesis, describing a hy-
pothesis or tentative problem solution (technical solution), and then by analysis
which investigates the proposed solution. The synthesis question is: “Which
system has these properties?” The analysis question is the inverse: “What pro-
perties does this system have?” Synthesis may be regarded as starting from a
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functional view on the system, while analysis starts from a compositional view.
The result of the analysis is added to the background knowledge and may lead
to a revision of the goal. During the design process, hypotheses and tests are
made alternately, and the properties of the intended artifact are determined
incrementally. The design cycle — which by Simon is called the “Generator-
Test Cycle” [154], proceeds until a satisfactory solution has been reached. The
problem solving process is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
environment
functional
requirement
tested
technical 
solution
actual
function
discovered new 
function and new 
environment
hypothesized
technical 
solutionSynthesis Analysis
Problem definition
Figure 4.1: The problem solving process [65].
4.2.1 Incremental design: An example
Consider the process of designing a house to be built. Usually, the overall
structure is sketched before large details like doors, windows, the sort of walls,
etc. can be specified; although that may not always be the case.
Figure 4.2 shows three stages of such a design: (a) a drawing of rough lines
indicating the exterior structure, (b) a drawing of more precise geometry, doors
added and wall type information stated, and (c) a drawing which in addition
states the widths and lengths of walls.
We thus go from a rough sketch to more and more detailed specifications. By a
rough sketch, we understand an artefact description which is less precise than
a (relatively) more detailed specification.
Using predicate logic, we could formalize aspects of a wall object at two of the
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(a)
masonry
door
door
door
masonry
(b)
28cmmasonry
masonry
28cm
200cm
100cm
16cm
16cm
28cm
180cm
28cm
350cm
80cm
80cm
80cm
16cm
70cm
80cm
30cm
80cm
(c)
Figure 4.2: Rough sketch (a), simple drawing (b), more detailed drawing (c).
wall(x1) ∧ straight(x1) ∧masonry(x1) (4.1)
wall(x1) ∧ straight(x1) ∧masonry(x1) ∧ (4.2)
width28(x1) ∧ length568(x1)
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We see, that Formula 4.1 and 4.2 are bound by implication from the latter to
the former. That is, the former is a more rough description of the object x1
than the latter.
4.2.2 Many–sorted knowledge and multiple inheritance
An essential issue of design is that of adding different, many–sorted knowledge
to an artefact description. That is, designing a building means adding different
incomparable sorts of knowledge like material, colour, texture, etc. Furthermore,
designing is also the process of putting together parts on the conceptual level,
thereby forming wholes, as well as adding other binary relations between objects.
Seen this way, design is: (i) multiple inheritance as set–inclusion of properties
like being red or made of wood, (ii) set–inclusion of parts like being composed
by a number of bricks, and (iii) set–inclusion of other binary relations like for
two walls to be parallel and two meters appart.
Figure 4.3 shows how multiple inheritance of properties is meet (×) and design
moves in separate incomparable directions origins from join (+) in a lattice
structure [13].
white concrete wall reinforced
concrete x wall reinforced x wall
reinforced x concrete x wall
white x  reinforced x concrete x wall
+
Figure 4.3: Multiple inheritance.
4.3 Tools for design
In context of tools for design, the introduction of the object–oriented paradigm
has not been more revolutionary than adding some convenient ways of working
with data. That is, the real difference between classes and traditional data types
is merely on some technicalities. In essence, classes are (as types) still static.
98
From rough to final designs
by incremental set–inclusion of properties
The following two sections state the importance of abandoning this restriction
by indicating requirements for design tools for incremental design.
4.3.1 Dynamics on properties
According to the object–oriented paradigm, objects are created as belonging to
a certain class.
This has at least two consequences: (i) we cannot speak of loosely defined
objects being incrementally specialised during run–time of the design tool, and
(ii) objects cannot shift classes.
These facts, we claim, delimit today’s design tools from fully supporting the
creative process of design.
4.3.2 Dynamics in type system
A class in the object–oriented paradigm is a type in the language in which
the tool is written. Thus adding a class definition or an attribute denoting a
property, usually requires recompilation of the program code. This implies that
classes and attributes cannot be changed or added after instantiation of any
objects [97, 87].
In order to facilitate dynamics according to properties of objects and of the
underlying type system, we need to move properties and relations of objects
from the static type level to the dynamic run–time level [67]. We do so by
establishing a generic system in which properties and relations are values and
thus can be managed at run–time. Furthermore, we have objects, which are
also values. These map to their properties in an object environment store. The
latter, we shall call an artefact model .
This solution, however, has implications as we shall see in Section 4.6.
4.4 Artefact model
By an artefact model, we understand a configuration of objects, i.e. maps from
objects to their properties and parts, respectively; and a map from conceptual
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object pairs to relation designators. We found the specification of artefact mo-
dels on the notion of design moves such that artefact models indeed facilitate
incremental design.
4.4.1 Design move
The three stages of design from Section 4.2.1 are related by design moves. A
design move is a transition from one artefact model a to another artefact model
b; denoted Φ(a) ≡ b. A design move Φ(a) ≡ b is valid, iff b is a description of an
artefact idea which is a relevant successor to the artefact idea corresponding to
the description b [79]. Logically, the description b is a relevant successor of a, if
and only if the artefact described taxonomically as well as partonomically and
according to other binary relations, is a specialisation of the artefact described
by a.
4.4.2 Specification
A formal specification of an artefact model should accomplish incremental spe-
cialisation and we thus specify the notion as a record with three entries: (i) The
taxonomical relations as a map (t–map) from objects (x:X) to sets of properties
(p:P), (ii) the partonomic relations as a map (p–map) from objects to their ob-
ject parts, and (iii) additional binary relations as a map (r–map) from pairs of
objects to sets of relation designators (υ:Υ):
type
Θ :: t:X →m P-set p:X →m X-set r:(X × X) →m Υ-set,
X, P, Υ
Note, that part-whole relations are singled out as a special case of binary rela-
tions between objects.
The wall modelled in Formula 4.2, can then be represented by the following
artefact model:
value
x1: X, wall, straight, masonry, width28, length568:P,
θ:Θ = mk_Θ([ x1 7→{wall, straight, masonry, width28, length568} ],
[ x1 7→{} ],[ ])
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Using the specification of Θ, we define the notion of design move as:
value
Φ: Θ → Θ,
≤: Θ → Θ → Bool
axiom ∀ θ, θ′:Θ •
θ ≤ θ′ ≡
let (t,p,r)=θ, (t′,p′,r′)=θ′ in
(∀ x:X • x ∈ dom t ⇒ x ∈ dom t′ ∧ t(x) ⊆ t′(x)) ∧
(∀ x:X • x ∈ dom p ⇒ x ∈ dom p′ ∧ p(x) ⊆ p′(x)) ∧
(∀ (x,x′):X×X • (x,x′) ∈ dom r ⇒ (x,x′) ∈ dom r′ ∧
r(x,x′) ⊆ r′(x,x′))
end,
Φ(θ) as θ′
post θ ≤ θ′
It can be shown that the relation ≤ defines a partial ordering on artefact models
(see Chapter 5).
4.5 Towards property–orientation
The backbone of any ontology–based information system is the kind–of relation
and the relation between objects and their properties. The foundation for these
relations is the mathematical notion of a Galois connection which can be said to
hold between two power sets [85]. A Galois connection between sets of objects
and sets of their common properties has the convenience that it defines a partial
ordering of the properties. Furthermore, the partial ordering is a lattice which
facilitates advanced and flexible querying and knowledge management.
In the following sections, we give a short introduction to Galois connections in
order to justify the presented specification of artefact models and its focus on
properties.
4.5.1 Galois connection
We can say that an object x has the property y. For that, we write xRy where
R is called the incidence relation [85]. The correspondence between objects and
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their common properties becomes quite an important relation, as the functions
giving the common properties of an object set and the residual function appears
to be a Galois connection.
Definition 4.1 A pair of mappings (f, g), with respect to the power sets X-
set and P -set, is a Galois connection iff f and g are monotonously decreasing:
type
X, P
value
f: X-set → P-set,
g: P-set → X-set
axiom
(∀ xs,xs′:X-set • xs ⊆ xs′ ⇒ f(xs′) ⊆ f(xs)) ∧
(∀ ps,ps′:P-set • ps ⊆ ps′ ⇒ g(ps′) ⊆ g(ps)) ∧
(∀ xs:X-set • xs ⊆ g(f(xs))) ∧
(∀ ps:P-set • ps ⊆ f(g(ps)))
The two mappings are then called dually adjoint [85]. The above rather sloppy
specification assumes the existence of only one incidence relation.
We now define f and g, as we model the incidence relation as a map (m:M)
from object–property pairs to boolean values:
type
M = (X × P) →m Bool
axiom ∀ x:X,p:P,xs:X-set, ps:P-set, m:M •
fm(xs) ≡ {p|p:P • (∀ x:X • x ∈ xs ∧ (x,p) ∈ dom m ⇒ m(x,p))},
gm(ps) ≡ {x|x:X • (∀ p:P • p ∈ ps ∧ (x,p) ∈ dom m ⇒ m(x,p))}
Note, that we for f and g assume the presence of a formal context (m:M). The
pair (f, g) satisfies the criteria for being a Galois connection [85]. This has the
advantage that properties are partially ordered and forms a lattice structure,
which can be utilized in semantic queries and support facilities in design tools
as sketched in Section 4.6.2.
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The important taxonomical relation is modelled in Θ as the t–map. The re-
lation is essential; a backbone in all ontological systems, and can be formu-
lated as unary predicates, like being a wall (wall(x)), or having a length of
4cm (width_4(x)). The partial ordering of properties is fundamental, as it e.g.
places the property of being a door as a more general property than e.g. being
a left–hand door, in the lattice.
The t–map, however, is not the only structure forming a lattice. Also the p–map
and r–map form lattices because of their set–based nature.
In knowledge engineering, attempts have been made for unifying taxonomic
and partonomic relations using the Pierce product as notation for attribution;
[34]. In Θ, the three maps can be seen as three different aspects of the artefact
described [155].
4.5.2 Relation to the BAS•CAAD ThingClass
In this section, we relate the presented artefact model to the ThingClass of the
BAS•CAAD project [68], from which it was inspired. A ThingClass is defined
as a 6–tuple of attribute sets, denoted: T = (TG, TC , RI , TE, RE , AU ). TG is the
set of generic or superclass attributes, TC is the set of composition attributes,
RI is the set of internal relations, TE is the set of environment attributes, RE
is the set of external relations, and AU is the set of unary attributes which
represent intrinsic properties of systems.
The specification of the presented artefact model Θ can be considered a projec-
tion of the above ThingClass specification.
The members in the union set of generic or superclass attributes (TG) and unary
attributes representing intrinsic properties (AU ) each designate properties (p:P)
in Θ. We have not made a distinction between class attributes and intrinsic
properties, as we formally cannot make this distinction. Both may be denoted
by unary predicates, so the distinction is merely intentional.
The set of composition attributes, corresponds to the p–map in Θ.
The sets of environment attributes and external relations have been omitted
in Θ. In the ThingClass these aim at modelling functional requirements (or
behaviour) of an artefact, but such information might exist on a different level
of description. Formally, instantiating a binary relation between an artefact
and the environment implies considering that environment piece as part of the
artefact. Rather, it is combinations of properties and relations that makes
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the artefact functional. E.g. a certain combination of dimension and material
makes a wall resist fire. Thus, functional requirements are to be modelled as a
mathematical function ranging over sets of properties and relations. This way
we are able to model what Bunge’s calls dispositional properties [38].
A further study of this area could be founded on understanding properties as
functions of events [153].
4.6 Design tool requirements
In this section, we specify some basic requirements for design tools facilitating
incremental design and improved semantic support. We found this specifica-
tion on an organisation of information levels. We have already mentioned the
conceptual level on which artefact descriptions belong. In addition, there are
two more levels: The presentation level on which visualisations of artefact mo-
dels belong, and the Conceptual level!semantic level on which the semantical
functions of properties, relations, design moves, etc. belong. The mathematical
function modelling dispositional properties (see Section 4.5.2) appears as a spe-
cial semantic function (see [61] for another denotational semantic treatment of
the domain of civil engineering).
Information on the presentation level is the result of computerized interpretation
of information on the conceptual level, according to information on the semantic
descriptive level.
Figure 4.4 shows the semantic relations between the three levels.
interpretation of
red_ochra(x) ∧ wall(x) ∧ . . .
[[ red_ochra ]] = . . .Semantic descriptive level
Conceptual level
Presentation level
defined by
— x
Figure 4.4: Information Levels.
Adding properties and various sorts of relations to an artefact model, we consider
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a special case of semantic descriptive information (although it certainly differs
from the understanding of specifying the semantics of properties).
4.6.1 Semantics of design moves
The semantics of design moves can be described as functions from one artefact
model to another. That is, the various sorts of moves like adding a part, ascri-
bing a property to an object, etc. are considered syntactical commands (c:Cmd)
on the semantic descriptive level. The semantics (specified using the semantical
parentheses [[ ]]) we model as the result/effect of performing the move; here
using a denotational approach [61]:
type
Cmd == addobj | addprop(p:P) | addpartrel(x:X, x′:X) |
addrel(z:X, z′:X, υ:Υ),
value
[[ ]]: Cmd ∼→ Θ ∼→ Θ,
new: Θ → X
axiom ∀ c:Cmd, θ, θ′:Θ, p:P, x,x′:X •
[[ addobj ]](θ) ≡
let x=new θ in
mk_(t(θ)†[ x 7→ {} ],p(θ)†[ x 7→ {} ],r(θ))
end,
[[ addprop(p) ]](θ) ≡
mk_Θ(t(θ)†[ x 7→ t(θ) ∪ {p} ],p(θ),r(θ)),
[[ addpartrel(x, x′) ]](θ) ≡
mk_Θ(t(θ),p(θ)†[ x′ 7→ p(θ) ∪ {x} ],r(θ)),
[[ addrel(x, x′, υ) ]](θ) ≡
mk_Θ(t(θ),p(θ),r(θ)†[ (x,x′) 7→ r(θ) ∪ {υ} ]),
4.6.2 Semantic support
The presented property–oriented framework facilitates a large number of se-
mantic applications. Of these, we emphasize: Querying design models (e.g. as
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conformance checking), and merging artefact models. From an artefact model,
we can extract the formal context (m:M) by determining the property–set (ps:P-
set) present in the artefact model. We then build the map for the formal con-
text by pairing objects (x:X) from the artefact model with each property in ps
and mapping the pair to a boolean value (b:Bool) stating whether or not the
object has this property. This context serves as the taxonomical information we
need in simple querying.
value
X_M: Θ → M
X_M(θ) ≡
let ps={p|p:P • (∃ x:X • x ∈ dom t(θ) ∧
p ∈ t(θ)(x))} in
[ (x′,p′)7→b | x′:X,p′:P,b:Bool • x′ ∈ dom t(θ) ∧
p ∈ ps ∧ b = p ∈ t(θ)(x) ]
end
A simple form for query is one which returns the set of objects that satisfies
certain criteria according to possessed properties and relations. That is, a query
(q:Q) is a tuple of the form (P-set × (Υ→m X-set)). Leaving all X-set empty
yields partially evaluation assuming some Υ–relation to any object.
type
Q = P-set × (Υ →m X-set),
value
I: Q → Θ → X-set
I(ps,rel)(θ) ≡
{x|x:X • (∀ p:P • p ∈ ps ⇒ p ∈ t(θ)(x)) ∧
∀ υ:Υ • υ ∈ dom rel ⇒
υ ∈ dom r(θ) ∧
(∃ x′:X • x′ ∈ rel(υ) ⇒ υ ∈ r(θ)(x,x′))}
The above can be specialised such that interpretations of queries return sub–
models of artefacts. This can be convenient when writing various extraction
applications. Furthermore, by specifying requirements as sets of properties and
relations, it is possible to perform conformance checking on artefact models.
As a result of distributed design processes, e.g. web–based, a function for merg-
ing two artefact models may be useful. The function should, given two artefact
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models, state what possible inconsistency there is. Such information is given
in terms of artefact models; i.e., the set of objects mapping to conflicting pro-
perties, and the objects making a cycle in the part–whole relations, see [134]
for a formal definition. We assume, the existence of a predicate conflict stating
whether or not two properties are mutually exclusive; based on some “universal”
taxonomy represented as a formal context.
value
merge: Θ × Θ → M → Θ
merge(θ,θ′)(m) as θ′′
post (∀ x:X • x ∈ dom t(θ′′) ⇒
(∀ (p,p′):(P×P) • {p,p′} ⊆ t(θ′′)(x) ⇒ conflict(p,p′)(m)) ∧
p(θ′′) = [ x 7→xs|x:X,xs:X-set •
(x ∈ p(θ) ∧ x ∈ p(θ′) ⇒
xs=p(θ)(x) ∪ p(θ′)(x)) ∨
(x ∈ p(θ) ⇒ xs=p(θ)(x)) ∨
(x ∈ p(θ′) ⇒ xs=p(θ′)(x)) ] ∧
is_cyclic(p(θ′′))),
conflict: (P × P) → M → Bool,
is_cyclic: (X→m X-set) → Bool
Simple consistency of one artefact model (θ:Θ) can be obtained by using the
empty artefact model as second argument. That is, merge(θ,([],[],[])) applied on
some formal context, e.g. X_M(θ).
4.6.3 Accumulating design knowledge
Even though we have assumed that an artefact model only applies to one artefact
idea, the notion has more potential. Consider the case of making a whole series
of artefact models θ1, θ2, . . . , θn. These, we assume represent different artefact
ideas, each on their “final” stages of design. The knowledge within these might
be important for future design processes in two ways: (i) Each artefact model
defines taxonomic relations, and (ii) each artefact model can be seen as examples
of how to model certain artefacts. The two can be quite important in knowl-
edge engineering of artefacts. It can be shown that formal contexts representing
taxonomic relations easily can be added incrementally. Thereby, knowledge of
kind–of relations can be built up and concepts involving various incomparable
properties can be deduced [85]. Such concepts can then be made predefined
types such that efficiency of design (like we have it in today’s commercial CAD
tools) is achieved. Furthermore, collecting previous artefact models together
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with the semantic definitions of e.g. properties, we have a (though primitive)
foundation for defining concepts by their extentions. That is, simply by visual-
ising previous objects falling under the concept in question.
4.7 Conclusion: Beyond drawings
We have presented a property–oriented framework for design tools supporting
incremental design. In order to do so, we have specified the notion of an artefact
model storing taxonomic and partonomic information, as well as information
about other binary relations of the artefacts. An achievement is that properties
and relations can be added incrementally to the current artefact model. That
is, we abandon the idea of static type systems and move properties and rela-
tions to the dynamic run–time level. Furthermore, we have indicated how new
properties and relations can be introduced by formally specifying their seman-
tics. We have argued that the aspects of any artefact model separately satisfies
Galois criterion, and thus makes the specification a solid foundation for tools
offering improved semantic support. In this context, we have specified some
basic requirements.
However, the framework can be taken further. In this paper, we have not
really relied on artefact descriptions as syntactical documents like drawings.
Rather, we have focused on the underlying conceptual framework, being the
semantical one. A similar framework could certainly be defined for other sorts of
civil engineering tools like for managing construction specifications or handling
contracts. We believe that a wide range of civil engineering tools might benefit
from a semantic treatment and thus can be founded on a property–oriented
framework.
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Chapter 5
Incremental building design
as lattices
Abstract: The paper explores the formal and philosophical foundation
for incremental design by introducing the notion of artefact models and an
ordering relation between such models. As a step towards advanced design
tools, we suggest that the various design stages are recorded in a struc-
tural way which complies with a mathematically defined ordering relation
between the stages. Two mathematically well–founded approaches are ex-
plored: An approach based on class partition, and an approach based on
lattices. We argue that the latter is most suitable as it facilitates a dis-
tinction between two sorts of design moves: Those which explore design
aspects, and those which compose partial solutions. The former kind of
moves origin from join in the lattice. The moves include adding objects,
properties of objects, and relations between objects. The latter kind cor-
responds to lattice meet. The lattices for recording design processes are
called design lattices. In these, nodes correspond to artefact models and
edges correspond to design moves. We show that the design moves define
a partial ordering of artefact models, and that this ordering satisfy lattice
criteria.
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5.1 Introduction
Consider the process of designing a steel profile for a bridge structure. Through
the process, a number of properties are selected. These could be: a length of
2400mm, a height of 28mm, a width of 44mm, the property of being made of
steel, and having an H –shaped profile. Figure 5.1 depicts such a steel profile.
Figure 5.1: A steel profile.
The properties mentioned may be conceived and selected for the design in any
order without resulting in different object conceptions. The reason is that the
property domains of length, height, width, material, etc. are incomparable sorts
of design knowledge. A property domain, following Gärdenfors, is an ontological
space of properties similar in kind [86]. E.g. colour properties belong to the same
property domain. Properties belonging to the same domain exclude each other.
E.g. an object cannot have two distinct masses. Contrary, properties from
incomparable domains can co–exist for an object.
Properties from incomparable domains are brought together in order for the
object in mind to have certain functionality. In general, we say that the object
has certain causal dispositions. This means that the object can react in a certain
way given certain stimuli or when put in certain situations. We thereby follow
philosophical doctrines like Shoemaker’s [153] in which properties are related
to the notion of causation; the theory of causes and effects. For example, the
mentioned dimension and material properties may give the profile the strength
to resist a certain pressure on the middle. This strength is a causal disposition
of the beam. The problem of selecting a set of properties such that an object
will have certain functionality is called a design problem [45].
Bringing together a number of properties from incomparable domains is in knowl-
edge engineering and formal ontology known as multiple inheritance. We believe
that this concept is crucial to that of designing.
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As a step towards advanced and sophisticated planning and design tools, we
wish to record design stages and the relation between them; the design moves
[149]. The systematic design practitioner may strive to be aware of the design
moves being made. It is background and sometimes tacit knowledge whether one
design is more detailed and specialised than another, whether two alternative
design solutions are in conflict or can be combined, etc.
In this paper, we introduce a structure and approach for recording and struc-
turing design processes. Such a structure is to maintain an ordering relation
between design stages. Order–theoretically, we can take three seemingly dif-
ferent approaches.
The first approach partitions a class of objects falling under some general design
concept like hospital or bridge. The partition process is performed recursively
until a satisfactory design concept is reached. We call this approach the class
partition approach. The approach complies with the mathematical notion of
class partition of individuals and thereby seems attractive.
The second approach origins in an empty design to which objects, properties of
objects, and relations between objects, are added. Different design stages can
be combined by means of multiple inheritance. The approach is called design
lattices, as it is based on the mathematical notion of lattices which makes the
approach attractive.
The third approach origins in a notion ofmereological1 universe which is the sum
of all objects. This sum is partitioned recursively until a satisfactory object sum
is reached2. Objects are, however, not specialised by their kinds, which makes
the approach unattractive for design processes going from rough sketches to final
designs3.
The notion of design is complex. It involves such notions as knowledge and be-
lieve, causal dispositions, natural laws, creativity, aesthetics, non–deterministic
and even irrational decisions. Also, a given design problem can be approached
and solved in various ways. Selecting a property in one domain may restrict the
space of properties from other domains, necessary for solving the design problem
at hand. E.g. designing the H–profile to be of weaker material requires it to be
larger in cross section, in order for it to have the same strength. The restrictions
are defined by ontological bindings; most important the natural laws of physics.
1We shall not discuss the notion of mereology in this paper, but refer to [155].
2In fact the reverse process could also be considered in which case the process (besides the
process of specialising objects) has similarity with design lattices.
3This subject has been treated in Chapter 4.
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The aim of introducing design lattices is, however, deliberately terse: We
do not explain how nor under what mental conditions the designer conceives
design ideas or makes choices. Neither, do we attempt to order design choices
according to ontological bindings.
Our aim is to record — not to restrict — the design process. We believe that
design lattices, in its order–theoretics is a suitable approach and makes a good
formal foundation for conceptual design tools aimed for all stages of design.
Design lattices facilitate browsing and combining of design configuration. By
browsing we understand reviewing previous design configurations. Combining
design configurations is an important ingredient in todays distributed world.
In Section 5.2 we present a perspective on the design process and define the
notion of design move based on a philosophical and scientific understanding of
problem and solution. We argue in Section 5.3 that the seemingly attractive
approach of class partition falls short of capturing important design process is-
sues. We claim that the reason is that the approach lacks a distinction between
two sorts of design moves: design moves by aspect and design moves by confi-
guration. The notion of design lattice is then introduced in Section 5.4 in order
to facilitate such a distinction which incorporates multiple inheritance.
In Section 5.6 we present a formal model of building design configurations.
Further in Section 5.7, we define a relation between such configurations and we
show that the relation is a partial ordering satisfying basic lattice axioms.
Throughout the paper, we use the RAISE Specification Language [134, 135] to
specify mathematical precise formulations of the presented ideas.
5.2 The design process
We found our work on a design understanding called incremental design. It is
a design conception which sees design as an exploration process in design which
knowledge is incrementally added to design configurations. More precisely:
Definition 5.1 (Incremental design) Incremental design is a process
in which objects, properties of objects and relations between objects are desig-
nated and alternately added to a design configuration.
Definition 5.2 (Design configuration) By a design configuration we
understand a conceptual design representation.
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When a design configuration represents the design of an artefact, we speak of
an artefact model .
Definition 5.3 (Artefact) By an artefact , we understand a physical ob-
ject which is the product of human actions and which has been intentionally
produced for some purpose [100].
Incremental design has been explored intensively in the BAS•CAAD project [64,
67, 75, 167] which focused on design at the early stages. Formal treatments of
incremental design include [62] (Chapter 4) which founded ideas for the present
paper.
5.2.1 Problem and solution
The notion of incremental design is founded on a philosophical and a scientific
understanding of the notions of problem and solution. According to Bunge a
problem can be seen roughly as lack of solution knowledge [40]:
“A problem is a knowledge gap, and a problem solving process is one
aiming at filling such gap. . .”
The definition is a general one; although, there are sorts of problems which
do not match it, e.g. computational problems which can be described but not
solved. However, the definition seems attractive when considering the notion of
design.
Through an iterative process, knowledge for a solution is collected into a ten-
tative solution. In each iteration, the tentative solution is validated against the
problem at hand. The result shows whether the solution has been reached, al-
ternatives should be considered, or whether more design knowledge needs to be
added. The understanding shows that the path from problem to solution is one
which incrementally adds solution knowledge as well as may span into distinct
alternatives at each stage.
In design, a problem is usually one of offering functionality. Examples include
the functionality of protecting against cold weather and the functionality of
defining a space for certain activities [69]. A solution to the problem is the
identification of the characteristics of artefacts which offer such functionality.
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The notion of functionality is to be understood in a broad sense here. Require-
ments of buildings — defining the design problem at hand — can be categorized
into three distinct sorts: functional, spatial and contextual.
Definition 5.4 (Functional requirements) By functional require-
ments, we understand requirements to the behaviour of an artefact when given
certain situation.
A functional requirement of a wall can be for it to reduce noise with a certain
percentage. The problem is to fulfil the functional requirements and the solution
is a certain set of properties such that it is the case.
Definition 5.5 (Spatial requirements) By spatial requirements, we
understand a measurement of the minimum space needed for the activities for
which a building is to be built.
A spatial requirement of an office building can be for it to possess 32 office rooms
of (at least) 20m2 each. The solution is a certain partition and distribution of
available space such that it is the case.
Definition 5.6 (Contextual requirements) By contextual require-
ments, we understand the bindings of the building to the surroundings, which
restrict the choices of locations.
A contextual requirement of a kindergarten building is that it is placed at least
240m from any highway. The solution is a selection of a certain available building
site such that it is the case.
In a sense, a solution to each sort of requirement makes the artefact satisfy
certain needs. Functional requirements are met by ascribing the right sets of
properties to objects. Spatial requirements are met in a similar manner, though
with a focus on spatial properties like length and height, and in addition by
including spatial–oriented relations between objects. Contextual requirements
usually concern the relations in which an artefact is supposed to stand to the
surroundings. Thus, it is not primarily concerned with the artefact in isolation.
Still, certain restrictions due to the surroundings may influence the problem
solving processes concerning functionality and spatiality. E.g. there may be re-
strictions which say that the building should fit by not being too tall, a property
which involves surrounding buildings.
Various design and construction technical conceptions comply with the philo-
sophical and scientific understanding of problem and solution. One of the most
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prominent within architecture, engineering, and construction (AEC), is included
in Gielingh’s definition of The General AEC reference model ; also known as the
GARM [89]. In the GARM, artefacts are specified in terms of Product Defi-
nition Units (PDU ). By a PDU, Gielingh understands any part of an artefact
interesting or important enough to record information about. Seven life–cycle
stages of artefact development are distinguished; all considered sub–types of
PDUs. Two of these are Functional Unit and Technical Solution.
A functional unit is a product definition unit concerned with what is required
of the artefact; also called “as–required ”. A Technical solution is a product
definition unit concerned with how the requirement, stated by the functional
unit as a problem is solved; also called “as–designed ”.
The GARM model was proposed for inclusion in the STEP standard [6]. Even
though it was never accepted, it has had a tremendous influence on research and
on industry practice within standardisation of product data, interoperability,
etc.
5.2.2 Design move
Adding objects, properties of objects and relations between objects to a design
configuration makes the design more specialised and thus more narrow for in-
terpretation. The actions conceptually change a design and are what we shall
understand by design moves.
The notion of design moves (and its varieties) was originally introduced by Schön
[149] and used as fundamental notion in [164, 139, 79].
Definition 5.7 (Design move (cognitively)) By a design move, we
understand an action of thought with which the practitioner conceives a design
aspect or changes a design conceptually.
We shall consider design moves to be formally defined functions which change
a design model — from one stage into another.
In incremental design, the various stages are related by design moves. Recording
the moves and structuring design stages requires a proper and formal definition of
the relation. More importantly, the definition must explicitly state how incremen-
tality is incorporated such that we can talk of design specialisation. This means,
that the relation between design stages is an ordering relation.
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The intuition of designing being a series of choices and changes to a design
configuration outlines a hierarchy of design stages.
In the following sections, we consider two definitions of the relation between
design stages: (i) The approach of class partition, and the approach of Design
Lattices . The two approaches differ in the sense that the former is based on a
principle of class partition, in which each class represents possible realisations of
the design in question. As a general term we shall use the term “individual ” to
denote such realisations. A collection of such individuals makes the extension
of a class4. Design lattices, on the other hand, represent dual knowledge to
individuals, like the properties of individuals. Also, design lattices facilitate
multiple inheritance of objects, properties of objects, and relations between
objects. Both approaches are fundamental in the sense that they are founded
on mathematical abstractions: trees and lattices, respectively.
5.3 Class partition
The approach of class partition is based on the notion of classification. In the
beginning of the design exploration process, we have a concept under which the
possible designs as individuals fall5. A collection of individuals is called a class.
A full collection of all possible individuals falling under a concept is called the
extension of the concept. These may, however, not all qualify as proper solutions
to the design problem at hand.
The exploration process now divides the class recursively until a satisfactory
design concept is reached. In mathematics this is called class partition, or
simply partition.
Definition 5.8 (Class partition) By a class partition, in mathematics,
we understand a division of a set of individuals into mutually exclusive and
jointly exhaustive subsets. Each such subset is a class of which individuals are
intimately associated by means of an equivalence relation [8].
Instead of expressing equivalence relations, it is common to describe individuals
of classes by expressions with a predicative nature on individuals. Such ex-
4although not all collections may be proper class extensions.
5Several philosophical problems are here present. Primarily, we have the problem of having
collections of artefacts not yet existing. Suggestions for solving this problem include applying
a Platonic perspective [84] and introducing possible worlds (see the papers in Chapter 8 and
Chapter 9).
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pressions may refer to properties of the individuals which means that what is
expressed is the conditions for individuals to belong to a certain class.
The structure of class partitions spans a tree structure as depicted on Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: Classification of individuals.
Design choices here means selecting a certain path among possible alternatives.
Each choice decreases the space of individuals and the process stops when a
satisfactory design concept is reached. A partition of the class of bridges is
pictorially shown on Figure 5.36.
It is fundamental to the approach, that what is partitioned right from the start
is the class of all individuals (perhaps restricting to some basic concept like
house or hospital).
Model–theoretically, the approach is extensional as each stage in the design
process associates to it a class of individuals. Going from problem to solution
means going from the class of all individuals to more and more narrow classes
by means of restriction. Each such restriction corresponds to the incrementally
added conditions derived from the design problem.
Although the partition approach complies with the problem–solution under-
standing and the mathematical notion of class partition, we claim six objections
to it.
6Note, that any pictorial representation of concepts which differ in abstraction is wrong.
Excluding parts of a picture does not correctly express the fact that what is presented is more
abstract. However, this is the only graphical means for expression possible.
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suspension bridge with 76m
76m
free height
suspension bridge with 45m
45m
suspension bridge with openingsuspension bridgecable-stayed bridge
Figure 5.3: Partition of the bridge class.
The first objection is that it may not be possible always to state the overall
concept under which a final design solution falls. As argued by Schön [149],
working with a design may open for other sorts of solutions than first conceived.
Thus, a straight top–down approach is not always possible. As a rule of thumb,
we could say that the better we know the domain of discourse, the better can
a top–down approach be applied. Solving this problem by starting with a very
general concept, may result in loss of the focus instead. One of the characteristic
of design is that we do not really know the class of design solutions that well —
especially not if we are talking about innovative design; i.e. design of completely
new sorts of artefacts.
The second objection is that we are hardly interested in representing the classes
of design individuals which have not been selected. Thereby, the whole idea of
class partition seems to be lost. In some cases, a design process will then be
a series of class name definitions of which the definiendum may be difficult to
express simply because we need to express what individuals the classes do not
include.
The third objection is that the approach does not give a good account on how
to handle removal of design knowledge. We cannot overlook the fact that some
design moves are in fact removal of objects, properties of objects or relations
between objects, from a design. Basically, there are two problems. The first is
that in order to maintain consistency, removal of such design information has
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to be performed in the opposed order in which it has been added. However,
removing one piece of information may also remove other pieces of information,
depending on the order in which the classes have been partitioned. In general,
we may need to make several such steps upwards the classification structure
before the unintended design information has been removed. Along the way
we may have removed other design information which we wished to keep. The
problem, we call the backtracking problem. The second problem appears if we
try to solve the first by allowing removal downwards the tree structure. This
may result in obscure situation, in which we start with a general design concept
and ends up with this concept again because restrictions have been removed.
The fourth objection is that identical pieces of design information may exists
in stages of non–equivalent classes in a partition. This means that we have
redundant information. Redundancy, potentially is the cause of inconsistency
problems, and should in general be avoided.
The fifth objection is that the partition approach do not offer convenient and
easy ways of combining distinct, possibly overlapping design solutions.
The sixth objection is that it may be a problem categorising a design indivi-
dual to belong to a certain class. In knowledge engineering, it is common to
categorise individuals according to their properties. However, the individuals
we are considering may consist of several objects; each having own properties.
Classifying such multi–object constellations is complicated. The reason is that
we need to include conditions for whether design concepts have parts of certain
kinds. Thereby, the problem of classification becomes a type identity problem
based on part–whole relations of objects. This problem is one of the problems
in part–whole theory (in general, extensional mereology) for which objections
are strong (cf. Chapter 8).
Also, other concept names may better characterise intention and use of the in-
dividuals of a class. E.g. several theaters are housed in closed factory buildings.
The first and second objections indicate that the design process should be con-
sidered to start with an empty configuration. To this empty configuration,
design knowledge is added incrementally, thereby specialising the design and
decreasing the solution space. Instead of having concepts for each design stage,
we suggest that we focus on properties of objects and relations between objects.
The third, fourth, and fifth objections call for a distinction between two sorts of
design moves: (i) those which explore design alternatives, and (ii) those which
combine design alternatives. We call these: design move by aspect and design
move by configuration, respectively. The distinction is convenient in order to
represent the many–sorted knowledge of designs.
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Together, the five objections suggest that a convenient structure for recording
and structuring design processes, is a lattice.
The sixth objection raises more philosophical and epistemological questions of
how names can be used to denote classes of artefacts. Among these is the
question of whether we can relate concept and use/rôle of objects falling under
concepts. However, we shall not treat this issue in this paper (cf. Chapter 8).
5.4 Design lattices
The approach of design lattices does not rely on concepts for denoting individual
design solutions. Rather it relies on the properties which aim at characterising
the objects in design solutions. The approach is thus intensional, whereas the
other is extensional.
Design lattices have the structure of mathematical lattices.
Definition 5.9 (Design lattice) By a design lattice, we understand a
collection of design configurations which are partially ordered. Each design
configuration corresponds to a specific stage in the design process. The relation
stands between such design stages corresponds to design moves which specialise
the configurations.
Figure 5.4 shows a design lattice for one design process leading to a bridge design
similar to the one depicted on Figure 5.3.
A design lattice is always bounded upwards. The bound is called Top (⊤)
and represents the empty design configuration; that which has the empty set
of objects. From Top, we can go to stages such that objects, properties of
objects, and relations between objects are added — one step at a time, though.
Design configurations (i.e. stages) are brought together by means of the lattice
operationmeet . This operation takes two design configurations (partial designs)
and gives the configuration with the union set of objects and the union set of
properties for equally named objects. A similar account applies to the relations
in the two models.
It is not inevitable that design lattices are bound downwards. The reason is that
lattice meet can be applied for later being abandoned in favour of the meet of
other design stages. However, a design lattice can always be bound downwards
by adding to it lattice meet of all lower branches.
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Figure 5.4: Design lattice leading to a bridge design.
As a general interpretation rule of design stages in design lattices, we can say
that objects in a design are required to be existing parts of the artefact in mind.
Similar goes for properties and relations.
Model–theoretically, design lattices have similarities with the approach of class
partition. The empty configuration of a design lattice corresponds to a most
general design concept; the concept for which we do not require that individuals
consist of certain objects nor that certain properties are ascribed the objects. All
artefacts satisfy these criteria. Adding objects, properties of objects, and rela-
tions between objects introduce restrictions which specialise the design concepts.
Such concepts could be the concept of individuals consisting of two objects of
which the former is ascribed the property of being made of steel and the latter
the property of being made of wood. Suitable concept names may be difficult
to define but with design lattices, we do not have to do so.
Compositionally, the notion of design lattices have similarity with extensional
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mereology — i.e. the theory of part–whole relations. The empty configuration
corresponds to absurdum — the empty object constellation. Lattice meet of
all design configuration corresponds to universe; although in a very local un-
derstanding. In mereology universe is the mereological sum of all objects in
the world. In this doctrine, objects are either atomic or sums of other objects,
where sum is the inverse operation of performing a partition of the universe or
a part of the universe. However, mereology focuses on the opposed direction of
going from empty configurations with its emphasis on universe.
In order to overcome the problems stated by the six objections, design lattices
make a distinction between two sorts of design moves: design moves by aspect
and design moves by configuration.
From lattice theory, we know that redundancy can be eliminated by means of
restructuring. This is a possibility, but not a requirement, in design lattices
as we aim at recording the design decisions of the practitioner. The partial
ordering of lattices ensures that consistency is maintained. Figure 5.5 shows
how design lattices handle object removal compared to an approach which does
not maintain order of design stages.
remove object
(a)
remove object
(b)
Figure 5.5: Object removal: Design lattice (a), without order (b).
However, it should be stated that design lattices do not give complete freedom
in backtracking. Consider the situation where a set of objects have been put
together with lattice meet, and then from this stage additional objects are added.
Removing one of the first added objects cannot be done from the resulting
stage; only from the stage of the first meet operation. That is, the backtracking
problem can occur with design lattice, but they still add more flexibility (with
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respect to order consistency) than the class partition approach.
5.4.1 Design choice by aspect
Design choice by aspect is the class of design moves which add an object, a
property of an object, or a relation between two objects, to a design. The
choice is made between different incomparable sorts of design knowledge; that
is: objects, properties of various domains, and relations of various kinds. The
domains of such knowledge are called aspects. That is:
Definition 5.10 (Aspect) By an aspect, we understand the conception
of an object or a domain of properties/relations which relate by their kinds.
In a design lattice, design choice by aspect means selecting a certain design path.
That is, exploring possibilities of a certain domain of properties, like colours or
material. Figure 5.6 shows the principle of design choice by aspect.
dimensions construction/
 material
colour
Figure 5.6: Design choice by aspect.
The notion of aspect is inspired by Gärdenfors’ notion of domains. Besides
making partitions of design knowledge into incomparable sorts, design choice by
aspect also serves the purpose of making partitions of single property domains.
Not all equivalence classes of a partition need to be represented in the lattice,
as indicated on Figure 5.7. Consider a partition of the property of having a
length of 3m or more into the property of having a length between 3 and 8m,
and 5 and 10m, respectively. This partition excludes the possibility of having a
length of more than 10m and less than 3m. It may seem strange mathematically,
but there is no rationality in representing design knowledge which will never be
considered to be added to the current design. Selecting the colour green for an
object does not commit us to also representing all other colours. We simply
represent nodes that correspond to actual or previous design stages.
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Figure 5.7: Partition of length properties.
5.4.2 Design choice by configuration
Design choice by configuration is the class of design moves which combine exist-
ing design stages. That is, they combine different aspects into a configuration.
For properties, this principle is known as multiple inheritance and — concern-
ing representation — it is the point where lattices put distance to trees. For
comparable properties like having the colour red and green, the result is the
intersection set of the property values. We shall later see how names (called
attributes) are used in the identification of property domains.
For incomparable properties like being made of concrete and being shaped as
a column, the result is the union set of the property values. An explanation
of incomparability is as follows. Consider the property of being transparent
and the property of having the colour blue. These properties do not exclude
each other; they can co–exist for an object. The reason is that the former is
defined as materials capability to let through light, whereas the latter is defined
as the property of how light is reflected. The two properties thus instantiate
distinct causal relations between the objects in question, and the surrounding.
This understanding of properties is adopted from Shoemaker [153] (see also
Chapter 9).
Figure 5.8 shows the principle of design choice by configuration.
5.5 Ontological entities for design representation
We search for a minimal set of ontological entities to which references can be
made in design descriptions. This set seems to include the notions of objects,
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construction/
 material colour
Figure 5.8: Design choice by configuration.
properties, and relations.
5.5.1 Objects as containers
In research of conceptual design systems, a focus has been directed towards
the notion of properties [64, 82]. In this paper, we shall maintain this focus.
Thereby, we follow the property oriented approach suggested in [62] (Chapter 4)
which has many similarities with the class oriented approach presented in [87].
However, we cannot ignore objects in favour of properties. That would soon
present the problem of formally distinguishing two parts of an artefact which
have been ascribed identical properties but cognitively represents distinct ob-
ject conceptions. An example is two identical windows. In description of the
windows, we might need references to infinite many properties (of which most
would be of little importance) in order to distinguish the two objects.
Therefore, we introduce objects as a kind of containers. They are simply identi-
fiers which facilitate distinguishing equal sets of property and relations, respec-
tively. They can be thought of as containers in which we can fill in representa-
tions for properties.
5.5.2 Properties
Properties are refereed to when describing or characterizing objects formally
and in every days life. First, the notion of properties is included in knowledge
engineering in order to distinguish objects and to define similarity of objects. A
similar aim can be seen in the metaphysical world in which the notion of property
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relates to perception, characterisation, and communication, as well as causes and
effects (causation). Some basic work about properties as metaphysical entities,
include [71, 143, 122, 153, 86].
Gärdenfors argues in [86] for making a distinction between properties and regions
of properties (property domains), and concepts. The latter is a combination of
properties from various domains. Gärdenfors’ view adds an extra dimension to
ontologies coming out of analytic philosophy. Important examples are Frege’s
introduction of truth–conditions and Russell’s notion of universals [71, 143].
In this paper, we shall understand property designations as pairs. The first
component of such a pair is a name of the domain to which the property belongs.
We shall call this component the attribute. The second component of the pair
is a set of values.
The question is now how we should understand properties ontologically. Most
important: What sorts of property values should we include? Shoemaker [153,
152], following Geach [88], chooses to exclude extrinsic properties, and thus only
focus on intrinsic properties.
Extrinsic properties are the properties that objects possess in virtue of a connection
to their surroundings. Intrinsic properties are the properties that objects possess
completely independently of any surroundings.
Shoemaker makes his choice in his epistemological search for an explanation of
how we can know that an object has certain properties. This becomes intere-
sting when analysing design rationality in context of the relation to functional
requirements (see Chapter 9).
Shoemaker thus concentrates on properties that are genuine. The broad no-
tion of Cambridge properties satisfies the criteria that loosing or gaining such a
Cambridge property results in a Cambridge change7 — simply that Fx at time t
and ¬Fx at time t′ > t. However, this definition also applies to so–calledMere–
Cambridge properties like for a person to be 100 miles from a burning barn.
That is, the class of Mere–Cambridge properties is a sub–class of the class of
extrinsic properties. According to Shoemaker, there is hardly a good metaphys-
ical reason for maintaining extrinsic properties. Being 100 miles from a burning
barn is simply a topological relation between two objects; not something which
is intrinsically part of the identity of objects8.
7In [8] though defined more restrictively; namely as a non–genuine change.
8However, relations (especially part–whole relations) may be important in order to desig-
nate objects. We argue for this perspective in Chapter 8
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We claim that in order for an artefact description to be natural, knowledge of
how objects relate must be expressed by reference to relations and not to extrin-
sic properties. Thereby, we follow Shoemaker’s distinction between properties
solely associated with an object, and properties relying on the existence of other
objects. The latter, we — as Shoemaker — exclude all together and replace with
binary relations.
5.5.3 Relations
In our understanding, relations differ from properties in that their instantiation
depend on the declaration of two objects. In this work, we shall settle with
binary relations. A relation R(x, x′) reads: Object x has relation R to x′. The
relation is not necessarily symmetric.
Topological relations, which relate objects spatially, are inevitable in all design
descriptions of artefacts. E.g., a topological relation can state that two objects
are placed within a certain distance, on top of each other, one approaching
another with some angle, etc.
As for properties, we understand relation designations as pairs of which the first
component is an attribute and the second is a set of values. Relation attributes
and values may, however, distinct from those of properties.
Topological relations define orientation for the included objects in a model and
we thus do not need any coordinate system to help us. We see coordinate systems
as convenient when describing something geometrically. However, conceptually
they are a flaw of design system, although interpretation of conceptual models
may require some kind of translation from relation designations to geometrical
data (see also our discussion on this subject in Section 7.10.1 in Chapter 7).
We believe — as Shoemaker [153, 152] — that information like placement in
space is not a property of the object but rather a relation between objects.
5.5.4 Values and value domains
Consider the property of having a length of 5m and the property of having a
length of more than 3m. In Formal Concept Analysis, we need to express these as
unary predicates as subsumption is not defined between the individual properties
they denote. We would have to write length_5m and length_more_than_3m
which is a standard solution to the problem of many–valued logic [85]. Both
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names have predicative nature; however, in design we need to handle properties
of object, isolated from any formal context. In Formal Concept Analysis, a for-
mal context is what defines extension and intension of a concept. It is basically
a table of which the columns can be represented by predicates and the rows
correspond to objects being predicated. The cells within the table are Boolean
values. Formal contexts are most often used in bottom up data analysis which
is a process different from the constructive process of designing. If we were to
compare the properties denoted by the predicates like the above, the comparison
would be merely syntactical. We seek a more smooth approach for our purpose.
Therefore, we have introduced attributes and values for designation of proper-
ties and relations. It is important to emphasize, that the attribute of a property
should have predicative nature — not on objects — but on property values.
E.g. colour is predicative on the values red and green, and denotes the ontologi-
cal domain to which such values belong. That an object has a property, which
is defined as a set with one property value, means that the object is considered
or expected to have that specific property. If the set of property values contains
more than one value, each value represents a possible or acceptable value for
that property. In case of the empty set, we talk of the absurd property, which
may be used to represent invalid configurations or conflicts.
5.6 Artefact models
An artefact model (θ:Θ) is a record of two maps stating: (i) The bindings of
objects (x:X) to property sets (ps:PS), and (ii) the bindings of object pairs to
binary relation sets (rs:RS). A property set (ps:PS) is a map from property
attributes (a:AP) to value sets (vs:VP). A relation set (rs:RS) is a map from re-
lation attributes (a:AR) to value sets (vs:VR). Note, that we make a distinction
between values for properties and values for relations.
We say that an artefact model is wellformed if and only if: (i) all related objects
are in the domain of the map that binds objects to property sets. Formally, we
write:
type
Θ′ :: objects:X →m PS relations:(X × X) →m RS,
Θ = {|θ:Θ′ • wf(θ)|},
PS′ = AP →m VP-infset,
PS = {|ps:PS′ • (∀ vs:VP-infset • vs ∈ rng ps ⇒ vs 6= {})|}
RS′ = AR →m VR-infset,
RS = {|rs:RS′ • (∀ vs:VR-infset • vs ∈ rng rs ⇒ vs 6= {})|}
AP,
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AR,
VP,
VR
value
wf: Θ′ → Bool
wf(θ) ≡
(∀ x,x′:X • ((x,x′) ∈ dom relations θ ∨ (x′,x) ∈ dom relations θ) ⇒
{x,x′} ⊆ dom objects θ),
5.6.1 Design moves on artefact models
Whether design is understood as spanning a lattice, a tree, or some other struc-
ture, the relation between design representations is crucial.
Definition 5.11 (Design move (formally)) A design move is a tran-
sition from one artefact model (θ:Θ) to another artefact model (θ′:Θ); denoted
ψ(θ) ≡ θ′.
A design move ψ(θ) ≡ θ′ is valid, if and only if θ′ is a model of an artefact idea
which is a relevant successor to the artefact idea corresponding to the model
θ. The notion of relevant successor has been defined by Galle [79, 80]. How-
ever, we need a more mathematical explicit definition for our formal purpose
here. We recognize that the definition of relevant successor comply with ex-
tensional semantics: Each model denotes the possibly infinite set of artefacts
which complies with the restrictions and existential commitment expressed in
the model.
However, trouble is present when we wish to handle distinct objects which have
their own set of properties and relations. In our approach a model b is a relevant
successor of a model a, if an only if b includes the objects, properties of objects
and relations of a. This means that the relation between artefact models is not
a ordinary kind–of relation as for property subsumption. We write θ′ ≤ θ to
emphasize the restriction on value domains downwards the ordering of artefact
models. Especially, ∀θ • θ ≤ e, where a and e are artefact models and e is the
empty model.
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5.7 Partial order
As a first step towards design lattices, we define the relation (≤,Θ) between
artefact models.
value
≤: Θ × Θ → Bool
axiom ∀ θ, θ′:Θ •
θ ≤ θ′ ≡
(∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ⇒ (x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧
(∀ a:AP • a ∈ dom objects(θ′)(x) ⇒
(a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ∧
objects(θ)(x)(a) ⊆ objects(θ′)(x)(a))))) ∧
(∀ (x,x′):(X×X) • (x,x′) ∈ dom relations(θ′) ⇒
((x,x′) ∈ dom relations(θ) ∧
(∀ a:AR • a ∈ dom relations(θ′) ⇒
(a ∈ dom relations(θ)(x,x′) ∧
relations(θ)(x,x′)(a) ⊆ relations(θ′)(x,x′)(a)))))
Design moves are either single value functions (ψ:Ψ), or the binary lattice op-
erations join (⊓) or meet (⊔). Design moves must preserve the relation (≤,Θ):
type
Ψ = Θ → . . . → Θ,
⊓: Θ × Θ → Θ,
⊔: Θ × Θ → Θ
axiom ∀ θ, θ′:Θ, ψ:Ψ •
ψ(θ) ≤ θ,
θ ≤ ⊓(θ,θ′),
θ′ ≤ ⊓(θ,θ′),
⊔(θ,θ′) ≤ θ,
⊔(θ,θ′) ≤ θ′
With “ . . .” we intend to express that the function may take additional parame-
ters.
Definition 5.12 (Partial ordering) From [85] and [13] we have that
a binary relation is a partial ordering if it satisfies the criteria of reflexivity,
anti–symmetry, and transitivity:
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θ ≤ θ Reflexivity (5.1)
θ ≤ θ′ ∧ θ 6= θ′ ⇒∼ (θ′ ≤ θ) Anti–symmetry (5.2)
θ ≤ θ′ ∧ θ′ ≤ θ′′ ⇒ θ ≤ θ′′ Transitivity (5.3)
In the following, we shall utilize the following lemma:
Lemma 5.13 The two mappings named objects and relations in the type of
artefact models (θ:Θ), have structures that are isomorphic.
Proof: Substitute [z/x] and [z/(x, x′)], respectively, throughout the definition of
≤. Furthermore, replace types PS with RS, AP with AR, and VP with VR, and
vice versa.
From the Lemma 5.13, we have that proofs for partial ordering and lattice
equations only need to be performed for the mapping objects in artefact models.
Then the proofs apply to the mapping relations as well.
Proposition 5.14 The binary relation (≤,Θ) is reflexive.
Proof: We show that θ ≤ θ holds. From Lemma 5.13 and the definition of ≤,
we have:
(∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ) ⇒ (x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧
(∀ a:AP • a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ⇒
(a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ∧ objects(θ)(x)(a) ⊆ objects(θ)(x)(a)))))
As (z ⊆ z) ≡ true:
≡ (∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ) ⇒ (x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧
(∀ a:AP • a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ⇒
(a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ∧ true))))
As z∧ true ≡ true:
≡ (∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ) ⇒ (x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧
(∀ a:AP • a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ⇒ a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x))))
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As (z ⇒ z) ≡ true:
≡ (∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ) ⇒ (x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ true))
As (z∧ true) ≡ true:
≡ (∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ) ⇒ x ∈ dom objects(θ))
As z ⇒ z ≡ true:
≡ true
Qed
2
Proposition 5.15 The binary relation (≤,Θ) is symmetrical.
Proof: We show that θ ≤ θ′ ∧ θ 6= θ′ ⇒∼ (θ′ ≤ θ). We assume θ ⇒ θ′ ∧ θ ≤
θ′ ∧ θ 6= θ′ and prove that θ′ ≤ θ yields a contradiction.
From Lemma 5.13 and the definition of ≤, we have:
(∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ) ⇒ (x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧
(∀ a:AP • a ∈ objects(θ)(x) ⇒
(a ∈ objects(θ′)(x) ∧ objects(θ′)(x)(a) ⊆ objects(θ)(x)(a)))))
From the assumption we derive (in the quantification of x and a) that:
objects(θ)(x)(a) ⊆ objects(θ′)(x)(a) ∧ objects(θ)(x)(a) 6= objects(θ′)(x)(a) ≡
objects(θ)(x)(a) ⊂ objects(θ′)(x)(a)
Thereby, we have:
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(∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ) ⇒ (x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧
(∀ a:AP • a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ⇒
(a ∈ dom objects(θ′)(x) ∧ false))))
As z∧ false ≡ false:
≡ (∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ) ⇒ (x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧
(∀ a:AP • a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ⇒ false)))
From the assumption, we derive (in the quantification of x and a) that:
objects(θ)(x)(a) ⊆ objects(θ′)(x)(a) and objects(θ)(x)(a) 6= objects(θ′)(x)(a)
≡ objects(θ)(x)(a) ⊂ objects(θ′)(x)(a)
This means that dom objects(θ′) 6= {}.
That is: ∃ a:AP • a ∈ dom objects(θ′)(x).
We have:
(∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ) ⇒ (x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧ false))
As (z∧ false) ≡ false:
≡ (∀ x:X x ∈ dom pm ⇒ false)
From the assumption, we have that dom objects(θ) 6= {}.
That is, ∃ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ). We have:
≡ false
Qed
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2
Proposition 5.16 The binary relation (≤,Θ) is transitive.
Proof: We show that θ ≤ θ′∧θ′ ≤ θ′′ ⇒ θ ≤ θ′′. We assume that θ ≤ θ′∧θ′ ≤ θ′′
and prove that θ ≤ θ′′. From Lemma 5.13 and the definition of ≤, we have:
(∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ′′) ⇒ (x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧
(∀ a:AP • a ∈ dom objects(θ′′)(x) ⇒
(a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ∧ objects(θ)(x)(a) ⊆ objects(θ′′)(x)(a)))))
From the assumption, we derive (in the quantification of x and a) that:
objects(θ)(x)(a) ⊆ objects(θ′)(x)(a) ∧
objects(θ′)(x)(a) ⊆ objects(θ′′)(x)(a)
≡ objects(θ)(x)(a) ⊆ objects(θ′′)(x)(a)
Because of transitivity of set-inclusion, we have:
≡ (∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ′′) ⇒ (x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧
(∀ a:AP • a ∈ dom objects(θ′′)(x) ⇒
(a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ∧ true))))
As (z∧ true) ≡ true:
≡ (∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ′′) ⇒ (x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧
(∀ a:AP • a ∈ dom objects(θ′′)(x) ⇒ a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x))))
From the assumption, we derive (in the quantification of x and a) that:
dom objects(θ′)(x) ⊆ dom objects(θ)(x) ∧
dom objects(θ′′)(x) ⊆ dom objects(θ′)(x)
≡ dom objects(θ′′)(x) ⊆ dom objects(θ′′)(x)
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Because of transitivity of set-inclusion, we have:
(∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ′′) ⇒ (x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ true))
(As z∧) true ≡ z:
≡ (∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ′′) ⇒ x ∈ dom objects(θ))
From the assumption, we derive (in the quantification of x and a) that:
dom objects(θ′) ⊆ dom objects(θ) ∧
dom objects(θ′′) ⊆ dom objects(θ′)
≡ dom objects(θ′′) ⊆ dom objects(θ)
Because of transitivity of set-inclusion, we have:
≡ true
Qed
2
Theorem 5.17 The relation (≤,Θ) defines a partial order.
Proof: The proof follows directly from Proposition 5.14, Proposition 5.15, and
Proposition 5.16.
2
5.8 Lattices operations
The next step towards design lattices is to define the two lattice operations
meet (⊔) and join (⊓). This is done hierarchically on the mapping structures of
artefact models. That is, we overload the operations for property sets (ps:PS)
as well as for relation sets (rs:RS).
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Definition 5.18 (Lattice meet) The meet of two artefact models a and
b is the artefact model which is the union set of objects, the union set of pro-
perties for each common object, and the union set of relations between common
objects. For each property and relation the value sets of common attributes are
the intersection sets, respectively.
Definition 5.19 (Lattice join) The join of two artefact models a and
b is the artefact model which is the intersection set of objects, the intersection
set of properties for each common object, and the intersection set of relations
between common objects. For each property and relation the value sets of
common attributes are the union sets, respectively.
Formally, we write this as:
value
⊓: Θ × Θ → Θ
⊔: Θ × Θ → Θ
⊓: PS × PS → PS
⊔: PS × PS → PS
⊓: RS × RS → RS
⊔: RS × RS → RS
axiom ∀ ps, ps′:PS •
ps ⊓ ps′ ≡
[ a 7→vs | a:AP, vs:VP-infset •
a ∈ dom ps ∧ a ∈ dom ps′ ∧ vs=ps(a) ∪ ps′(a) ],
ps ⊔ ps′ ≡
[ a 7→vs | a:AP, vs:VP-infset •
(a ∈ dom ps ∧ a ∈ dom ps′ ∧ vs=ps(a) ∩ ps′(a)) ∨
(a ∈ dom ps ∧ a 6∈ dom ps′ ∧ vs=ps(a)) ∨
(a 6∈ dom ps ∧ a ∈ dom ps′ ∧ vs=ps′(a)) ],
axiom ∀ rs, rs′:RS •
rs ⊓ rs′ ≡
[ a 7→vs | a:AR, vs:VR-infset •
a ∈ dom rs ∧ a ∈ dom rs′ ∧ vs=rs(a) ∪ rs′(a) ],
rs ⊔ rs′ ≡
[ a 7→vs | a:AR, vs:VR-infset •
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(a ∈ dom rs ∧ a ∈ dom rs′ ∧ vs=rs(a) ∩ rs′(a)) ∨
(a ∈ dom rs ∧ a 6∈ dom rs′ ∧ vs=rs(a)) ∨
(a 6∈ dom rs ∧ a ∈ dom rs′ ∧ vs=rs′(a)) ],
axiom ∀ θ, θ′:Θ •
θ ⊓ θ′ ≡
mk_Θ([ x 7→ps | x:X, ps:PS •
x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧
ps=objects(θ)(x) ⊓ objects(θ′)(x) ],
[ (x,x′)7→ rs | x,x′:X, rs:RS •
(x,x′) ∈ dom relations(θ) ∧ (x,x′) ∈ dom relations(θ′) ∧
rs=relations(θ)(x,x′) ⊓ relations(θ′) ]),
θ ⊔ θ′ ≡
mk_Θ([ x 7→ps | x:X, ps:PS •
(x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧
ps=objects(θ)(x) ⊔ objects(θ′)(x)) ∨
(x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x 6∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧ ps=objects(θ)(x)) ∨
(x 6∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧ ps=objects(θ′)(x)) ],
[ (x,x′)7→ rs | x,x′:X, rs:RS •
((x,x′) ∈ dom relations(θ) ∧ (x,x′) ∈ dom relations(θ′) ∧
rs=relations(θ)(x,x′) ⊔ relations(θ′))
∨
((x,x′) ∈ dom relations(θ) ∧ (x,x′) 6∈ dom relations(θ′) ∧
rs=relations(θ)) ∨
((x,x′) 6∈ dom relations(θ) ∧ (x,x′) ∈ dom relations(θ′) ∧
rs=relations(θ′)) ]),
From [85] and [13] we know that a partial ordering is a lattice if it has unam-
biguous least upper bound and greatest lower bound for all pairs of nodes. We
thus need to show the following equations:
θ ≤ θ′ ≡ θ ⊔ θ′ = θ (5.4)
θ ≤ θ′ ≡ θ ⊓ θ′ = θ′ (5.5)
Theorem 5.20 The partial ordering (Θ,≤) is a lattice.
Proof: We assume θ ≤ θ′ and show θ ⊔ θ′ = θ. From Lemma 5.13 and the
definition of ≤, we have:
[ x 7→ ps | x:X, ps:PS •
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(x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧
ps=objects(θ)(x) ⊔ objects(θ′)(x)) ∨
(x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x 6∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧
ps=objects(θ)(x)) ∨
(x 6∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧
ps=objects(θ′)(x)) ] = objects(θ)
From the definition of ⊔ ranging over PS × PS, we have:
≡ [ x 7→ ps | x:X, ps:PS •
(x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧
ps=[ a 7→ vs | a:AP, vs:VP-infset •
(a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ∧ a ∈ dom objects(θ′)(x) ∧
vs=objects(θ)(x)(a) ∩ objects(θ′)(x)(a)) ∨
(a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ∧ a 6∈ dom objects(θ′)(x) ∧
vs=objects(θ)(x)(a)) ∨
(a 6∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ∧ a ∈ dom objects(θ′)(x) ∧
vs=objects(θ′)(x)(a)) ]) ∨
(x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x 6∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧
ps=objects(θ)(x)(a)) ∨
(x 6∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧
ps=objects(θ′)(x)(a)) ] = objects(θ)
From the assumption, we have:
≡ [ x 7→ ps | x:X, ps:PS •
(x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧
ps=[ a 7→ vs | a:AP, vs:VP-infset •
(a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ∧ a ∈ dom objects(θ′)(x) ∧
vs=objects(θ)(x)(a) ∩ objects(θ′)(x)(a)) ∨
(a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ∧ a 6∈ dom objects(θ′)(x) ∧
vs=objects(θ)(x)(a)) ∨
false ]) ∨
(x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x 6∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧
ps=objects(θ)(x)(a)) ∨
false ] = objects(θ)
As (z) ∨ false isz:
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≡ [ x 7→ ps | x:X, ps:PS •
(x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧
ps=[ a 7→ vs | a:AP, vs:VP-infset •
(a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ∧ a ∈ dom objects(θ′)(x) ∧
vs=objects(θ)(x)(a) ∩ objects(θ′)(x)(a)) ∨
(a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ∧ a 6∈ dom objects(θ′)(x) ∧
vs=objects(θ)(x)(a)) ]) ∨
(x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x 6∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧
ps=objects(θ)(x)(a)) ] = objects(θ)
From the assumption, we have that
objects(θ)(x)(a) = objects(θ)(x)(a) ∩ objects(θ′)(x)
is objects(θ)(x)(a) ⊆ objects(θ′)(x)(a).
We have:
≡ [ x 7→ ps | x:X, ps:PS •
(x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧
ps=[ a 7→ vs | a:AP, vs:VP-infset •
(a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ∧ a ∈ dom objects(θ′)(x) ∧
vs=objects(θ)(x)(a)) ∨
(a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ∧ a 6∈ dom objects(θ′)(x) ∧
vs=objects(θ)(x)(a)) ]) ∨
(x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x 6∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧
ps=objects(θ)(x)) ] = objects(θ)
As (z ∧ z′) ∨ (z∧ ∼ z′) ≡ z:
≡ [ x 7→ ps | x:X, ps:PS •
x ∈ dom ∧ ps=[ a 7→ vs | a:AP, vs:VP-infset •
a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ∧ vs=objects(θ)(x)(a) ] ] = objects(θ)
Qed
We now assume θ⊔θ′ = θ and show θ ≤ θ′. From Lemma 5.13 and the definition
of ≤, we have:
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(∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ⇒ (x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧
(∀ a:AP • a ∈ dom objects(θ′)(x) ⇒
(a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ∧ objects(θ)(x)(a) ⊆ objects(θ′)(x)(a)))))
From the assumption, we derive
objects(θ)(x)(a) ∩ objects(θ′)(x)(a) = objects(θ(x)(a)).
We have:
(∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ⇒ (x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧
(∀ a:AP • a ∈ dom objects(θ′)(x) ⇒
(a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ∧ true))))
As (z∧ true) ≡ z:
≡ (∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ⇒ (x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧
(∀ a:AP • a ∈ dom objects(θ′)(x) ⇒ a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x))))
From the assumption, we derive that
dom objects(θ)(x) ∪ dom objects(θ′)(x) =
dom objects(θ)(x).
We have:
(∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ⇒ (x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ true))
As (z∧ true) ≡ z:
≡ (∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ⇒ x ∈ dom objects(θ))
From the assumption, we derive that
dom objects(θ) ∪ dom objects(θ′) =
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dom objects(θ).
We have:
≡ true
Qed
We assume θ ≤ θ′ and show θ ⊓ θ′ = θ.
From Lemma 5.13 and the definition of ≤, we have:
[ x 7→ ps | x:X, ps:PS •
(x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧
ps=objects(θ)(x) ⊓ objects(θ′)(x)) ] = objects(θ′)
From the definition of ⊓ ranging over PS × PS, we have
[ x 7→ ps | x:X, ps:PS •
(x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧
ps=[ a 7→vs | a:AP, vs:VP-infset •
a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ∧ a ∈ dom objects(θ′)(x) ∧
vs=objects(θ)(x)(a) ∪ objects(θ′)(x)(a) ]) ] = objects(θ′)
From the assumption, we have that
objects(θ)(x)(a) ⊆ objects(θ′)(x)(a)
so
objects(θ)(x)(a) ∪ objects(θ′)(x)(a) = objects(θ′)(x)(a).
We have:
[ x 7→ ps | x:X, ps:PS •
(x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧
ps=[ a 7→vs | a:AP, vs:VP-infset •
a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ∧ a ∈ dom objects(θ′)(x) ∧
vs=objects(θ′)(x)(a) ]) ] = objects(θ′)
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From the assumption, we have that
dom objects(θ′)(x) ⊆ dom objects(θ)(x).
We have:
[ x 7→ ps | x:X, ps:PS •
(x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧
ps=[ a 7→vs | a:AP, vs:VP-infset • a ∈ dom objects(θ′)(x) ∧
vs=objects(θ′)(x)(a) ]) ] = objects(θ′)
From the assumption, we have that
dom objects(θ′) ⊆ dom objects(θ)(x).
We have:
[ x 7→ ps | x:X, ps:PS •
x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧
ps=[ a 7→vs | a:AP, vs:VP-infset • a ∈ dom objects(θ′)(x) ∧
vs=objects(θ′)(x)(a) ] ] = objects(θ′)
Qed
We now assume θ⊓θ′ = θ and show θ ≤ θ′. From Lemma 5.13 and the definition
of ≤, we have:
(∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ⇒ (x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧
(∀ a:AP • a ∈ dom objects(θ′)(x) ⇒
(a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ∧ objects(θ)(x)(a) ⊆ objects(θ′)(x)(a)))))
From the assumption, we derive that
objects(θ)(x)(a) ∪ objects(θ′)(x)(a) =
objects(θ′)(x)(a).
We have:
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≡ (∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ⇒ (x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧
(∀ a:AP • a ∈ dom objects(θ′)(x) ⇒
(a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x) ∧ true))))
As (z∧ true) ≡ z:
≡ (∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ⇒ (x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧
(∀ a:AP • a ∈ dom objects(θ′)(x) ⇒ a ∈ dom objects(θ)(x))))
From the assumption, we derive that
dom objects(θ)(x) ∩ dom objects(θ)(x) =
dom objects(θ′)(x).
We have:
(∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ⇒ (x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ true))
As (z ∧ true) ≡ z:
(∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ⇒ x ∈ dom objects(θ))
From the assumption, we derive that
dom objects(θ) ∩ dom objects(θ′) =
dom objects(θ′).
We have:
≡ true
Qed
2
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Artefact models and the associated lattice operations thus satisfy the following
lattice axioms:
θ ⊓ θ = θ idempotency (5.6)
θ ⊔ θ = θ (5.7)
θ ⊓ θ′ = θ′ ⊓ θ commutativity (5.8)
θ ⊔ θ′ = θ′ ⊔ θ (5.9)
θ ⊓ (θ′ ⊓ θ′′) = (θ ⊓ θ′) ⊓ θ′′ associativity (5.10)
θ ⊔ (θ′ ⊔ θ′′) = (θ ⊔ θ′) ⊔ θ′′ (5.11)
θ ⊓ (θ ⊔ θ′) = θ absorption (5.12)
θ ⊔ (θ ⊓ θ′) = θ (5.13)
Thereby, a number of conveniences mathematically and algorithmically are
achieved as artefact models follow Boolean algebra.
Figure 5.9 shows how multiple inheritance of properties and object designators
are lattice meet (⊔), and design moves in separate incomparable directions ori-
gins from lattice join (⊓) in a design lattice structure [13, 131]. In the figure, x1
and x2 are object designators and v1, v2, and g are property values. Further-
more, the figure illustrates the transitivity of property and object inheritance.
[x1 7→[w 7→{v1}]]
[x1 7→[w 7→{v1},c 7→{g}],x2 7→[w 7→{v2}]]
[x1 7→[w 7→{v1}],x2 7→[w 7→{v2}]][x1 7→[w 7→{v1},c 7→{g}]]
[x2 7→[w 7→{v2},...]]
Figure 5.9: Design lattice.
A similar account holds for relations.
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5.8.1 Design configuration and jump abstraction
We shall now explore some of the conveniences of design lattices namely in
relation to what could be called design jumps.
By a design jump, we understand really performing a jump from one design
configuration to another. Design jumps appear in situations where the prac-
titioner shifts between two or more artefact models which appear in parallel.
Such situations origins in the fact that the design process indeed follow different
disciplines in which certain ideas may be discovered.
Certainly, the two configurations should exist in order for the jump to be pos-
sible. The two configurations are, however, not directly related by what we
understand by a design move. They are configurations that exist in parallel to
each other, and the common sets of objects, properties and relations may thus
be quite small or even empty sets. Two artefact models appear in parallel in
a design lattice, if they belong to different design aspect sub–lattices, at some
higher level. E.g. an artefact model describing a yellow house may exist in par-
allel to an artefact model describing a red house because of the non-unifiability
of the two colour values. Still, the practitioner may shift between these during
a process of finding the right design configuration for meeting the requirements.
However, design jumps are orthogonal to any logical understanding of design.
The reason is that we in principle can make a design jump from a model of
a bridge to a model of a tunnel. Formally, we do not accept design jumps as
design moves as it would undermine the partial order. The incremental principle
is then lost.
In stead we aim at explaining design jumps by means of abstraction. An ab-
straction of a design jump is to backtrack the necessary steps in order to be
able to perform design moves down the parallel path. This principle is shown
in Figure 5.10.
The class partition approach would have difficulty handling abstractions of de-
sign jumps because steps upwards the structure may result in removal of objects,
properties, or relations, not intended to be removed.
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Figure 5.10: Abstraction of design jump.
5.9 Discussion
In this paper, we have proposed a formal foundation for incremental design. We
have done so by suggesting that the design process can be recorded in a lattice
structure where nodes correspond to design stages (artefact models) and edges
correspond to the steps being made (design moves). We call such a lattice a
design lattice. We have presented formal models in RSL of artefact models and
the functions which change such models; the design moves.
Recording design processes as design lattices has a number of conveniences.
Some of these, mentioned in this paper, include distinction between two sorts
of design moves, eliminating unnecessary redundancy, and facilitating model
composition in a mathematical way. Furthermore, it gives the opportunity to
verify design steps by utilizing that an ordering relation holds between artefact
models.
The specification of artefact models cuts down to a minimal set of ontological
sorts: properties, binary relations, and values of these. In this framework the
notion of object plays a minor rôle as the focus is on the characteristics of
artefact. However, in order to avoid a problem of indiscernibility of property
sets, identifiers of objects are introduced.
The presented understanding of the ontological entities necessary for represent-
ing designs as artefact models have founded the basis for formally specifying the
two lattice operations join (⊓) and meet (⊔), as well as design moves for adding
objects, properties of objects, and relations between objects. We have shown
that design lattices indeed satisfy the criteria of being lattices. Thereby, design
lattices have a number of mathematical properties, which eases implementation
and management of design information. Also, the simplicity of the value and
set–based representation of properties and relations makes design lattices suit-
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able as foundation for future formal treatments of design like in definition of
formal modelling languages and design algebras. The notion of artefact mo-
dels is a simple one but have strong mathematical implication due to Boolean
algebra being its foundation.
Further study may include the notion of decomposition of objects and an inves-
tigation of the relation between properties of object wholes and properties of
the part of such wholes.
Finally, the notion of design lattices is similar to the notion of refinement in
systematic software development, although the ordering symbol is syntactically
reversed (see Section 2.3.2.5). It is similar in its motivation for recording design,
but also in the possibility of utilising the partial ordering as a method for sys-
tematic designing. Therefore, future work may try to incorporate mathematical
properties and concepts of refinement in the notion of design lattices.
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Chapter 6
An algebraic specification of
incremental, conceptual
building design
Abstract: In this paper, we present a formal specification of incremen-
tal, conceptual building design. Our specification is written in The RAISE
Specification Language (RSL) and is highly abstract and algebraic. Thus,
representations of design stages are modelled as values of an abstract type,
from which we can observe objects, properties of objects, relations between
objects, and decompositions. We call such representations artefact mo-
dels. Artefact models can now be changed and combined by a number
of generator functions. These functions represent the ontologically funda-
mental design moves. We define a partial ordering on artefact models and
show that the generator functions obey this ordering. Our contribution is
thus to provide an alternative angle on the notion of incremental design
as a process spanning what in Chapter 5 was called a design lattice.
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6.1 Introduction
As a new foundation for software tools supporting incremental, conceptual de-
sign of buildings1, we introduced the notion of design lattices in Chapter 5. In
the paper we suggested a distinction between two sorts of design moves: Design
moves By aspect and design moves by configuration. The former includes design
moves of object conception, ascribing properties to objects, and adding relations
between objects. The latter includes a design move for bringing partial2 designs
together. The two sorts of design moves, we claimed, originated from join and
meet, respectively, in a lattice. Such a lattice is convenient for structuring design
moves and can thus serve as foundation for design systems supporting incremen-
tal, conceptual design. A design lattice is thus introduced in order to facilitate
structural representation of the design moves being made and the correspond-
ing stages between the moves. Such a lattice structure may be represented in
a data structure and capture performed design moves. Thereby, browsing the
various design paths and combining different design stages. This is a necessary
mechanism in distributed design where distinct practitioners work out individual
partial design solutions. The approach, differs in particular from the approach
in which possible design moves spans a tree structure due to class partition be-
ing its foundation. It does so by allowing partial designs from different paths to
be combined. We wish to be able structure design information such that design
moves maintains an ordering relation on designs stages. Thereby, redundancy is
reduced and incrementality of the design process can be maintained. The latter
is desirable as each design move should contribute alternately with knowledge
of the artefact being designed. Lattices are convenient to accommodate these
requirements and as argued in Chapter 5, design lattices may be a new angle to
the discussion on what design is.
The partial relation maintains a principle of incrementality concerning objects,
properties of objects, and relations. We believe that the concept of design
lattices, in its mathematics, capture central issues in design in the case where
design is brought into a formal context. Thus our contribution, we believe, is
to clarify the concept of design when put in a formal framework motivated by
potential software application.
In this paper, we explore the formal foundation for incremental, conceptual
design further. However, we shall take a different approach as we define an al-
gebraic specification of artefact models and design moves. By an algebraic speci-
1We here mention the concept of building design but in fact we could be concerned with
the design of any kind of artefacts.
2Since all designs are abstract descriptions, they may all be considered partial. However,
what we mean here is that two design stages are brought together to form a more complete
(though not necessarily finish) design.
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fication, we understand a formal specification which contains abstract datatypes
(i.e. sorts) and functions on these types. The functions mainly fall in two cat-
egories: (i) Observer functions which state what information can be extracted
from values of the abstract types, and (ii) generator functions which can change
the internal state of these values.
Observer functions are the most abstract recognition rules we have as they can be
used to model intractable domain concepts as well as technical solutions.
Also see [135] for further characteristics of algebraic specification methods. We
use the RAISE Specification Language (RSL) as formal language [134, 135].
We shall again focus on the concept of design lattices. However, we aim at
specifying each sort of design move (from both categories) instead of emphasizing
the lattice operations as in Chapter 5. We redefine a partial ordering relation
(derived from the one given in Chapter 5) on artefact models and prove that the
presented design moves obey this ordering relation. That is, the design moves
(modelled as generator functions) maintain incrementality in design processes.
6.1.1 The domain: Incremental design
The domain is that of conceptual design models and the operations which build
up and elaborate on such models. The models we call artefact models as they are
abstract descriptions of things to be man–made. The notion of artefact model
is inspired by the notion of artefaction which is defined in [79]. The operations
on artefact models are design moves. By a design move, we understand the
cognitive or physical action of changing and elaborating a design representation.
The notion of move in context of design originates in [149] and the notion has
been picked up in various work [164, 139, 79, 62].
We follow [64, 67, 75, 167, 62] and understand design as an incremental process
in which objects are introduced, properties are ascribed to objects, and objects
are related.
It is convenient to define each design move as a move in the smallest sense.
That is, to minimize the change of effect a design move has on the present
design. Thereby, we are able to restrict to a minimum of fundamental generator
functions for representing design moves. We thus, see all design moves as small
steps.
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6.1.2 Design lattices
As in Chapter 5, we consider the design moves of: conceiving an object, as-
cribing a property to an object, and adding a relation between two objects,
to a model. Furthermore, we have the lattice operation meet which combines
artefact models, and the lattice operation join which gives the artefact models
having the intersection set of objects, properties, and relations.
In this paper we shall follow the principles of algebraic specification in RAISE
[134, 135]. This means that each design move (modelled as a generator func-
tion) takes (among other parameters) a previous artefact model which is then
modified. This principle is applied besides for the two lattice operations which
apply on pairs of artefact models.
In addition to the design moves defined in Chapter 5, we introduce the design
move of decomposition. This design move serves another cognitive purpose.
Decomposition introduces a special relation holding between objects and sub–
objects. However, the relation is not represented by edges in the design lattice
as expected using mereological thinking. It is part of the artefact model itself.
The difference is that the part–whole relation ontologically is a more diffuse re-
lation than a relation between an object and its properties, or binary (possibly
topological) relations between objects. In Chapter 8 it is argued that the dis-
tinction between parts and whole often may be a matter of convention3. Often
decomposition is used simply in order to be able to refer to an object as a whole
and its parts. Other times decomposition is used as part–whole knowledge may
come after the conception of the object being decomposed.
Many paths and many lattices can lead to the same design. Knowledge of an
artefact may be conceived and added to the model in different orders. Also,
similar designs may be achieved by taking either a bottom up or top–down
approach. Figure 6.1 shows a bottom up approach in which three objects are
added in parallel paths4. The objects are independently specialised by adding
properties, and are finally put together to form an entrance section for a house.
Figure 6.2 shows a top–down approach which leads to a similar design5. In this
approach a single object is introduced, specialised, and then decomposed into
three sub–objects forming a similar entrance section.
3Socially or based on the present use of language.
4We use dashed lines in lack of better graphical ways of depicting object without properties
(and thus also without specific dimension and size.)
5We use dashed boxes with round edges in order not to confuse lines representing part–
whole relations and arrows representing design moves.
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add object add object
add object
add dimension
properties
add dimension
properties
add dimension
properties
add form properties
add form properties
lattice meet
lattice meet
Figure 6.1: Bottom–up design lattice.
6.2 Artefact models
In the following, we present an algebraic specification of artefact models (θ:Θ)
containing: objects (x:X), properties (p:P) of objects, and relations (r:R) be-
tween objects. A property is considered a pair of which the first component is
called the attribute6 (a:AP) and the latter is a set of values7 (vs:VP-infset).
A set of values may be infinite in order to express properties like weighing at
least 200 pounds. An attribute uniquely identifies a set of values for a given
object. An example of an attribute is colour. The corresponding set of property
values could be {blue, grey, green}. A set with more than one element means
that the object can be realised in more than one way; namely one for each of
the property values.
If an object has properties with attributes a1, . . . , am and corresponding values
{v11, . . . , v1n1}, . . . , {vm1, . . . , v1nm}, the number of possible realisations is n1×
. . .× nm.
The empty set of values corresponds to absurdum: no possible realisation ex-
ists. Absurdum can be used to designate an error which may occur because of
6or property attribute.
7called property values.
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add object
add dimension properties
decompose (incl. certain property ascriptions)
add topology relations
(A and B)
add topology relations
                         (B and C)
lattice meet
A
B B
C
Figure 6.2: Top–down design lattice.
conflicting models on which lattice meet is applied. A similar account is given
for relations. A relation between two objects is a pair of two component. The
first is the attribute8 (a:AR) and the second is a set of values9 (vs:VR-infset).
An example of an attribute of a relation is horizontal–distance for which the
corresponding relation values could be {20m, 30m, 60m}. Another example of
an attribute is placement with the values {on_top, next_to}. As it appears,
many relations concern topology.
8or relation attribute.
9called relation values.
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6.2.1 Observer functions
From an artefact model (θ:Θ), we can observe the objects (xs:X-set) which
makes the model. Given an object in a model, we can observe the properties
(ps:P-set) ascribed to that object in the model. From an artefact model, we
can observe the relations (rs:R-set) added to that model. These relations are
given explicitly, including the object pairs of concern. Given an object in a
model, we can observe the set of sub–objects into which the argument object
has been decomposed. In case the object has not been decomposed, this set is
empty. Properties are attribute–value pairs ((a,vs):(AP×VP)) as are relations
((a,vs):(AR×VR)). Note, that we distinguish between attributes of properties,
and attributes of relations, as well as between values of properties and relations.
type
Θ,
X,
P = AP × VP-infset,
R = AR × VR-infset,
AP, AR,
VP, VR
value
[ observer functions ]
objects: Θ → X-set,
properties: X × Θ → P-set,
relations: Θ → ((X × X) × R)-set,
decomposition: X × Θ → X-set,
6.2.2 Concerning properties in decomposition
Before we can state a consistency axiom for artefact models, we need an answer
to the question of whether properties are to be considered in this context. That
is, do the properties of a decomposed object relate to the properties of the sub–
objects? The following discussion aims at reaching a clarification in answering
this question. We conclude that no such relation can be claimed. Our discus-
sion goes as follows (the section can easily be skipped if interest is not on the
ontological or epistemological aspects):
We consider the problem of how to understand the relation between proper-
ties possessed by an object and the properties which seem to be derived to
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sub–objects in a decomposition. We name this relation the derivation relation
assuming that derivation concerns properties. For convenience we define the
notion of attribution as follows: An object is said to be attributed with an
attribute a if the object is ascribed a property p = {a, vs}; where vs is some
property value set.
Our quest here is problematic though our solution is uncontroversial. The quest
is problematic in the sense that the derivation relation in question seems not
to be in focus either in literature on the metaphysics of properties, neither in
literature on part–whole theories. Though, Simon treats a similar question in
context of essential parts and defines the notion of local predication (see page 135
in [155]). Also, Simons states that predicates over objects as sums (the objects
we decompose) are to be cumulative (see page 111 in [155]). If a predicate
applies to a part, it must apply to the whole as well. But according to Simons,
Quine has argued the absurdity in this perspective: It simply does not hold for
mass–predicates. However, if we claim a relation to hold — as a conjecture —
we should at least try out some different approaches as we intend to do here.
To start with, we shall dogmatically assume that we need to say something about
that derivation relation. That is, there must indeed be a wellformed condition
for properties of objects and properties of sub–objects.
A first approach could be that we allow decompositions in which sub–objects
not necessarily derive all attributes from the properties of the object being
decomposed. The motivation here is that we often may speak of an object
having a property even though we know that the object consists of parts which
do not possess the property. As an example, consider a table. We may ascribe
the property of having the colour blue to that table even though the legs have
the colour grey. Thus, motivation comes from our (perhaps vague) way of using
natural language. It is one of the ways we perform abstractions in every day
life: “This chair is blue” may be true in our conception even though only main
parts are blue. Let us consider it formally and in our context. The approach
means that the set of attributes to be derived is a subset of the attributes which
are attributed the object being decomposed.
The approach emphasizes the situation where this subset is a proper subset.
The situation, however, opens for the possibility of having the empty set of as
a special case. If the derived set of attributes is empty, there is no relation to
be claimed. It turns out in our formalisation that this implies that there are
not sub–objects then. However, this was not our intention, and if we try to
accommodate by choosing another formalisation, we discover that the problem
is much more far reaching. If a certain attribute of a decomposed object is
not designated as to be derived, we allow a property with this attribute to
be ascribed the sub–objects after the decomposition. This latter property could
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have a different value set, but more problematic; the attribute could be different,
so that the property belongs to a different ontological domain of properties. But
this is absurd. A wall which is ascribed the property of being made of concrete
can then be decomposed into two parts which all are later ascribed the property
of being made of wood. That is, we cannot say anything about the derivation
relation. In defence, we shall allow for partial decomposition. It may be that a
property, which is not derived in one lattice path, is derived in another. Still,
we have not said anything about the derivation relation; only that some sort of
consistency should exist..
A second approach is to try to repair the leaks of the first one. Leaving out
an attribute of a decomposed object may lead to absurdities. We might require
that at least one sub–object derives a property with that attribute. That is, in
order for the decomposition to be wellformed with respect to derived properties,
the derivation relation should maintain that all properties are derived to sub–
objects in some way. We can divide this approach into two cases: (i) We could
require that at least one sub–object derives all the properties of the decomposed
object, or (ii) we could require that all properties are at least derived in some way
to some sub–object; i.e. distributed. The approach, in either case, introduces
the notion of essential parts. In (i) the object which derives all properties, is
considered essential and thus more important than the other sub–objects. In (ii)
such importance depends on what perspective we take when “considering” the
decomposed object. In one perspective, material may be essential; in another,
mass may be essential, etc. The difference between (i) and (ii) is thus a matter of
context, and we shall treat them together. The second approach (although quite
appealing) has a built in problem which is rooted in distinguishing essential from
non–essential parts. Take for example a television. We say that this television
is black even though some parts of it do not possess this property. Let us
now decompose the television object into a black box, electronics inside, glass
front and a little red lamp flashing. The essential part, concerning the property
mentioned, may be the black box; perhaps because it spatially dominates the
outer surfaces of the television. However, for that we cannot be sure. It could
as well be the glass front which is dominating. But then we might also say that
the red light is the essential part, and so on. If we wish to select the second
approach, we should at least have a formal way of distinguishing essential and
non–essential parts. This issue is in fact a known problem in mereology and
we are here far from a real clarification [155]. Furthermore, since we allowed
for partial decomposition it may be that no sub–objects can be designated as
essential at the time of decomposition.
A third approach is to require that what is said about an object should also apply
for all sub–objects into which it is decomposed. We thus avoid the tricky ways
of using language, which were mentioned for the first approach. In decomposing
an object, we should make sure to designate all attributes of the decomposed
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object as to apply to all sub–objects as well; and similar for value sets. For
colour properties and material properties, the approach seems appealing. If a
decomposed object is red, its parts should be too, and if a decomposed object
is made of wood so should its parts. The trouble appears when considering
properties like dimensions. If a beam has a length of 2m any proper part of it
certainly does not.
A fourth approach is to repair the lacks of the third approach. We maintain
the requirement that all attributes of a decomposed object are attributed sub–
objects as well. However, we loosen the restriction on value sets. The derivation
relation thus only says something about the kind of properties, not what specific
properties. However, this is hardly the way a design practitioner works. If we
are not allowed to state — using a top–down approach — that a house is to
be made of wood because the chimney is not, we loose the fuzzy way designers
abstract. The abstraction process may here be impossible to define explicitly
and universally.
A fifth variant could be considered as solution to the problem of the fourth
approach. It is as appealing as it is strange, which is partly why it has not been
chosen in this paper. Still, if the notion of abstraction — as considered under
the fourth approach — is to be defined explicitly, this fifth variant we believe
is the best candidate for a foundation. Consider an object with a property p.
The object is now decomposed into a number of sub–objects. The rule is now
that if a sub–object derives a property, this property does not apply to the
decomposed object anymore, if not all sub–objects derive the property. That is,
it is removed.
We conclude that there seems not to be any derivation principle which satisfies
both the requirement of stating a consistent, universal rule for derivation of pro-
perties, and at the same time do not restrict the design process. The seemingly
strange solution of the fifth variant needs more clarifications before it can be
called a real candidate. Therefore, we have chosen not to claim there to be a
relation between properties of an object and properties of the objects into which
it is decomposed.
6.2.3 Consistency
In order for an artefact model to be consistent, it must satisfy the following:
(i) All attributes for properties of an object must uniquely identify a corre-
sponding value set, and (ii) all attributes for relations must uniquely identify a
corresponding value set.
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[ consistency ]
axiom ∀ θ:Θ, x,x′:X, a:AP, vs, vs′:VP-infset, a′,AR, vs′′,vs′′′:VR-infset •
((a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ) ∧ (a,vs′) ∈ properties(x,θ) ⇒ vs = vs′) ∧
(((x,x′),(a′,vs′′)) ∈ relations(θ) ∧ ((x,x′),(a′,vs′′′)) ∈ relations(θ) ⇒
vs′′=vs′′′)
The algebraic laws of Section 6.4 ensure non–cyclicity of decompositions. Sub–
objects which are introduced by decompositions, are new objects and cannot be
objects already existing in the model.
6.3 Design moves
We shall follow the distinction between design moves by aspect and design moves
by configuration, as defined in Chapter 5.
6.3.1 Design move by aspect
Design moves of the first class are: (i) Adding an object to a model, (ii) ascribing
a property to an object in a model, and (iii) adding a relation between two
objects to a model. These are common in the sense that their application,
contribute with knowledge of the artefact in mind. We see this “adding of
knowledge” as restriction on the scope of possible interpretations of the model
into reality. Thus, we shall talk of specialisation. Adding an object makes
the design more specialised as we then require the existence of such an object.
Adding a property to an object makes the design more specialised as we then
require the object to possess that property. Adding a relation between two
objects makes the design more specialised as we then require these objects to
be related in this way.
Each of the described design moves is modelled as a generator function:
value
add_object: X × Θ ∼→ Θ,
add_property: P × X × Θ ∼→ Θ,
add_relation: R × (X × X) × Θ ∼→ Θ,
All three generator functions are partial. Adding an object to a model in which
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that object already exists yields problems in determining what properties that
resulting object should have. It seems most reasonable that observing the pro-
perties of a newly added object gives the empty set. For adding an object, it is
thus required that the object is not already present in the model. On the other
hand, ascribing a property to an object requires existence of that object in the
argument model. For adding relations, we require that both objects are present
in the argument model. We thus define the following guards:
value
[ guards ]
is_object_present: X × Θ → Bool
is_object_present(x,θ) ≡ x ∈ objects(θ),
is_property_attribute_present: AP × X × Θ → Bool
is_property_attribute_present(a,x,θ) ≡
(∃ vs:VP-infset • (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ)),
is_relation_attribute_present: AR × (X × X) × Θ → Bool
is_relation_attribute_present(a,(x,x′),θ) ≡
(∃ vs:VR-infset • ((x,x′),(a,vs)) ∈ relations(θ)),
6.3.2 Design move by configuration: Lattice operations
The two lattice operations are generator function which apply to pairs of artefact
models:
value
meet: Θ × Θ → Θ,
join: Θ × Θ → Θ
It is convenient, explicitly to overload similar operations for sets of properties
and relations. For relations, we need to include pairs of related objects. We
have:
value
meet: P-set × P-set → P-set,
join: P-set × P-set → P-set,
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meet: ((X×X) × R)-set × ((X×X) × R)-set → ((X×X) × R)-set,
join: ((X×X) × R)-set × ((X×X) × R)-set → ((X×X) × R)-set
axiom
[ property set axioms ]
∀ ps, ps′:P-set •
meet(ps,ps′) ≡
{(a,vs)|(a,vs):AP×VP-infset •
(∃ vs′,vs′′:VP-infset •
((a,vs′) ∈ ps ∧ (a,vs′′) ∈ ps′ ∧ vs=vs′ ∩ vs′′) ∨
((a,vs′) ∈ ps ∧ (a,vs′′) 6∈ ps′ ∧ vs=vs′) ∨
((a,vs′) 6∈ ps ∧ (a,vs′′) ∈ ps′ ∧ vs=vs′))},
∀ ps, ps′:P-set •
join(ps,ps′) ≡ {(a,vs)|(a,vs):AP×VP-infset •
(∃ vs′,vs′′:VP-infset • (a,vs′) ∈ ps ∧ (a,vs′′) ∈ ps′ ∧ vs=vs′ ∪ vs′′)},
[ relation set axioms ]
∀ rs, rs′:R-set •
meet(rs,rs′) ≡
{((x,x′),(a,vs))|(X×X)×P •
(∃ vs′,vs′′:VR-infset •
(((x,x′),(a,vs′)) ∈ rs ∧ ((x,x′),(a,vs′′)) ∈ rs′ ∧ vs=vs′ ∩ vs′′) ∨
(((x,x′),(a,vs′)) ∈ rs ∧ ((x,x′),(a,vs′′)) 6∈ rs′ ∧ vs=vs′) ∨
(((x,x′),(a,vs′)) 6∈ rs ∧ ((x,x′),(a,vs′′)) ∈ rs′ ∧ vs=vs′′))},
∀ rs, rs′:R-set •
join(rs,rs′) ≡ {((x,x′),(a,vs))|(X×X)×P •
(∃ vs′,vs′′:VR-infset •
((x,x′),(a,vs′)) ∈ rs ∧ ((x,x′),(a,vs′′)) ∈ rs′ ∧ vs=vs′ ∪ vs′′)}
We see that lattice meet applied on two property sets (ps:P-set) and (ps′:P-
set), gives the property set which is the union set of property attributes from
ps and ps′. For common property attributes of ps and ps′ the set of property
values is the intersection set of values taken from ps and ps′. A similar account
applies to relations. Lattice join applied on two property sets (ps:P-set) and
(ps′:P-set) is the property set which is the common property attributes of ps
and ps′′. For common property attributes of ps and ps′, the set of property
values is the union set of values from ps and ps′.
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6.3.3 The design move of decomposition
In addition to the three design moves described in Section 6.3.1, we introduce
a generator function for the design move of decomposition. The reason for in-
cluding this design move is to accommodate top–down designing where artefact
models are specialised by decomposing objects into sub–objects. Such a design
move contributes with knowledge of an objects parts.
The design move of decomposition is declared as the generator function:
value
decompose: X × (AP →m (X →m VP-infset)) × Θ
∼
→ Θ
The second argument defines a kind of rule for the decomposition. For each
property attribute (a:AP) of the argument object, we get a map from the new
sub–objects to their individual value sets. The rule is a way of specifying how the
sub–objects derive properties from the object which is decomposed. However, it
is only a convenient way of comprising a sequence of specialisation operations.
To make this clear, we introduce a number of terminological definitions:
Definition 6.1 An object xp is called a parent object of another object xs
if xp has been decomposed into a set of objects including xs. xs is then called
a sub–object of xp.
A sub–object may get a number of attributes from properties of its parent
object. The reason is that knowledge of an object may also say something
about the parts of which that object consists. Such knowledge is expressed by
the decomposition rule.
Definition 6.2 An object x is said to derive a property (a, vs) from another
object x′ if x is a sub–object of x′ and a is an attribute of x as well as of x′.
If a table is described as possessing the property of being made of wood this
property contains an attribute material. The property is also possessed by the
various parts of the table. However, it may be the case that only the attribute
is the same for sub–object and parent object. E.g. for the property of having a
certain length. Decomposing a beam into parts conceptually ascribes different
length values to the sub–objects, though the attribute “length” is maintained
(see Section 6.3.3). However, as argued in Section 6.2.2, we cannot in general
state a relation between the properties of a sub–object and the properties of
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a parent–object. The decomposition rule is therefore to be understood in a
constructive sense.
Three issues are important in context of decomposition rules. First: we allow
that objects are not decomposed at once into all their parts. We call this partial
decomposition. Second: Although we allow for partial decompositions, we do
not allow for an object to be decomposed several times in distinct operations
(if following the same path in the design lattice). This may seem strange,
however, the argumentation is similar to the one for not allowing an object
to be ascribed a property with the same attribute twice, following the same
path in the design lattice. We want dogmatically to maintain a principle of
incrementality. If an object needs to be decomposed in two steps we see these
as alternative decompositions of the same object, belonging to parallel paths of
the design lattice. The two decomposition configurations can then be combined
using lattice meet as shown on Figure 6.3. Stepwise decomposition can thus be
modelled as applying lattice meet on alternative (partial) decompositions.
Figure 6.3: Stepwise decomposition using lattice meet.
As a special case of this issue, we allow for sub–objects to “overlap” spatially.
The reason for this is that it can be convenient to talk about the same object in
context of its decomposition relation to different parent objects (see Figure 6.3).
Third, we have an issue concerning what happens if an already decomposed
object is ascribed properties. For the parent object the situation is similar to
when an object is ascribed a property with add_property. For the sub–objects,
however, the status maintains the same as we do not require a relation between
properties of parent objects and properties of sub–objects.
A decomposition is valid if and only if the argument object is in the argument
model, the argument object is not designated as a sub–object, and each property
attribute in the rule is an attribute of a property which is ascribed the argument
object.
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is_valid_decomp: X × (AP →m (X →m VP-infset)) × Θ → Bool
is_valid_decomp(x,am,θ) ≡
x ∈ objects(θ) ∧
(∀ a:AP • a ∈ dom am ⇒ x 6∈ dom am(a)) ∧
(∀ a:AP • a ∈ dom am ⇒ (∃ vs:VP-infset • (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ)))
In addition to the consistency axiom defined in Section 6.2.3, we require that
if an object is a sub–object in a decomposition, it cannot be an object in the
previous artefact model:
value
[ decomp−consistency ]
∀ x, x′:X, am:AP →m (X →m VP-infset), θ:Θ •
x ∈ decomposition(x′,decompose(x′,am,θ)) ∧
(∃ a:AP • a ∈ dom am ∧ x ∈ dom am(a)) ⇒ x 6∈ objects(θ)
When defining decomposition algebraically, we need a function which given a
decomposition rule and a sub–object, gives the properties that the sub–object
derives according to the rule.
value
[misc ]
derive: AP →m (X →m VP-infset) × X → P-set
derive(am,x) ≡
{(a,vs)|(a,vs):P • a ∈ dom am ∧ x ∈ am(a) ∧ vs=am(a)(x)}
6.4 Algebraic axioms
We now specify a number of axioms which aims at relating observer functions
to generator functions.
6.4.1 Observing objects
axiom
[ objects ]
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∀ θ:Θ, x:X •
objects(add_object(x,θ)) ≡ objects(θ) ∪ {x},
pre ∼is_object_present(x,θ),
∀ θ:Θ, (a,vs):P, x:X •
objects(add_property((a,vs),x,θ)) ≡ objects(θ)
pre is_object_present(x,θ) ∧ ∼is_property_attribute_present(a,x,θ),
∀ θ:Θ, (a,vs):R, x, x′:X •
objects(add_relation((a,vs),(x,x′),θ)) ≡ objects(θ)
pre is_object_present(x,θ) ∧ is_object_present(x′,θ) ∧
∼is_relation_attribute_present(a,(x,x′),θ),
∀ θ, θ′:Θ •
objects(meet(θ,θ′)) ≡ objects(θ) ∪ objects(θ′),
∀ θ, θ′:Θ •
objects(join(θ,θ′)) ≡ objects(θ) ∩ objects(θ′),
∀ θ:Θ, x:X, am:AP →m (X →m VP-infset) •
objects(decompose(x,am,θ)) ≡ objects(θ) ∪
{x′|x′:X • (∃ a:AP • a ∈ dom am ∧ x′ ∈ dom am(a))}
pre is_valid_decomp(x,am,θ),
6.4.2 Observing properties
axiom
[ properties ]
∀ θ:Θ, x,x′:X •
properties(x,add_object(x′,θ)) ≡
if x=x′ then {} else properties(x,θ) end
pre ∼is_object_present(x′,θ),
∀ θ:Θ, (a,vs):P, x,x′:X •
properties(x,add_property((a,vs),x′,θ)) ≡
if x=x′ then properties(x,θ) ∪ {(a,vs)}
else properties(x,θ)
end
pre is_object_present(x′,θ) ∧ ∼is_property_attribute_present(a,x′,θ),
∀ θ:Θ, (a,vs):R, x,x′,x′′:X •
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properties(x,add_relation((a,vs),(x′,x′′),θ)) ≡ properties(x,θ)
pre is_object_present(x′,θ) ∧ is_object_present(x′′,θ) ∧
∼ is_relation_attribute_present(a,(x′,x′′),θ),
∀ θ, θ′:Θ, x:X •
properties(x,meet(θ,θ′)) ≡ meet(properties(x,θ),properties(x,θ′)),
∀ θ, θ′:Θ, x:X •
properties(x,join(θ,θ′)) ≡ join(properties(x,θ),properties(x,θ′)),
∀ θ:Θ, x,x′:X, am:AP →m (X →m VP-infset) •
properties(x,decompose(x′,am,θ)) ≡
if x ∈ decomposition(x′,θ) then
derive(am,x)
else properties(x,θ)
end
pre is_valid_decomp(x,am,θ)
6.4.3 Observing relations
axiom
[ relations ]
∀ θ:Θ, x:X •
relations(add_object(x,θ)) ≡ relations(θ)
pre ∼is_object_present(x,θ)
∀ θ:Θ, (a,vs):P, x:X •
relations(add_property((a,vs),x,θ)) ≡ relations(θ),
pre is_object_present(x,θ) ∧ ∼is_property_attribute_present(a,x,θ),
∀ θ:Θ, (a,vs):R, x, x′:X •
relations(add_relation((a,vs),(x,x′),θ)) ≡ relations(θ) ∪ {((x,x′),(a,vs))}
pre is_object_present(x,θ) ∧ is_object_present(x′,θ) ∧
∼is_relation_attribute_present(a,(x,x′),θ),
∀ θ,θ′:Θ •
relations(meet(θ,θ′)) ≡ meet(relations(θ),relations(θ′)),
∀ θ,θ′:Θ •
relations(join(θ,θ′)) ≡ join(relations(θ),relations(θ′)),
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∀ θ:Θ, x:X, am:AP →m (X →m VP-infset) •
relations(decompose(x,am,θ)) ≡ relations(θ)
pre is_valid_decomp(x,am,θ)
6.4.4 Observing decompositions
axiom
[ decomposition ]
∀ θ:Θ, x,x′:X •
decomposition(x,add_objects(x′,θ)) ≡
if x=x′ then {} else decomposition(x,θ) end
pre ∼is_object_present(x′,θ),
∀ θ:Θ, x,x′:X, (a,vs):P •
decomposition(x,add_property((a,vs),x′,θ)) ≡ decomposition(x,θ)
pre is_object_present(x′,θ) ∧ ∼is_attribute_present(a,x′,θ)
∀ θ:Θ, x, x′,x′′:X, (a,vs):R •
decomposition(x,add_relation((a,vs),(x′,x′′),θ)) ≡ decomposition(x,θ)
pre is_object_present(x′,θ) ∧ is_object_present(x′′,θ) ∧
∼is_relation_attribute_present(a,(x′,x′′),θ),
∀ θ, θ′:Θ, x:X •
decomposition(x,meet(θ,θ′)) ≡
decomposition(x,θ) ∪ decomposition(x,θ′),
∀ θ, θ′:Θ, x:X •
decomposition(x,join(θ,θ′)) ≡
decomposition(x,θ) ∩ decomposition(x,θ′),
∀ θ:Θ, x,x′:X, am:AP →m (X →m VP-infset)
decomposition(x,decompose(x′,am,θ)) ≡
if x=x′ then
{x′′|x′′:X • (∃ a:AP • a ∈ dom am ∧ x′′ ∈ dom am(a))}
elsif x ∈ {x′′|x′′:X •
(∃ a:AP • a ∈ dom am ∧ x′′ ∈ dom am(a))} then {}
else decomposition(x,θ)
end
pre is_valid_decomp(x′,am,θ)
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6.5 Partial order
In Chapter 5, the notion of artefact models was defined by two mappings objects
and relations. In this paper, the job of these are performed by observer functions.
In addition, we have added the notion of decomposition.
As mentioned in Section 6.1, maintaining some sort of ordering relation between
designs is necessary in order to assure that incrementality is not violated. In
order to show that the specification of artefact models and the associated gen-
erator functions defines a lattice, we need to show that each design move does
not violate the partial order relation between artefact models; non–ambiguity
for lattice meet and join has been proved in Chapter 5.
We shall approach this problem by rewriting the definition of the ordering re-
lation (≤,Θ) into a version which complies with the specification of artefact
models given in this paper. By θ′ ≤ θ we mean that the artefact model θ′ is
more specialised than the model θ. We use the symbol ≤ to emphasize that
design moves are non–increasing on value sets. A design move from a to b thus
should preserve the ordering b ≤ a.
In order to rewrite the axiom for partial order of artefact models presented in
Chapter 5, we first do the following observation. The domains of the mappings
objects and relations in the axiom from Chapter 5 correspond to the observer
functions objects and relations in this paper.
We can thus formulate the ordering relation (≤,Θ) as:
value
≤: Θ × Θ → Bool
axiom ∀ θ, θ′:Θ •
θ′≤θ ≡
(∀ x:X • x ∈ objects(θ) ⇒ (x ∈ objects(θ′) ∧
(∀ a:AP, vs:VP-infset • (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VP-infset • (a,vs′) ∈ properties(x,θ′) ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs′)))) ∧
(∀ (x,x′):(X×X), a:AR, vs:VR-infset •
((x,x′),(a,vs)) ∈ relations(θ) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VR-infset • ((x,x′),a,vs′) ∈ relations(θ′) ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs)) ∧
(∀ x:X • decomposition(x,θ) ⊆ decomposition(x,θ′))
We notice that the axiom can be split up into the following parts (assuming a
conjunction of the parts):
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(∀ θ,θ′:Θ, x:X • x ∈ objects(θ) ⇒ x ∈ objects(θ′)),
(∀ θ,θ′:Θ, x:X, a:AP, vs′:VP-infset •
x ∈ objects(θ) ⇒ (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VP-infset • (a,vs′) ∈ properties(x,θ′) ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs)),
(∀ θ,θ′:Θ, (x,x′):(X×X), a:AR, vs, vs′:VR-infset •
((x,x′),(a,vs)) ∈ relations(θ) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VR-infset • ((x,x′),a,vs′) ∈ relations(θ′) ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs)),
(∀ θ,θ′:Θ, x:X • decompositions(x,θ) ⊆ decompositions(x,θ′)),
We shall take advantage of this paraphrase in the proofs.
The unambiguous existence of least upper bound and greatest lower bound
have already been proven in Chapter 5 for a definition of partial order which
includes requirements besides those to decomposition. However, proving this
for decomposition is trivial as it follows Boolean algebra. Also, changes to
the definition of lattice meet and lattice join have not changed significantly
from those given in Chapter 5. Thus, we shall not repeat the proves of these
properties here. Left is to prove that the operations add_object, add_property,
add_relation, decompose, union, and join, do not violate the partial order of
artefact models.
Proposition 6.3 The design move given by the generator function
add_object order preserves (≤,Θ).
Proof: We show that the generator function do not violate the axiom for the
partial order.
∀ θ,θ′,Θ, x:X • x ∈ objects(θ) ⇒ x ∈ objects(θ′)
θ′=add_object(x′,θ):
x:X • x ∈ objects(θ) ⇒ x ∈ objects(add_object(x′,θ))
≡ x:X • x ∈ objects(θ) ⇒ x ∈ (objects(θ) ∪ {x′})
≡ true
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∀ θ,θ′:Θ, x:X, a:AP, vs:VP-infset •
(x ∈ objects(θ) ∧ (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ)) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VP-infset • (a,vs′) ∈ properties(x,θ′) ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs)
θ′=add_object(x′,θ):
(x ∈ objects(θ) ∧ (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ)) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VP-infset • (a,vs′) ∈ properties(x,add_object(x′,θ)) ∧
vs′ ⊆ vs)
x=x′:
(x ∈ objects(θ) ∧ (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ)) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VP-infset • (a,vs′) ∈ {} ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs)
From pre–condition ∼is_object_present(x′,θ) we have that x 6∈objects(θ).
≡ true
x 6=x′:
(x ∈ objects(θ) ∧ (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ)) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VP-infset • (a,vs′) ∈ properties(x,θ) ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs)
From axiom [consistency] we have that vs=vs′.
≡ true
∀ (x,x′):(X×X), a:AR, vs:VR-infset, θ,θ′:Θ •
((x,x′),(a,vs)) ∈ relations(θ) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VR-infset • ((x,x′),(a,vs′)) ∈ relations(θ′) ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs)
θ′=add_object(x′,θ):
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((x,x′),(a,vs)) ∈ relations(θ) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VR-infset • ((x,x′),(a,vs′)) ∈ relations(add_object(x′,θ))
∧ vs′ ⊆ vs)
≡ ((x,x′),(a,vs)) ∈ relations(θ) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VR-infset • ((x,x′),(a,vs′)) ∈ relations(θ) ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs)
From axiom [consistency] we have that vs=vs′.
≡ true
∀ θ,θ′:Θ, x:X • decomposition(x,θ) ⊆ decomposition(x,θ′)
θ′=add_object(x′,θ):
decomposition(x,θ) ⊆ decomposition(x,add_object(x′,θ))
x=x′:
decomposition(x,θ) ⊆ {}
From pre–condition ∼is_object_present(x′,θ) we have:
≡ {} ⊆ {}
≡ true
x 6=x′:
decomposition(x,θ) ⊆ decomposition(x,θ)
≡ true
Qed
172
An algebraic specification of incremental,
conceptual building design
2
Proposition 6.4 The design move given by the generator function
add_property order preserves (≤,Θ).
Proof: We show that the generator function do not violate the axiom for the
partial order.
∀ x:X • x ∈ objects(θ) ⇒ x ∈ objects(θ′)
θ′=add_property((a,vs),x′,θ):
x:X • x ∈ objects(θ) ⇒ x ∈ objects(add_property((a,vs),x′,θ))
≡ x:X • x ∈ objects(θ) ⇒ x ∈ objects(θ)
≡ true
∀ θ,θ:Θ, x:X, a:AP, vs:VP-infset •
(x ∈ objects(θ) ∧ (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ)) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VP-infset • (a,vs′) ∈ properties(x,θ′)) ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs
θ′=add_property((a′′,vs′′),x′,θ):
(x ∈ objects(θ) ∧ (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ)) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VP-infset • (a,vs′) ∈ properties(x,add_property((a′′,vs′′),x′,θ)) ∧
vs′ ⊆ vs)
x=x′:
(x ∈ objects(θ) ∧ (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ)) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VP-infset • (a,vs) ∈ (properties(x,θ) ∪ {(a′′,vs′′)}) ∧
vs′ ⊆ vs)
From axiom [consistency] we have that vs=vs′.
≡ true
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else:
≡ (x ∈ objects(θ) ∧ (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ)) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VP-infset • (a,vs′) ∈ properties(x,θ) ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs)
From axiom [consistency] we have that vs=vs′.
≡ true
∀ (x,x′):(X×X), a:AR, vs:VR-infset, θ,θ′:Θ •
((x,x′),(a,vs)) ∈ relations(θ) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VR-infset • ((x,x′),(a,vs′)) ∈ relations(θ) ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs)
θ′=add_property((a′′,vs′′),x′,θ):
((x,x′),(a,vs)) ∈ relations(θ) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VR-infset •
((x,x′),(a,vs′)) ∈ relations(add_property((a′′,vs′′),x′,θ)) ∧
vs′ ⊆ vs)
≡ ((x,x′),(a,vs)) ∈ relations(θ) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VR-infset • ((x,x′),(a,vs′)) ∈ relations(θ) ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs)
From axiom [consistency] we have that vs=vs′.
≡ true
∀ x:X • decomposition(x,θ) ⊆ decomposition(x,θ′)
θ′=add_property((a′′,vs′′),x′,θ):
decomposition(x,θ) ⊆ decomposition(x,add_property((a′′,vs′′),x′,θ))
≡ decomposition(x,θ) ⊆ decomposition(x,θ)
≡ true
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Qed
2
Proposition 6.5 The design move given by the generator function
add_relation order preserves (≤,Θ).
Proof: We show that the generator function do not violate the axiom for the
partial order.
∀ θ,θ′:Θ, x:X • x ∈ objects(θ) ⇒ x ∈ objects(θ′)
θ′=add_relation((a′′,vs′′),(x′,x′′),θ):
x ∈ objects(θ) ⇒ x ∈ objects(add_relation((a′′,vs′′),(x′,x′′),θ))
≡ x ∈ objects(θ) ⇒ x ∈ objects(θ)
≡ true
∀ x:X, a:AP, vs:VP-infset •
(x ∈ objects(θ) ∧ (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ)) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VP-infset • (a,vs′) ∈ properties(x,θ′) ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs)
θ′=add_relation(((a′′,vs′′),(x′,x′′)),θ):
(x ∈ objects(θ) ∧ (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ)) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VP-infset •
(a,vs′) ∈ properties(x,add_relation((a′′,vs′′),(x′,x′′),θ)) ∧
vs′ ⊆ vs)
≡ (x ∈ objects(θ) ∧ (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ)) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VP-infset • (a,vs′) ∈ properties(x,θ) ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs)
≡ true
∀ (x,x′):(X×X), a:AR, vs:VR-infset, θ,θ′:Θ •
((x,x′),(a,vs)) ∈ relations(θ) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VP-infset • ((x,x′),(a′′,vs′′)) ∈ relations(θ′) ∧
vs′ ⊆ vs)
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θ′=add_relation((a′′,vs′′),(x′′,x′′′),θ):
((x,x′),(a,vs)) ∈ relations(θ) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VR-infset •
((x,x′),(a,vs′)) ∈ relations(add_relation((a′′,vs′′),(x′′,x′′′),θ)) ∧
vs′ ⊆ vs)
≡ ((x,x′),(a,vs)) ∈ relations(θ) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VP-infset • ((x,x′),(a,vs′)) ∈ (relations(θ) ∪
{((a′′,vs′′),(x′′,x′′′))}) ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs)
From axiom [consistency] we have that vs=vs′
≡ true
∀ θ,θ′:Θ, x:X • decomposition(x,θ) ⊆ decomposition(x,θ′)
θ′=add_relation(x′,θ):
decomposition(x,θ) ⊆ decomposition(x,add_relation((a′′,vs′′),(x′′,x′′′),θ))
≡ decomposition(x,θ) ⊆ decomposition(x,θ)
≡ true
Qed
2
Proposition 6.6 The design move given by the generator function
decompose order preserves (≤,Θ).
Proof: We show that the generator function do not violate the axiom for the
partial order.
∀ θ,θ′:Θ, x:X • x ∈ objects(θ) ⇒ x ∈ objects(θ′)
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θ′=decompose(x′,am,θ):
x ∈ objects(θ) ⇒ x ∈ objects(decompose(x′,am,θ))
≡ x:X • x ∈ objects(θ) ⇒ x ∈ objects(θ) ∪
{x′′|x′′:X • (∃ a:AP • a ∈ dom am ∧ x′′ ∈ dom am(a))}
≡ true
∀ θ,θ′:Θ, x:X, a:AP, vs:VP-infset •
(x ∈ objects(θ) ∧ (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ)) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VP-infset • (a,vs′) ∈ properties(x,θ′) ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs)
θ′=decompose(x′,am,θ):
(x ∈ objects(θ) ∧ (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ)) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VP-infset • (a,vs′) ∈ properties(x,decompose(x′,am,θ)) ∧
vs′ ⊆ vs)
x ∈ decomposition(x′,θ):
≡ (x ∈ objects(θ) ∧ (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ)) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VP-infset • (a,vs′) ∈ derive(am,x) ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs)
From axiom [decomp-consistency] we have that x /∈ objects(θ)10:
≡ true
else:
(x ∈ objects(θ) ∧ (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ)) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VP-infset • (a,vs′) ∈ properties(x,decompose(x′,am,θ)) ∧
vs′ ⊆ vs)
≡ (x ∈ objects(θ) ∧ (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ)) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VP-infset • (a,vs′) ∈ properties(x,θ) ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs)
10Note, that the function derive is not related to the partial order which is why we do not
utilize that decompose evaluates to the result of applying derive.
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From axiom [consistency] we have that vs=vs′.
≡ true
∀ (x,x′):(X×X), a:AR, vs:VR-infset, θ,θ′:Θ •
((x,x′),(a,vs)) ∈ relations(θ) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VR-infset • ((x,x′),(a,vs′)) ∈ relations(θ′)) ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs
θ′=decompose(x′,am,θ):
((x,x′),(a,vs)) ∈ relations(θ) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VR-infset • ((x,x′),(a,vs′)) ∈ relations(decompose(x′,am,θ)) ∧
vs′ ⊆ vs)
≡ ((x,x′),(a,vs)) ∈ relations(θ) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VR-infset • ((x,x′),(a,vs′)) ∈ relations(θ) ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs)
From axiom [consistency] we have that vs=vs′
≡ true
∀ θ,θ′:Θ, x:X • decomposition(x,θ) ⊆ decomposition(x,θ′)
θ′=decompose(x′,am,θ):
decomposition(x,θ) ⊆ decomposition(x,decompose(x′,am,θ))
x=x′:
≡ {x′′|x′′:X • (∃ a:AP • a ∈ dom am ∧ x′′ ∈ dom am(a))} ⊆
{x′′|x′′:X • (∃ a:AP • a ∈ dom am ∧ x′′ ∈ dom am(a))}
≡ true
x∈ {x′′|x′′:X • (∃ a:AP • a ∈ dom am ∧ x′′ ∈ dom am(a))}:
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≡ decomposition(x,θ) ⊆ {}
≡ {} ⊆ {}
else:
≡ ∀ x:X • decomposition(x,θ) ⊆ decomposition(x,θ)
≡ true
Qed
2
Proposition 6.7 The design move given by the generator function
join order preserves (≤,Θ).
Proof: We show that the generator function does not violate the axiom of partial
order. We do so by showing that the order is preserved between θ and θ′′ for
arbitrary θ′ in θ′′ = join(θ, θ′). The dual case comes out of commutativity of
set operations.
∀ θ,θ′′:Θ, x:X • x ∈ objects(θ′′) ⇒ x ∈ objects(θ)
θ′′=join(θ,θ′):
x ∈ objects(θ′′) ⇒ x ∈ objects(θ)
≡ x ∈ objects(join(θ,θ′)) ⇒ x ∈ objects(θ)
≡ x ∈ (objects(θ) ∩ objects(θ′)) ⇒ x ∈ objects(θ)
≡ true
∀ θ, θ′′:Θ, x:X, a:AP, vs′′:VP-infset •
(x ∈ objects(θ′′) ∧ (a,vs′′) ∈ properties(x,θ′′)) ⇒
(∃ vs:VP-infset • (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ) ∧ vs ⊆ vs′′)
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θ′′=join(θ,θ′):
≡ (x ∈ objects(join(θ,θ′)) ∧
(a,vs′′) ∈ properties(x,join(θ,θ′))) ⇒
(∃ vs:VP-infset • (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ) ∧ vs ⊆ vs′′)
≡ (x ∈ (objects(θ) ∩ objects(θ′)) ∧
(a,vs′′) ∈ join(properties(x,θ),properties(x,θ′))) ⇒
(∃ vs:VP-infset • (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ) ∧ vs ⊆ vs′′)
From inspection according to the definition of join, we get:
≡ true
∀ (x,x′):(X×X), a:AR, vs′′:VR-infset, θ,θ′′:Θ •
((x,x′),(a,vs′′)) ∈ relations(θ′′) ⇒
(∃ vs:VR-infset • ((x,x′),(a,vs)) ∈ relations(θ) ∧ vs ⊆ vs′′)
θ′′=join(θ,θ′):
≡ ((x,x′),(a,vs′′)) ∈ relations(join(θ,θ′)) ⇒
(∃ vs:VR-infset • ((x,x′),(a,vs)) ∈ relations(θ) ∧ vs ⊆ vs′′)
≡ ((x,x′),(a,vs′′)) ∈ join(relations(θ),relations(θ′)) ⇒
(∃ vs:VR-infset • ((x,x′),(a,vs)) ∈ relations(θ) ∧ vs ⊆ vs′′)
From inspection according to the definition of join, we get:
≡ true
∀ θ,θ′′:Θ, x:X, decomposition(x,θ′′) ⊆ decomposition(x,θ)
θ′′=join(θ,θ′):
decomposition(x,join(θ,θ′)) ⊆ decomposition(x,θ)
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≡ (decomposition(x,θ) ∩ decomposition(x,θ′)) ⊆ decomposition(x,θ)
≡ true
Qed
2
Proposition 6.8 The design move given by the generator function
meet order preserves (≤,Θ).
Proof: We show that the generator function do not violate the axiom for the
partial order. We do so by showing that the order is preserved between θ and θ′′
for arbitrary θ′ in θ′′ = meet(θ, θ′). The dual case comes out of commutativity
of set operations.
∀ θ,θ′′:Θ, x:X • x ∈ objects(θ) ⇒ x ∈ objects(θ′′)
θ′′=meet(θ,θ′):
x ∈ objects(θ) ⇒ x ∈ objects(θ′′)
≡ x ∈ objects(θ) ⇒ x ∈ objects(join(θ,θ′))
≡ x ∈ objects(θ) ⇒ x ∈ (objects(θ) ∪ objects(θ′))
≡ true
∀ θ,θ′′:Θ, x:X, a:AP, vs:VP-infset •
(x ∈ objects(θ) ∧ (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ)) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VP-infset • (a,vs′) ∈ properties(x,θ′′) ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs)
θ′′=meet(θ,θ′):
(x ∈ objects(θ) ∧ (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ)) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VP-infset • (a,vs′) ∈ properties(x,join(θ,θ′)) ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs)
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≡ (x ∈ objects(θ) ∧ (a,vs) ∈ properties(x,θ)) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VP-infset •
(a,vs) ∈ join(properties(x,θ),properties(x,θ′)) ∧
vs′ ⊆ vs)
From inspection according to the definition of meet, we get:
≡ true
∀ (x,x′):(X×X), a:AR, vs:VR-infset, θ,θ′′:Θ •
((x,x′),(a,vs)) ∈ relations(θ) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VR-infset • ((x,x′),(a,vs′)) ∈ relations(θ′′) ∧ vs′ ⊆ vs)
θ′′=meet(θ,θ′):
≡ ((x,x′),(a,vs)) ∈ relations(θ) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VR-infset • ((x,x′),(a,vs)) ∈ relations(meet(θ,θ′)) ∧
vs′ ⊆ vs)
≡ (x,x′):(X×X), a:AR, vs:VR-infset, θ,θ′′:Θ •
((x,x′),(a,vs)) ∈ relations(θ) ⇒
(∃ vs′:VR-infset • ((x,x′),(a,vs)) ∈meet(relations(θ),relations(θ′)) ∧
vs′ ⊆ vs)
From inspection according to the definition of meet, we get:
≡ true.
∀ θ,θ′′:Θ, x:X • decomposition(x,θ) ⊆ decomposition(x,θ′′)
θ′′=meet(θ,θ′):
decomposition(x,θ) ⊆ decomposition(x,join(θ,θ′))
≡ ∀ x:X • decomposition(x,θ) ⊆
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(decomposition(x,θ) meet decomposition(x,θ′))
≡ true
Qed
2
6.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have elaborated on the notion of design lattices from Chapter 5.
We have done so by taking another approach to model design representations
(artefact models) and the moves which bind representation through stages of
development (design moves). The approach is the algebraic approach from the
RAISE method. In the approach, domain entities are modelled as abstract types
(sorts) and functions of two different kinds are specified as function signatures
ranging over the abstract types. The two kinds of functions are observer func-
tions and generator functions. With observer functions, we observe entities of
the values of abstract types. With generator functions we indicate the changes
that can be made to values of the abstract types. In this paper, the generator
functions represent design moves. The algebraic approach now appears from
combining observer functions with generator functions in formal axioms.
As in Chapter 5, we have made a distinction between two sorts of design moves
(and thus two sorts of generator functions). The former is the class of design
moves by aspect which are modelled as functions updating artefact models; e.g.
with new objects. The latter is the class of design moves by configuration which
are modelled as binary operations on pairs of artefact models. As in Chapter 5,
these binary operations are lattice join and meet.
The notion of decomposition has been introduced as a new sort of design move
in this paper. A decomposition introduces sub–objects and associates these
with a given object in a model. The function is essentially distinct from the
lattice operations as the relation between object and sub–objects is represented
within an artefact model and not as a relation between artefact models. The
purpose of decomposition is to refer to parts of objects in a convenient way.
However, it is not based on complex mereological issues. As an example, we do
not make any restrictions to how objects are decomposed nor to their ontological
status as objects falling under well–defined concepts11. Neither do we make any
11For a discussion of such issues, we refer to Chapter 8.
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assumptions of how these sub–objects must relate to each other, like excluding
spatial overlap.
For decompositions, it seemed plausible to suggest that a relation should hold be-
tween the properties of an object and the properties of its sub–objects. Thereby,
a requirement of such a relation could be included in the axiom for partial order.
We have explored various criteria for such a relation and we found that it is not
plausible to define such a relation. The reason is that some properties — like
the length of a beam — may not maintain their values in sub–objects. Other
properties — like the colour of a house — may be considered dominating for
some sub–objects compared to others, but a consistent theory of essential parts
is here needed for clarification. We have argued that a consistent criteria, not
obstructing the process of the design practitioner, cannot be defined; this based
on the present ontological status on which this paper has been founded.
The notions of artefact models and design moves are intended to span a lattice
structure as were the notions in Chapter 5. In Chapter 5, we showed that
this was indeed the case. However, in this paper, the specification is different,
although the intrinsic structure is the same as in Chapter 5. We have shown that
the generator functions do not violate the axiom for partial order. Combining
the proofs and considerations from Chapter 5, we have that artefact models and
moves satisfy lattice criteria.
Future work can turn in various directions. One direction may try formally
to relate the algebraic specification to mathematically well–founded algebras
or calculi like Lambda–calculus , Cardelli’s F<:, etc. An approach could be to
encode the algebraic specification in these calculi. Thereby, the mathematical
properties of the specification could be explored. Also, the notion of artefact
models could be related to category theory by defining the notion of artefact
models as a category. Thereby, further steps towards a mathematically founded
design algebra will be taken.
Another direction for future work could be to specify convenient languages for
design representation. A basic core–language is presented in Chapter 7. How-
ever, other sorts of languages may be explored. An important step in such
future work is to apply such languages as means for expression in cases of real
designing.
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Chapter 7
Semantic parameterized
interpretation as a
foundation for conceptual
design systems
Abstract: This paper suggests a software architecture for conceptual
design systems. We claim that today’s design systems lack of dynamics
in two respects. The former is that objects usually cannot be specialised
incrementally. The latter is that introducing new sorts of properties and
relations usually requires a large amount of programming, code restruc-
turing, and recompilation.
The suggested software architecture aims at introducing the desired dy-
namics by means of what we shall call semantic parameterized interpre-
tation. Conceptual design models are expressed in a modelling language
LM and interpreted according to a semantics written in a specification
language LS. The semantics specifies how names of properties and rela-
tions are to be interpreted. The result of the interpretation is what we call
a view of the model. A view is expressed in one of many possible target
languages LTi . A view can be a representation of visualisation, a database
scheme for bill–of–material calculations, equations for stress analysis, etc.
Each semantics defines a specific sort of view.
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A conceptual model contains: Object designators which are bound to sets
of properties, relations between objects, and decompositions of objects
into sub–objects.
New names for properties and relations can be introduced freely by ex-
pressing their meaning in the semantic language. This principle stands
in contrast to the object–oriented principle which founds most of today’s
design systems relying on pre–defined class hierarchies for design objects.
We specify the syntax and denotational semantics of the languages in-
volved. Furthermore, we present a formal specification of the software
architecture which is founded on the principle of semantic parameterized
interpretation.
However, the presented languages are not advanced in any sense, but
simply examples. The contribution, we believe, is the principle of semantic
parameterized interpretation as a new software architecture for conceptual
design systems.
Notation
The following is a list of some symbols which are repeatingly used in the paper.
LM Artefact specification language
m Range over artefact specifications written in LM
LS Family of semantic specification languages
However, LS is also used to denote a semantic specification
language in general
LSi Family member of LS
s Range over semantics specifications
LT Family of target languages
LTi Instances of the family of target languages.
t Range over semantics specifications
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7.1 Introduction
The introduction of object–orientation has had a tremendous impact on the
foundation and software architectures for computer aided design systems (CAD
systems). Such systems are today mostly object–oriented and founded on built–
in class hierarchies for the kind of objects which can be added to a design.
Examples are classes of walls, ceiling, beams, doors, and furniture objects. A
design — in this respect — is a configuration of objects, and designing is a
process of adding objects of classes to a configuration.
Class–based languages makes the majority of object–oriented languages. In
class–based languages, information is represented in objects by means of pro-
perties. Objects are instances of classes which contain methods for representing
and manipulating object data, [1].
Some methods are intended to capture kinds of semantic aspects of the objects.
An example is a method for visualising an object on screen. The method ex-
presses the visual properties of objects of that class by means of graphical and
geometrical values like lines, circles, and colour values.
We claim that object–oriented design systems lack of dynamics in two respects.
The first is that the systems do not support incremental design; i.e. a process
in which objects of the current design model are being specialised incrementally
according to their kinds. In object–orientation, each object is “born” with a
number of properties; namely those specified by its class. The second respect
is that introducing new sorts of properties or relations means re–organising the
class hierarchy which may require a large amount of programming, code re–
structuring, and re–compilation of the design program code. The latter may
have the impact that over time, the class system gets messy.
In [64, 67, 75, 167, 62] and in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, foundations for concep-
tual design systems have been explored. It is argued that properties of objects
and relations between objects are fundamental ontological entities for artefact
description. By an artefact, we understand a man–made physical object. Most
mechanical and architectural designing concerns artefacts. However, properties
and relations do not necessarily have to be “selected” from a pre–defined class
hierarchy.
In another sense, this paper adds another dimension to the discussion of inter-
operability in construction and design of buildings.
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7.1.1 Design models and views: a few examples
Consider a design conception of a beam object. The fundamental knowledge of
such a beam is the ontological intrinsic properties like dimensions and material.
Such knowledge can to some extend be expressed in a formal specification. For
our beam object (let us call it mybeam), we could give the specification:
model
mybeam : (sort={beam},
length={2400},
height={600},
width={800},
material={wood})
We call such a specification an artefact model , as the objects with which we are
concerned, are artefacts. The language in which it is written, we call a modelling
language, denoted LM .
An artefact model specifies the properties of uniquely identified objects; here
the singleton set of the object named mybeam. Properties are represented by
expressions like length={2400}, where the name length is called the attribute
and 2400 is called the property value (or just the value).
Note, that we have included a property with the attribute sort. The reason is
that it is much easier to distinguish the objects on their sort (an overall concept)
than making a long list of properties aiming a defining such distinctions. A
similar approach is used in object–oriented languages where we have the notion
of a class name in addition to the type structure inside the class definition.
However, the attribute sort is optional and considered to by at the same level
as all other attributes. We might even call it something else or omit it if it is
not needed.
From an artefact model (m:LM ), we can observe the set of object identifiers
(xs:X-set) in the model. Also, from an artefact model and an object identi-
fier, we can observe the set of properties (ps:A→m V) ascribed to that object in
the model. The set of properties of an object is modelled as a mapping from
attributes (a:A) to property values (v:V).
type
LM , X, A, V
value
objects: LM → X-set,
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properties: LM × X → (A →m V)
Let m be the artefact model which includes the object mybeam, then objects(m)
gives {mybeam} and properties(m,mybeam) gives:
[ sort 7→ beam, length 7→ 2400, height 7→ 600, width 7→ 800, material 7→ wood ]
The two observer functions are modified later in Section 7.2.1).
The specification only states the ontological knowledge intimately (intrinsically)
related to the object, and thus not behaviour, function, potential use, or how the
object looks like from various angles. Such knowledge are extrinsic to the object
and depends on the perspective we put on the artefact model specifying it. As
shown on Figure 7.1, various different perspectives exists. We can visualize the
beam in front view or in isometric view, we can illustrate the load–theoretic is-
sues which hold for the beam, present MatLab programs for calculating internal
stress, or we can even present another artefact model being the result of scaling
the beam’s proportion by a factor 12 .
The different perspectives are the results — indirectly or directly — of inter-
preting the artefact model in different ways. In fact an artefact model can be
interpreted in as many ways as there are pieces of information which can be
deduced from it.
An interpretation of an artefact model is performed by translating objects in the
artefact model to the meanings of terms denoting properties of these objects.
However, even though the names sort, length, height, etc., might make sense in
our normal understanding of artefacts, they do not in computer programs until we
specify the meaning of them.
A specification which defines the meaning of property names, we call a seman-
tics , and the language in which it is written we call a semantic language denoted
LS .
The semantics for getting a front view interpretation of objects like mybeam
could be given by the specification1:
1Note the use of pre–fix notation.
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model
  mybeam:
  (sort={beam},
   length={2400},
   height={600},
   width={800},
   material={concrete})
model
  mybeam:
  (sort={beam},
   length={1200},
   height={300},
   width={400},
   material={concrete})
artefact model
isometric visualisation
        theory for load calculation
Artefact model as result of 
a scaling operation
intuition
front view visualisation
S = [] ;
  for i = 0 : 600
    for j = 0 : 2400
      S(i+1,j+1) = -6*p*j*i*(2400-j) / (800*600^3) ;  
    end ;
  end;
MatLab program for stress calculation
Figure 7.1: Multiple views on a model.
template
(sort={beam}) :
{
(command "rectangle" (list (/ -width 2)) (/ -height 2)))
(list (/ width 2) (/ height 2)))
}
Expressions like (sort={beam}) are lists (here a singleton) of properties similar
to the list given for the object mybeam in the artefact model. In a semantics, we
call such an expression a property pattern. The semantics states that the mean-
ing of an object with attribute sort and value beam is the rectangle command
expression enclosed in the curly parenthesis.
From a semantics, we can observe the set of property patterns, and from a se-
mantics and a property pattern, we can observe the meaning which is expressed
in LT .
type
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LS , L′T , A, V
value
patterns: LS → (A →m V),
target: LS × (A →m V) → L′T
We recognize that the pattern (sort = {beam}) complies with the properties of
mybeam in the artefact model presented. It does so in the sense that the set of
properties in the pattern (here a singleton set) is a subset of the set of properties
of the object mybeam. We assume that the “best” target is selected in case of
ambiguity of any kind. A more sophisticated and fine grained approach is given
in Section 7.5 and Section 7.9.
Now, assume that we name the semantic specification s and the artefact model
m. A first, partial interpretation of mybeam (and thus of the artefact model) is
given by:
target(s,properties(m,mybeam))
and the result is:
(command "rectangle" (list (/ -width 2)) (/ -height 2)))
(list (/ width 2) (/ height 2)))
We call such a representation a view (or a target). The language in which it is
written is called a target language denoted LTi .
This view is, however, unsaturated in the sense that it contains the placeholders
width and height, as well as algebraic expressions to be evaluated2.
Substituting free variables and evaluating arithmetic sub–expressions yields the
resulting representation of a front–view perspective on the artefact model. The
property set of an object is here considered a substitution of attributes with
property values. For mybeam, we have the substitution:
[ sort 7→ beam, length 7→ 2400, height 7→ 600, width 7→ 800, material 7→ wood ]
2Frege used the term “unsaturated” about functions which become saturated by means of
applying their arguments. In this paper, the term is used in a different sense, though inspired
by Frege. We shall discuss the distinction between saturated and unsaturated views further
in Section 7.4.
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which yields:
(command "rectangle" (list -400 -300) (list 400 300))
This resulting view is a valid expression in the graphical language AutoLISP
which is a built–in language of the design system AutoCAD. Entering the view
specification into AutoCAD makes this tool display a visualisation of the object
as shown on Figure 7.23. We should note that AutoLISP uses a pre–fix notation
for arithmetic expressions which is why we used this notation earlier.
x1
height
height/2
width/2
width/2
height/2
width
y
x
y2
y1
x2
Figure 7.2: Front view visualization of mybeam.
A semantics which yields an oblique projection view of the artefact model could
be:
3Measurements are only shown for convenience.
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template
(sort={beam}) :
{
(command "rectangle" (list (/ -width 2) (/ -height 2))
(list (/ width 2) (/ height 2)))
(command "line" (list (/ -width 2) (/ height 2))
(list (+(/ -width 2) length) (+(/ height 2) height)) "")
(command "line" (list (+(/ -width 2) length) (+(/ height 2) height))
(list (+(/ width 2) length) (+(/ height 2) height)) "" )
(command "line" (list (/ width 2) (/ height 2))
(list (+(/ width 2) length) (+(/ height 2) height)) "" )
(command "line" (list (/ width 2) (/ -height 2))
(list (+(/ width 2) length) (/ height 2)) "" )
(command "line" (list (+(/ width 2) length) (/ height 2))
(list (+(/ width 2) length) (+(/ height 2) height)) "" )
}
The interpretation of the model according to this semantics gives the view4:
(command "rectangle" (list -400 -300) (list 400 300))
(command "line" (list -400 300) (list (+(-400 2400)) (+ 300 600)) "")
(command "line" (list (+ 400 2400) (+ 300 600)) (list (+ 400 2400)
(+ 300 600)) "")
(command "line" (list 400 300) (list (+ 400 2400) (+ 300 600)) "")
(command "line" (list 400 -300) (list (+ 400 2400) 300) "")
(command "line" (list (+ 400 2400) 300) (list (+ 400 2400) (+ 300 600)) "")
The isometric and the front view relate in the sense that the latter is written
in a sub–language of which the former is written. Also, they relate in the sense
that the former is simply a sub–expression of the latter.
We can also define views which are not intended for graphical display of the
form of the artefact. Consider for example5:
template
(sort={beam}) :
{
0.5*width*height*length kg
}
Applying this semantics on the artefact model gives the view:
3200 kg
I.e. we get a sequence of characters which express the mass of such beams.
4For clarity, we have avoided to completely evaluate the expressions into values
5Laminated wood usually have a mass of 0.5 ∗ Akg/m, where A is the cross area of such
beams [111].
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Amore advanced example could be a semantics which defines a view representing
a MatLab programs for calculating internal stress of such beams. Consider the
following semantics:
template
(sort={beam}) :
{
S=[];
for i = 0:height
for j = 0:length
S(i+1,j+1)=-6*p*j*i*(length-j)/(width*heightˆ3);
end;
end;
}
The semantics states that the meaning of an object which complies with the
given property pattern, is a MatLab programs which gives a matrix of stress
values6. The view is: Applying the semantics on the artefact model gives the
view:
S=[];
for i = 0:600
for j = 0:2400
S(i+1,j+1)=-6*p*j*i*(2400-j)/(800*600ˆ3);
end;
end;
7.1.2 Semantic parameterized interpretation
The class of design systems we outline in this paper rely on a principle we call
semantic parameterized interpretation. The design systems belonging to the
class follow a common structure — they have the same software architecture. By
a software architecture we understand the set of components and the interfaces
between components which together outlines a system structure [29].
Definition 7.1 (Semantic parameterized interpretation) By
semantic parameterized interpretation, we understand interpretation of artefact
models according to a semantics.
6The values are calculated on basis of Navier’s formula δ = −M
I
y, where M is the force
equation M = 1
2
pLx − 1
2
pLx2 and I is the moment of inertia for beams with a rectangular
cross section: 1
12
bh3. x and y are coordinate factors, L is the beam length, b and h are the
width and height of the beams, respectively, and p is the density of the material.
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A semantics binds sets of properties to target language expressions. Interpre-
tation is now made in two stages. The first stages of the interpretation is gives
the target expressions for each object in the model. Each target expression in
the set is a view of the individual objects. However, the target expressions may
be unsaturated in the sense that they contain free terms and unevaluated ex-
pressions. The second stage of the interpretation aims at: (i) substituting such
free terms with property values to which the terms as attributes in the artefact
model, are bound, (ii) evaluating expressions, and (iii) combining the resulting
views into one.
The second part is in fact a kind of term re–writing and evaluation [54]. It
requires what we shall call a calculus semantics CS which basically is a canonical
set of rewriting rules which include substitution. We call it a calculus semantics
as it specifies how to interpret the basic arithmetic expressions belonging to the
general calculus underlying the given target language.
Semantic parameterized interpretation is thus based on:
LM : a language for expressing artefact models.
LS : a language for specifying the semantics of artefact models.∑
i LTi : a family of target languages for expressing views.
CS: a calculus semantics.
Parsing an artefact model (m:LM ) gives an internal representation (θ:Θ). In
one sense the type Θ is just another abstract syntax of LM . In another sense,
we can see it as a sort of environment and thus interpreting an artefact model
means building up such an environment. In Chapter 5 and designalgebra, we
called (θ:Θ) an artefact model. In this paper, we call it an object environment
in order to avoid confusion with artefact models expressed following the syntax
given abstractly in Section 7.2.1 and concretely in Section 7.11. More precisely:
Definition 7.2 (Object environment) By an object environment, we
understand a record of two mappings: One which maps object identifiers to sets
of properties ascribed to objects, and one which maps pairs of object identifiers
to sets of relations ascribed to object pairs.
2
Parsing a semantics (s:LS), gives a semantic environment (ρ:ENV).
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Definition 7.3 (Semantic environment) By a semantic environment,
we understand a mapping from sets of properties (property patterns) to unsat-
urated expressions in a target language.
2
The production of a view (t:LTi), as the result of full interpretation of an arte-
fact model (m:LM ), according to a semantics (s:LS) and a calculus semantics
(CS:CS), is performed in the following steps:
M: translates an artefact model (m:LM ) into an object environment (θ:Θ).
SM: translates a semantics (s:LS) into a semantic environment (ρ:ENV).
I ′: interprets each object according to the semantics (s:LS). The result is a set
of target expressions (tz:L′Ti).
CS: saturates and combines such target expressions7.
Figure 7.3 depicts the principle of semantic parameterized interpretation.
tz′ : L′T -set CS
Interpreter
SM
M
sm : LS
ρ : ENV
θ : Θm : LM t : LTI
Figure 7.3: Semantic parameterized interpretation.
7We shall later see that in fact the function for combining targets is a parameter to the
calculus semantics.
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Since a semantics written in LS contains target language expressions, we may
need to refer to a semantics which complies with a certain target language. We
do so by means of indices or names. In general, LSi is the semantic language
for views in the target language LTi . We let the generic LS denote the semantic
language for views expressed in arbitrary target languages.
7.2 The modelling language LM
We follow the principles of incremental design, presented in Chapter 4, Chap-
ter 5, Chapter 6, and in the BAS•CAAD project [64, 67, 75, 167], by emphasizing
properties. For ontological completion we include relations as well. However,
relations play a minor rôle in this paper as they make the general interpretation
much more complex. Section 7.9 discuss this in more detail and suggests some
accommodations for including relations.
A property is represented by an attribute (a:A) and a value set (vs:VS). In order
to distinguish identical sets of properties ascribed to distinct objects in a design,
we make use of object identifiers (x:X). Of second importance come relations,
which are represented in a similar manner.
We call the approach property–orientation in contrast to object–orientation.
An essential difference between property–orientation and the class–centered ap-
proach of object–orientation is that property–orientation maintains the property
of subsumption (see Section 7.5). In [1], this is formulated as a distinction be-
tween sub–classing and sub–typing. Sub–typing relates two types based on the
structure of the type definitions. Sub–classing relates two types based on the
names of the types. Thus, in sub–classing, we can have two classes which are
identical in the sense that their objects have the same properties, though still
not related by subsumption.
Also, sub–typing in property–orientation possess the property of anti–symmetry
unless we consider coercion which translates values between distinct types. We
shall follow the principle of sub–typing (without coercion), as we consider two
objects with identical sets of properties to have the same meaning, though not
to be identical.
We define the language LM for expressing designs as artefact models. All model
specifications begin with the keyword model. After that comes a sequence of
object declarations and relation declarations. An object declaration ascribes a
collection of properties to an object. Furthermore, a list of sub–objects may be
ascribed the object as well. These sub–objects represent a decomposition of the
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object in question (see Chapter 8). A relation declaration ascribes a collection
of relations to a pair of objects.
There are two ways of expressing value sets: (i) as a comma separated sequence
of values, and (ii) as an interval. Values (v:V) are either numerals (n:Num),
property value names (vp:VP), infimum (inf) or negative infimum (neginf).
Models can be combined with two operations meet ⊔ and join ⊓. The intuition
behind the two operations is as follows. The join of two models gives a model
which has the intersection set of objects, the intersection set of sub–objects,
the intersection set of attributes for each common object, and the union set
of values for common attributes of common objects. The meet of two models
gives a model which has the union set of objects, the union set of sub–objects,
the union set of attributes for each common object, and the intersection set of
values for common attributes of common objects. We call the two operations
lattice operations as they define a lattice structure in which nodes are models
and specialisation/generalisation defines the ordering. The principle is called
Design Lattices and has been introduced in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 using two
different approaches. The present paper mostly follows the approach described
in Chapter 6, although simplifications concerning representation of value sets
are applied.
The two operations add a second level of sentence separations in the modelling
language, where the first level is bound to “;”. The operations meet and join
have higher precedence than “;”.
7.2.1 Syntax
We define the following syntactical categories:
m ∈ LM artefact models
s ∈ S object/relation declarations
p ∈ P property expressions
d ∈ X∗ decomposition expressions
vs ∈ VS property value sequences
v ∈ V = VP ∪ Num ∪ {inf,neginf} property values
Num is the syntactic category for numerals and VP is the syntactic category
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for property values not being numerals. The language LM is fully declarative
so order is only of importance in case of identifier doublets. Where sufficient,
instances of the syntactical domains may be indexed in order to avoid ambiguity.
Furthermore, (x:X) range over object identifiers, and (a:A) over attributes. The
abstract syntax of LM is as follows:
m ::= model s
| m1 ⊓m2
| m1 ⊔m2
s ::= x : ( p )
| x : ( p ){ d }
| (x1, x2) : ( p )
| s1; s2
p ::= a = {vs}
| a = [v1, v2]
| p1, p2
d ::= x
| d1, d2
vs ::= v
| v1, v2
v ::= n
| inf
| neginf
| vp
Parsing an artefact model (m:LM ) builds up an object environment (θ:Θ). The
object environment contains two mappings: objects and relations . The first
maps object identifiers to pairs ((σ,xs):Σ×X-set) of which (σ:Σ) is a mapping
from attributes to value sets (vs:VS), and (xs:X-set) is a set of sub–objects.
The second maps pairs of object identifiers to a map from attributes to values
sets in a similar manner. Contrary to in Chapter 6, we shall not make any type
distinction between values meant for expressing properties and relations. We
have:
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type
Θ ::
objects: X →m (Σ × X-set)
relations: (X×X) →m Σ,
X,
Σ = A →m VS,
A,
VS == Intv(lo:V,hi:V) | Seq(sq:V-set),
V == Number(n:Num) | Name(pn:VP) | Inf | NegInf,
VP,
value
⊥ : VS = Seq({})
The value ⊥ represents absurdum; i.e. the impossible/conflicting value of a prop-
erty. It may appear in the result of applying lattice meet on artefact models
which are in conflict concerning a property of a common object.
The structure gained by objects of Θ can be considered a tree or a forest8
structure where the nodes are object identifiers (x:X) of the model and nodes
may be annotated with property information (σ:Σ). The structure gained by
relations relates pairs of such nodes in the tree orthogonally on the tree ordering.
An example is:
value
x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9,
σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4, σ5, σ6, σ7, σ8, σ9,
σr1, σr2, σr3,
θ : Θ = mk_Θ([ x1 7→ (σ1,{x2,x3,x4}),
x2 7→ (σ2,{}),
x3 7→ (σ3,{x5,x6}),
x4 7→ (σ4,{}),
x5 7→ (σ5,{}),
x6 7→ (σ6,{}),
x7 7→ (σ7,{x8,x9}),
x8 7→ (σ8,{}),
x9 7→ (σ9,{}) ])
The decomposition hierarchy is depicted in Figure 7.4.
8if no unique object binds upwards.
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x1
(x6,x9)
(x3,x7)
(x1,x8)
x9
x8
x7
x6x5
x4 x3x2
Figure 7.4: Decomposition hierarchy.
We will need to extract the first and second component in the pair (Σ× X-set)
separately many times:
value
fst: Σ × X-set → Σ
fst(σ,xz) ≡ σ,
snd: Σ × X-set → X-set
snd(σ,xz) ≡ xz
7.2.2 Semantics
Object environments are built through a parsing process which applies a set of
semantic functions. These have the signatures:
value
M: LM
∼
→ Θ,
S: S → (Θ → Θ),
P : P → Σ → Σ,
D: D → X-set,
VS: VS → V-set,
V : V → V
and the definitions:
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M[[ model s ]] = S[[ s ]] [ ]
M[[ m1 ⊓m2 ]] = join(M[[ m1 ]],M[[ m2 ]])
M[[ m1 ⊔m2 ]] = meet(M[[ m1 ]],M[[ m2 ]])
S[[ x : ( p ) ]] θ = mk_Θ((objects θ) † [x 7→ (P [[ p ]] [ ], {})],
relations θ)
S[[ x : ( p ){ d } ]] θ = mk_Θ((objects θ) † [x 7→ (P [[ p ]] [ ],D[[ d ]])],
relations θ)
S[[ (x1, x2) : p ]] θ = mk_Θ(objects θ,
(relations θ) † [(x1, x2) 7→ (P [[ p ]] [ ])])
S[[ s1 ; s2 ]] = S[[ s2 ]]⊙ S[[ s1 ]]
P [[ a = { vs } ]] σ = σ † [a 7→ Seq(VS[[ vs ]])]
P [[ a = [v1; v2] ]] σ = σ † [a 7→ Intv(V [[ v1 ]],V [[ v2 ]])]
P [[ p1 , p2 ]] = P [[ p2 ]]⊙ P [[ p1 ]]
D[[ x ]] = {x}
D[[ d1 , d2 ]] = D[[ d1 ]] ∪ D[[ d2 ]]
VS[[ v ]] = V [[ v ]]
VS[[ vs1, vs2 ]] = VS[[ vs1 ]] ∪ VS[[ vs2 ]]
V [[ n ]] = Number(n)
V [[ inf ]] = Inf
V [[ neginf ]] = NegInf
V [[ vp ]] = Name(vp)
where join and meet are defined in Appendix 7.13, and ⊙ is functional compo-
sition (overloaded for Θ and Σ)9:
value
⊙: (Θ → Θ) × (Θ → Θ) → (Θ → Θ)
f ⊙ g ≡ λ θ:Θ • g(f(θ)),
⊙: (Σ → Σ) × (Σ → Σ) → (Σ → Σ),
f ⊙ g ≡ λ σ:Σ • g(f(σ)),
9We use the symbol ⊙ in order not to confuse with the map composition operation ◦ in
RSL.
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In stead of applying functional composition by ⊙ we could have settled with
simple map overriding. For S, the meaning would then be S[[ s1 ]] † S[[ s2 ]].
This would give the same result as the semantics of s2 does not depend on
the semantics of s1. Functional composition is chosen for simplicity, in case of
changes to the language, and in order to be faithful to common denotational
practice.
If join or meet are applied on a pair of models, represented as object environ-
ments, we require that each of these environments are wellformed. This is the
only reason why the semantic function M is partial.
However, M does not curry (θ:Θ) (i.e. it does not have signature LM → (Θ→
Θ)). The reason is that the two lattice operations are associative operations
which combine pairs of models; they do not build up object stores alternately
by means of overriding and updating. Therefore, M calls S with the empty
object environment at top level.
7.2.3 Wellformedness of models
All artefact models (m:LM ) can be represented by an object environment (θ:Θ).
The language LM is pure declarative and does not contain arithmetic or boolean
expressions to be evaluated. However, not all object environments are well-
formed in the sense that they can be interpreted into proper views. Thus,
wellformedness of artefact models is turned into wellformedness of object en-
vironments. It is defined hierarchically over the structure of Θ. Basically, we
require that values in a sequence are either all numbers (n:Num) or all names
(s:VP), that intervals are wellformed, that relations are non–reflexive, and that
decompositions are non–cyclic.
value
wf_Θ: Θ → Bool
wf_Θ(θ) ≡
(∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ) ⇒
wf_Σ(fst(objects(θ)(x)))) ∧
(∀ x,x′:X • (x,x′) ∈ dom relations(θ) ⇒
(wf_Σ(relations(θ)(x,x′)) ∧ x 6=x′)) ∧
nocycles([ x 7→ xz | x:X, xz:X-set •
x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧
xz=snd(objects(θ)(x)) ])
wf_Σ: Σ → Bool
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wf_Σ(σ) ≡
(∀ a:A • a ∈ dom σ ⇒ wf_VS(σ(a))),
wf_VS: VS → Bool
wf_VS(vs) ≡
case vs of
Intv(Number(n),Number(n′)) → n≤n′,
Intv(Number(n),Inf) → true,
Intv(NegInf,Number(n′)) → true,
Intv(NegInf,Inf) → true,
Seq(vs′) →
(∀ v, v′:V • {v,v′} ⊆ vs′ ⇒
(∃ n,n′:Num • v=Number(n) ∧ v′=Number(n′)) ∨
(∃ s, s′:VP • v=Name(s) ∧ v′=Name(s′)))
→ false
end,
nocycles: X →m X-set → Bool
nocycles(xm) ≡
(∀ x:X • x ∈ dom xm ⇒
x 6∈ {x_sub|x_sub:X • is_super(x,x_sub)(xm)}),
is_super: X × X → (X →m X-set) → Bool
is_super(x,x′)(xm) ≡
x′ ∈ xm(x) ∨
(∃ x′′:X • x′′ ∈ xm(x) ∧ is_super(x′′,x′)(xm))
For completeness, we have stated wellformedness criteria concerning relations,
well aware that these are not treated in this paper; besides in Section 7.10.1.
7.3 The semantic language LS
We introduce the language LS for specifying the meaning of artefact models.
A semantic specification is a sequence of pairs, of which the first component is a
property pattern and the second component is an unsaturated target expression.
Such a pair we call a template.
By a property pattern, we understand a specification of a set of properties as in
artefact models. However, in LS such a specification is considered a pattern as
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we are going to match these with the properties ascribed to objects in artefact
models. We use the same syntax for property patterns in LS as for property
sets in LM . The associated unsaturated target expression is enclosed in curled
parentheses and represents the partial meaning of objects matching the property
pattern.
7.3.1 Syntax
In addition to the syntactical categories of LM , we introduce the following:
sm ∈ LS semantic specifications
tm ∈ TM templates
Thus, we reuse the categories P, A, VS and V of LM . In addition, t range over
target language expressions (possibly unsaturated).
The abstract syntax of LS is as follows:
sm ::= template tm
| sm1; sm2
tm ::= ( p ) : { t }
| tm1; tm2
p ::= a = {vs}
| a = [v1, v2]
| p1, p2
d ::= x
| d1, d2
vs ::= v
| vs1, vs2
v ::= n
| inf
| neginf
| vp
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As for LM , we allow instances of the syntactical domains to be indexed where
sufficient. Parsing a semantics (sm:LS) builds up a semantic environment
(ρ:ENV) which maps property patterns (σ:Σ) to unsaturated target expres-
sions (t:L′Ti ). Such expressions are later saturated and combined by a calculus
semantics (see Section 7.8).
type
ENV = Σ →m L′Ti
LS ,
L′Ti
There are no wellformed criteria for a semantics. All the semantic functions are
thus complete. However, there are requirements to the semantics in order for it
to be applicable in interpretation of an artefact model (see Section 7.7.1).
7.3.2 Semantics
Semantic environments are built through a parsing process which applies a set
of semantic rules. These have the signatures:
value
SM: LS → ENV → ENV,
TM: TM → ENV → ENV,
P : P → Σ → Σ,
VS: VS → V-set,
V : V → V
and the definitions:
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SM[[ template tm ]] ρ = TM[[ tm ]] ρ
SM[[ sm1; sm2 ]] = SM[[ sm2 ]]⊙ SM[[ sm1 ]]
T M[[ ( p ) : { t } ]] ρ = ρ † [P [[ p ]] [ ] 7→ t]
TM[[ tm1, tm2 ]] = TM[[ tm2 ]]⊙ TM[[ tm1 ]]
P [[ a = { vs } ]] σ = σ † [a 7→ Seq(VS[[ vs ]])]
P [[ a = [v1; v2] ]] σ = σ † [a 7→ Intv(V [[ v1 ]],V [[ v2 ]])]
P [[ p1 , p2 ]] = P [[ p2 ]]⊙ P [[ p1 ]]
VS[[ v ]] = V [[ v ]]
VS[[ vs1, vs2 ]] = VS[[ vs1 ]] ∪ VS[[ vs2 ]]
V [[ n ]] = Number(n)
V [[ inf ]] = Inf
V [[ neginf ]] = NegInf
V [[ vp ]] = Name(vp)
where we, in addition, overload ⊙ for (ρ:ENV):
value
⊙: (ENV → ENV) × (ENV → ENV) → (ENV → ENV)
f ⊙ g ≡ λ ρ:ENV • g(f(ρ))
7.4 Saturated and unsaturated targets
We mentioned in the introduction that there are two sorts of target expressions:
saturated and unsaturated . By an unsaturated target expression, we understand
a target expression which contains placeholders and unevaluated expressions.
The placeholders are names which are not part of the target language for satu-
rated targets. However, they stand for expressions which should be valid in the
target language. Placeholders can be removed by substituting them with the
proper target expressions they represent. E.g. such expressions can be atomic
expressions like values or names valid in the target language.
The process is called saturation and is performed by a mixture of term–rewriting
and evaluation of expressions. We have already seen examples of both saturated
and unsaturated target expressions for a small sub–set of AutoLISP.
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We can compare the distinction between saturated and unsaturated expressions
with the distinction between ground terms and meta–variables in logic. The
ground terms could be expressions built from operations like ∧, ∨, →, ¬ and
constants true and false. Meta–variables can be introduced to represent ex-
pressions in ground terms and/or meta–variables. Expressions which contain
meta–variables need to be saturated before evaluation to true or false can be
performed.
The notion of saturation, as applied in this paper, has been inspired by Frege
[71]. In Function and Concept, Frege makes a distinction between concepts (be-
ing functions returning truth values) and objects [71]. Concepts are unsaturated
— they need objects in order to be saturated, just as functions need argument
values in order to yield a result. The result of applying objects to concepts is a
truth–value which states whether the object falls under the concept.
Today, we know that Frege’s distinction was wrong. The higher–order logic of
Church shows that functions (and thus also concepts) can have arguments and
results which themselves are functions [46]. The use of the notion of saturation
is in this paper just inspired by Frege’s notion of concepts as functions. It has
no real connection to the original meaning.
7.5 Subsumption of properties
In order to compare sets of properties of objects with property patterns of
templates in a semantics, we need a notion of subsumption <:.
Definition 7.4 (Subsumption) Order–theoretically as in object–orienta-
tion, subsumption <: is defined as (following [1]):
(p:P1 ∧ (P1 <: P2)) ⇒ p:P2
2
Considering types as sets of values, “:” corresponds to set–membership ∈, and <:
to subset ⊆. We shall apply subsumption for properties based on the intuition
that if x is an F and whatever is F is G, then x is a G as well; where F and
G are concepts constituted by sets of properties. Ontologically, we understand
subsumption of property sets such that ps1 <: ps2 means that objects ascribed
ps2 are more specialised than objects ascribed ps1. The intuition behind special-
isation is that ps2 includes more properties than ps1. Thus ps2 subsumes ps1.
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Increasing a set of properties makes the set of objects having all these proper-
ties decrease (or maintain the same). Thus, the order of sets of objects sharing
common properties is dual to the order of sets of the properties, as illustrated
on Figure 7.5. By dual, we understand that the order is reversed.
{a}
z 7→ {a, b, c}
z 7→ {a, b, c}
y 7→ {a, c}x 7→ {a, b}
z 7→ {a, b, c}
z 7→ {a, b, c}
y 7→ {a, c}
x 7→ {a, b}
{a, b, c}
{a, c}{a, b}
Figure 7.5: Duality of objects and common properties.
This is due to the Galois connection between objects and their common proper-
ties [85].
We need subsumption in two respects: (i) in determination of whether a given
template complies with the properties ascribed a given object in an artefact
model, and (ii) in defining an ordering of property patterns of templates such
that the most specialised template can be selected.
Since we want subsumption to apply, not only to pairs of properties concern-
ing their values, but also to property sets, we require that any binary relation
composing two properties into a collection, satisfies covariance [1]:
Definition 7.5 (Covariance) A binary relation A ◦ B is covariant (in
both arguments) if A ◦B varies in the same sense as the arguments A and B:
A <: A′ ∧B <: B′ ⇒ A ◦B <: A′ ◦B′ (7.1)
2
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Property sets expressed in LM and property patterns expressed in LS are spec-
ified using “,” and “;” as separators. Semantically, they represent combination
operations which obviously satisfy the criteria of covariance, as the model over
which they range are maps and sets. In these cases, ◦ corresponds to the union
set operation. The interpretation of expressions in LM and LS are designed
such that covariance is satisfied.
In Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6, we modelled property values as possibly
infinite sets. In this paper, we have two representations of value sets, namely
intervals and sequences. Our definition of <: complies with the set–theoretic
intuition. It is defined hierachically over value sets, properties, and property
sets (property patterns):
value
<: : Σ × Σ → Bool,
σ <: σ′ ≡
(∀ a : A • a ∈ dom σ ⇒
(a ∈ dom σ′ ∧ σ(a) <: σ′(a)))
<: : (A × VS) × (A × VS) → Bool,
(a,vs) <: (a′, vs′) ≡ a = a′ ∧ vs′ <: vs,
<: : VS × VS → Bool
vs <: vs′ ≡
case (vs, vs′) of
(Seq(vs), Seq(vs′)) → vs ⊆ vs′,
(Seq(vs), Intv(v, v′)) →
(∀ v′′ : V • v′′ ∈ vs ⇒ inintv(v′′, Intv(v, v′))),
(Intv(v, v′), Seq(vs)) →
(∀ v′′ : V • v′′ ∈ vs ⇒ inintv(v′′, Intv(v, v′))),
(Intv(v, v′), Intv(v′′, v′′′)) →
case ((v, v′), (v′′, v′′′)) of
((=NegInf, =Inf), (=NegInf, =Inf)) → true,
((=NegInf, =Inf), (Number(a′), =Inf)) → false,
((=NegInf, =Inf), (=NegInf, Number(b′))) → false,
((=NegInf, =Inf), (Number(a′), Number(b′))) → false,
((Number(a), =Inf), (=NegInf, =Inf)) → true,
((Number(a), =Inf), (Number(a′), =Inf)) →
inintv(Number(a), Intv(v′′, v′′′)),
((Number(a), =Inf), (=NegInf, Number(b′))) →
inintv(Number(a), Intv(v′′, v′′′)),
((Number(a), =Inf), (Number(a′), Number(b′))) →
inintv(Number(a), Intv(v′′, v′′′)),
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((=NegInf, Number(b)), (=NegInf, =Inf)) → true,
((=NegInf, Number(b)), (Number(a′), =Inf)) → false,
((=NegInf, Number(b)), (=NegInf, Number(b′))) →
inintv(Number(b), Intv(v′′, v′′′)),
((=NegInf, Number(b)), (Number(a′), Number(b′))) → false,
((Number(a), Number(b)), (=NegInf, =Inf)) → true,
((Number(a), Number(b)), (Number(a′), =Inf)) →
inintv(Number(a), Intv(v′′, v′′′)),
((Number(a), Number(b)), (=NegInf, Number(b′))) →
inintv(Number(b), Intv(v′′, v′′′)),
((Number(a), Number(b)),(Number(a′), Number(b′))) →
inintv(Number(a), Intv(v′′, v′′′)) ∧
inintv(Number(b), Intv(v′′, v′′′))
end
end
pre wf_VS(vs) ∧ wf_VS(vs′),
Interval membership ∈ is defined as follows:
value
inintv: V × VS ∼→ Bool
inintv(v,vs) ≡
case v of
Number(n) →
case vs of
Intv(=NegInf,=Inf) → true,
Intv(Number(a),=Inf) → a ≤ n,
Intv(=NegInf,Number(b)) → n ≤ b,
Intv(Number(a),Number(b)) → a ≤ n ∧ n ≤ b
→ false
end,
→ false
end
We assume the existence of binary relations overloaded for type Num.
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7.6 Well–constrainedness
The language LM is meant for modelling in an incremental way. Furthermore,
it is meant for combining various models using, primarily, the lattice meet op-
eration. Therefore, property values can be sequences or intervals. The principle
is that the more narrow a property value set for an object is, the more precise is
the design expression. Two values in a sequence means that either of the values
are valid for the object.
When interpreting an artefact model it is, however, convenient that all attributes
of objects in the model are ascribed single values only. In most cases, it is
necessary.
Therefore, we apply three notions introduced in [78] concerning the space of
interpretations of models. These are properties of design models in general:
over–constrained means that the set of possible interpretations of a model is
empty because of too many (possibly contra dictionary) constraints to be
satisfied. In our context, a model is over–constrained if an attribute of
an object is ascribed the empty sequence ⊥10. It may occur when lattice
meet is applied on models which are not compliant; e.g. do not agree on
the possible values for a properties of common objects.
under–constrained means that the set of possible interpretations of a model
is too large; i.e. not feasible. In our context a model is under–constrained
if some attributes of objects in a model are ascribed multiple values. In
such cases, also multiple interpretations (given the same semantics) exist.
well–constrained means that the model is neither over–constrained nor under–
constrained. In our context, it means that all attributes of objects in the
model are ascribed single values.
Formally, we specify the three properties by the following predicates:
value
over_constrained: Θ → Bool
over_constrained(θ) ≡
10We do not consider ill–formed sequence specifications for property values to be subject
to over–constrainedness because the three constraint predicates apply to well–formed model
specifications. An ill–formed sequence specification like Intv(Inf,NegInf) results in a ill–formed
model. In implementation, we represent ill–formed property values simply by the empty
sequence ⊥.
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(∃ x:X, a:A • x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ a ∈ dom fst(objects(θ)(x)) ∧
fst(objects(θ)(x))(a)=⊥),
under_constrained: Θ → Bool
under_constrained(θ) ≡
(∃ x:X, a:A, v:V, vs:V-set • x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧
a ∈ dom fst(objects(θ)(x)) ∧
fst(objects(θ)(x))(a)=Seq(vs) ∧ card vs > 1),
well_constrained: Θ → Bool
well_constrained(θ) ≡
∼over_constrained(θ) ∧ ∼under_constrained(θ)
We require that an artefact model is well–constrained for proper interpretation
to be made.
7.7 Properties of semantics
We specify a number of properties for our sets of a semantics. Such properties
are important when considering interpretation of artefact models according to
the semantics.
7.7.1 Completeness
We specify a criterion for the applicability of a semantics in interpretation of an
artefact model. We say that the semantics is complete concerning that model.
However, this notion of completeness is not to be confused with the notion
of completeness known from the discipline of programming language semantics
[161]. The distinction is that we are considering the relation between a semantics
and an artefact model to be interpreted according to this semantics; not the
properties of a inference system of the semantics.
Definition 7.6 (Complete semantics) A semantics represented by
(e:ENV) is complete concerning a model represented by (θ:Θ) if and only if
for all objects (x:X) designated in the model, there is a property pattern (σ:Σ)
which is subsumed by the property set of x.
value
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complete: ENV → Θ → Bool
complete(ρ)(θ) ≡
(∀ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ) ⇒
(∃ σ:Σ • σ ∈ dom ρ ∧
σ <: fst(objects(θ)(x))))
2
We can easily ensure that a semantic environment is complete for all artefact
models, by introducing the empty property pattern ⊤. If a semantic environ-
ment contains ⊤, we say that it is bounded upwards:
value
⊤ : Σ = mk_Σ([ ])
bounded: ENV → Bool
bounded(ρ) ≡ ⊤ ∈ dom ρ
However, the definition does not say what happens if ambiguity occurs.
7.7.2 Non–ambiguity
The notion of subsumption for patterns implies a partial order of these. In such
an ordering, ambiguity can occur if two patterns share properties but are distinct
and not related by subsumption. In such cases, it cannot be determined which
pattern to chose for objects complying with both patterns. We thus require the
existence of lattice meet of two such patterns. That is:
value
non_ambiguous: ENV → Bool
non_ambiguous(ρ) ≡
(∀ σ, σ′:Σ • {σ,σ′} ⊆ dom ρ ∧
σ 6= σ′ ∧ ∼(σ <: σ′ ∨ σ′ <: σ) ⇒
(∃ σ′′:Σ • σ′′ ∈ dom ρ ∧ σ′′ = meet(σ,σ′)))
However, we do not require lattice meet to exist for all pairs. The structure
we have here is a partial ordering with unique meet for all node pairs and
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unambiguous join for the node pairs for which join is present. This structure is
also called a semilattice [13].
7.8 Target saturation by term rewriting
Unsaturated target expressions, specified by templates in a semantics, are sat-
urated by means of a calculus semantics which incorporates a set of rewriting
rules for substitution and evaluation of expressions. There may exists distinct
calculus semantics for distinct target expressions.
A semantic function which defines such substitution, evaluation, and rewriting,
is one which takes an unsaturated target expression, an object environment
and an object in that environment. In addition, it takes an operation which
combines two target expressions. The result is a saturated target expression in
which attributes are substituted with their corresponding property values for
the given object, and in which expressions are evaluated and combined.
The unsaturated target language L′Ti concerning only boxes and lines (like a
small subset of AutoLISP) has the syntax:
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cs ::= ( command cmd )
| cs1 cs2
cmd ::= "line" l1 l2 ""
| "rectangle" l1 l2
| cmd1 cmd2
l ::= ( list es )
es ::= n
| a
| ( e )
| es1 es2
e ::= + f1 f2
| − f1 f2
| ∗ f1 f2
| / f1 f2
| ( e )
| n
| a
where n range over numerals and a range over attributes names. Note, that the
language is pre–fix concerning arithmetic operations. As in AutoLISP, there is
a distinction between unary and binary minus. In AutoLISP, the distinction is
based on whether there is a blank space after the operation. For unary minus
there is not, which is why we treat unary minus at the scanning stage, and not
as part of the semantics. Thus, n may stand for negative numbers as well.
We define a collection of semantic functions for saturating expressions in L′Ti .
These have the signatures:
value
CS: L′Ti → (Θ × X) → (LTi × LTi → LTi)
∼
→ LTi ,
CMD: L′Ti → (Θ × X)
∼
→ LTi ,
L: L′Ti → (Θ × X)
∼
→ LTi ,
ES: L′Ti → (Θ × X)
∼
→ LTi ,
E : L′Ti → (Θ × X)
∼
→ LTi ,
F : L′Ti → (Θ × X)
∼
→ LTi ,
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and the definitions:
CS[[ ( command cmd ) ]] (θ, x) ⊕ = ( command CMD[[ cmd ]] (θ, x) )
CS[[ cs1 cs2 ]] (θ, x) ⊕ = (CS[[ cs1 ]] (θ, x) ⊕)⊕
(CS[[ cs2 ]] (θ, x) ⊕)
CMD[[ "line" l1 l2 "" ]] (θ, x) = "line" (L[[ l1 ]] (θ, x))
(L[[ l2 ]] (θ, x)) ""
CMD[[ "rectangle" l1 l2 "" ]] (θ, x) = "rectangle" (L[[ l1 ]] (θ, x))
(L[[ l2 ]] (θ, x))
L[[ ( list es ) ]] (θ, x) = ( list (ES[[ es ]] (θ, x) ) )
ES[[ ( e ) ]] (θ, x) = ( (E [[ e ]] (θ, x)) )
ES[[ n ]] (θ, x) = ℜ(n)
ES[[ a ]] (θ, x) = ℜ(fst(objects(θ)(x))(a))
ES[[ es1 es2 ]] (θ, x) = ES[[ es1 ]]ES[[ es2 ]]
E [[ + f1 f2 ]] (θ, x) = ADD((F [[ f1 ]] (θ, x)),
(F [[ f2 ]] (θ, x)))
E [[ - f1 f2 ]] (θ, x) = SUB((F [[ f1 ]] (θ, x)),
(F [[ f2 ]] (θ, x)))
E [[ * f1 f2 ]] (θ, x) = MULT((F [[ f1 ]] (θ, x)),
(F [[ f2 ]] (θ, x)))
E [[ / f1 f2 ]] (θ, x) = DIV((F [[ f1 ]] (θ, x)),
(F [[ f2 ]] (θ, x)))
F [[ ( e ) ]] (θ, x) = ( (E [[ e ]] (θ, x)) )
F [[ n ]] (θ, x) = ℜ(n)
F [[ a ]] (θ, x) = ℜ(fst(objects(θ)(x))(a))
Note, that each time a completely new target language is invented, the design
system may require definitions of the underlying calculus. A fixed set of semantic
functions limits to a fixed set of target languages.
Furthermore, ℜ and ℧ are dual operations of which ℜ encodes internal rep-
resentations of property values (vs:VS) in LTi , and ℧ gives the value which
corresponds to such an encoding:
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value
ℜ: VS ∼→ VST
ℜ(vs) as vsT
pre wf_VS(vs)
post true,
℧: VST → VS
℧(vsT ) as vs
post true
axiom ∀ n:VS, vsT :
ℜ(℧(n)) ≡ n
The functions ADD, SUB,MULT, andDIV, perform the corresponding algebraic
operations based on their target language arguments.
value
ADD: LTi × LTi → LTi
ADD(n1,n2) ≡ ℧(n1) + ℧(n2),
SUB: LTi × LTi → LTi
SUB(n1,n2) ≡ ℧(n1) − ℧(n2),
MULT: LTi × LTi → LTi
MULT(n1,n2) ≡ ℧(n1) ∗ ℧(n2),
DIV: LTi × LTi → LTi
DIV(n1,n2) ≡ ℧(n1) / ℧(n2),
The operation ⊕ in this context can simply be string appending.
In the considered target language, we only allow numerals as representations
for property values. This defines a restriction of the range of artefact models
possible to interpret into targets. However, other target languages may allow
for such property value representations.
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7.9 Interpretation of artefact models
We have now presented the mechanisms for performing full interpretation of
artefact models. The result is a view expressed in a target language LT . This
view is the result of interpreting each object in a model according to the se-
mantics. This is done by selecting a property pattern in the domain of the
semantic environment. This pattern has to comply with the properties ascribed
the object. The result is an unsaturated target expression for that object. The
target expression is saturated by means of the calculus semantics. The tar-
get expressions, representing the meaning of objects in the artefact model, are
finally combined.
Figure 7.6 depicts the principle of semantic parameterized interpretation. The
figure gives a detailed description of the principles, compared to Figure 7.3.
CS
x1 7→ σx1
:
x2 7→ σx2
:
xm 7→ σxm
σs1 7→ t
′
1, σs2 7→ t
′
2, . . . , σn 7→ t
′
n
t:L′T
m:LM θ:Θ
ρ:ENV
sm:LS
tz:LT -set
t:LT
combine
M
σsj 7→ t
′
j
SM
xi 7→ σxi
Interpreter
select<:
Figure 7.6: Detailed picture of semantic parameterized interpretation.
type
CS = L′Ti → (Θ × X) → (LTi × LTi → LTi)
∼
→ LTi
value
I ′: Θ → ENV → CS → (LTi × LTi → LTi)
∼
→ LTi-set
I ′(θ)(ρ)(CS)(⊕) ≡
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{t|t:LTi •
(∃ x:X • x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧
let t′=select(fst(objects(θ)(x)),ρ) in
t=CS[[ t′ ]] (θ,x) ⊕
end)}
pre complete(ρ)(θ) ∧ well_constrained(θ) ∧
non_ambiguous(ρ) ∧ bounded(ρ)
The function select11 is defined as follows:
value
select: Σ × ENV ∼→ L′Ti
select(σlimit,ρ) as t
post let σ:Σ • σ ∈ dom ρ ∧
most_specialised(σ,ρ)(σlimit) in
t=ρ(σ)
end
pre bounded(ρ),
most_specialised: Σ × ENV → Σ ∼→ Bool
most_specialised(σ,ρ)(σlimit) ≡
σ <: σlimit ∧
(∀ σ′:Σ • σ′ ∈ dom ρ ∧ σ′ <: σlimit ⇒ σ′ <: σ)
pre σ ∈ dom ρ
Full interpretation of an artefact model (m:LM ) given a semantics (s:LS) and a
calculus semantics (CS:CS), is now defined as:
value
I: LM → LS → CS → (LTi × LTi → LTi) → LTi
I(m)(sm)(CS)(⊕) ≡
combine(I ′(M[[ m ]])(SM[[ sm ]]([ ]))(CS)(⊕))
where combine has the signature:
value
combine: LTi-set → LTi
11Which selects a proper entry in (ρ:ENV) such that it “best fits” σ:Σ.
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The function combine could be similar to a folding using the ⊕ operation from
Section 7.8.
It is important to note that the presented interpretation algorithm and principle
is designed for target languages which are compositional. That is, the meaning of
an artefact model is a function of the meaning of its objects. This excludes views
which require that the meaning of objects are calculated from the meanings of
other objects (in a non–cyclic way). However, in most normal cases, it is often
possible to write expressions in some functional languages such that the views
can still be defined in a compositional way.
By that we understand that the meaning of objects can be determined inde-
pendently and composed in a final step. There may be target languages for
which such an interpretation principle does not apply. Also, including relations
in artefact models in the interpretation requires a similar way of determining
the meaning of objects based on the meaning of other objects. The latter, we
discuss further in Section 7.10.1.
7.10 Conclusion
In this paper, we have suggested a new software architecture for conceptual de-
sign systems. The idea for the architecture has arised from the observation that
today’s design systems lack of dynamics with respect to incremental specialisa-
tion of design objects and with respect to dynamic evolution of type systems
for such objects.
The architecture presented aims at introducing these dynamics by means of
what we call semantic parameterised interpretation. In systems based on this
concept, design models (artefact models) are written in a formal language LM .
In LM , we are able to introduce objects, ascribe properties to objects, and
add relations between objects. Furthermore, LM offers two operations join and
meet which are binary operations on artefact models and which combine these
according to consistent laws. We have specified the syntax and formal semantics
of LM .
Design models refer to names of properties, relations, and values of these. The
meanings of these names are not statically defined as in object–oriented class
systems. The meaning of the names are given by a semantics which is written
in a formal language LS . Thereby, we are able to introduce new names for
properties, relations, and values, by defining the meaning of these names in the
semantics. Thus, introducing such new names do not require a large amount of
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programming nor rearrangement nor recompilation of the program code of the
design system. We have specified the syntax and formal semantics of LS .
Artefact models are now interpreted according to a semantics and a calculus
for evaluating expressions. The result is a view of the model which is a written
specification in some target language LT . It is essential to our principle that
the same artefact model can be subject to many different interpretations —
a principle which is highly important in today’s distributed and many–sorted
realm of construction. Thus we have shown how we can derive views for graphi-
cal presentation in AutoCAD, weight calculations, and stress calculations using
MatLab.
The architecture is based on the notion of property–orientation in which the
meaning of an object is the set of its properties. In order to be able to distinguish
objects with equivalent properties, object identifiers has been introduced.
The interpretation of models is based on the properties of the objects, such
that objects with the same properties have the same meaning. However, this
induces problems if objects are described by the same set of properties even
though they are intended to be conceptually distinct. We have argued that
often it is convenient to introduce a property which simply states the sort of
object at hand. This property, in a sense corresponds to the rôle played by
class names in object–oriented programming languages. Thereby, we are able
to make a distinction between, e.g. the plate for a door and the plate for a
table, even though these two kinds of objects may be equivalent with respect to
dimensions and material. Even though, the solution does not break our principle
of property–orientation, but it does shows the rationality in sometimes making
a distinction between class names and the types they denote. The solution is,
however, flexible as stating a sort property is optional; we can even call the
attribute something else or omit it if it is not needed.
A design tool with the presented architecture is generic in the sense that the
semantics — as a parameter — determines the sorts of entities that can be
designed. Thus, a semantics specialises the architecture into a certain applica-
tion. Thereby it has similarities with the principles of compiler generators — a
principle and theory which has inspired this paper.
It may be argued that the problem we have tried to solve is much easier solved
by means of database schemes. In such schemes, objects can be introduced
as rows and properties of objects can be introduced as columns. There are,
however, two main reasons why a database approach is not satisfactory. First,
dynamically changing the attributes of a database schema — known as schema
evolution — is in general complex and often problematic. Second, the result
of database operations and queries are either database schemas, tuples, or the
7.10 Conclusion 223
field values of relations. It is essential to our approach that we are able to define
the meaning of artefact models as expressions in many different incomparable
target languages.
We believe that the introduction of semantic parameterized interpretation can
serve as inspiration for future research in this area, and that we — by our
philosophical and design concerned study — has emphasized important issues
and solutions relevant to design practitioners and software industry working in
the interdisciplinary field of design and IT.
7.10.1 Future work: handling relations
Future work may focus on clarifying various issues. One is the compositionality
principle in the interpretation functions which limit the ways interpretation can
be made. Several sorts of views may require that the meaning of individual
objects or some of their properties are combined in a non–compositional way.
Another issue concerns the notion of relations. In the following, we shall explore
both issues but with an emphasis on the latter.
Until now, we have ignored relations in interpretation artefact models. The
modelling language LM has been designed on an ontological foundation which
makes a distinction between two sorts. In design, such states of affairs are the
configuration of objects. The entities are properties and relations. Often for
physical systems like buildings, properties are categorised into intrinsic and ex-
trinsic [64, 40, 38]. By an intrinsic property, we understand a property which
exists independently of any other object or surroundings. By an extrinsic prop-
erty, we understand a property which an object has by virtue of another object;
i.e. the existence of an extrinsic property depends on the existence of another
object than the object possessing the extrinsic property.
Ontologically, following Shoemaker [153], we believe extrinsic properties to be
less compliant with the mental process of designing than those of relations.
E.g. we may wish to express that two objects are to be two feet apart. This
information can easily be expressed as a topological relation, but it can also (as
common practice in object–oriented design systems) be expressed by introducing
a coordinate system and expressing position and orientation as properties of the
objects. The former approach, we believe is closest to the mental process of
designing. In addition, it makes deduction of knowledge more simple as rules
can be defined, e.g. as Prolog programs. The latter approach is more efficient
computationally when it comes to visualisation. Such visualisations utilize the
notion of coordinate systems on paper or screen.
224
Semantic parameterized interpretation
as a foundation for conceptual design systems
A conceptual design tool should, we claim, favour the former approach. There-
fore, we have designed LM for models to express a clear distinction between
intrinsic properties of objects and relations between objects. However, many
target languages are rooted in the latter approach.
The principle of semantic parameterized interpretation is based on a composi-
tional semantics. This principle is convenient for handling intrinsic properties,
as the meaning of each object can be computed for later to be combined with the
meaning of other objects.. Handling relations, following the latter approach, re-
quires a different interpretation approaches, as the meanings of each object may
depend on the meaning of other objects. In essence, a way of binding free terms
such that all relations hold, needs to be incorporated in a non–compositional
way.
For topological relations this problem is well known within the area of field
science. The problem is that of defining targets when the information is inad-
equate for saturating all free terms, and of finding a substitution such that all
relations hold. The problem takes the form as a combinatorial problem. Con-
sider the following model which makes use of three topological relations: xrel
means that the two objects are translated a certain distance from each other,
xzrot means that the objects are rotated a certain angle in the xz–plane accord-
ing to each other, and yzrot means that the objects are rotated a certain angle
in the yz–plane according to each other.
model
w1 : (sort ={wall},
length={1800},
height={600},
width={800});
w2 : (sort={wall},
length={1800},
height={600},
width={800});
(w1,w2) :(xrel={900}, xzrot={0}, yz={0})
The solution space, which satisfies the relations between the two objects, may be
infinite as both objects can be placed in infinite many ways and still satisfying
the relation. Furthermore, this solution space lies in a much larger space which
is the space of interpretations which do not satisfy the relations of the artefact
model. The difference in size between the two spaces makes finding suitable
solutions a hard task to solve computationally [125].
Figure 7.7 shows that there are many possible ways of positioning the two walls
in the plane. Fixing the position and orientation of the object w1 gives the
possibilities of placing the object w2 anywhere in a distance of 900 units as well
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as rotated in the xy–plane.
w1 w2
Figure 7.7: Possible ways of positioning the walls.
The space of possible interpretations is called the solution space. This space may
be infinite when relations like topological relations are introduced in artefact
models. Often, only a small sub–space of the solution space should be valid, as
much design knowledge may not be expressed, thereby creating a large solution
space.
One way to solve the problem is to encode topological information as properties.
This, we believe, does not break our ontological understanding as we are talking
about representation. The encoding process can be done automatically for topo-
logical relations and could be part of the preparation for the semantic parame-
terized interpretation. However, the encoding process may need algorithms for
solving constraint satisfactions of relations and for making optimisation. Still,
these are known issues so we leave it to future work.
Another way to solve the problem is simply to leave the task of placing ob-
jects topologically to the visualisation tool. In a design tool like AutoCAD, the
individual objects can be positioned in an interactive process with the user. Re-
lation constraints can then be added by selecting pairs of objects and specifying
their relations. This solution leaves more to the visualisation tool but without
violating our original motivations.
7.10.2 Disclaiming a seemingly risky business
It can be argued that founding a design system on the ability to specify the
meanings of constructs in conceptual design models, is a risky business. How-
ever, at some level this is what we actually do in most cases. The programmer
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of a CAD application writes procedures for visualization and manipulation of
objects, in requirements engineering tables and definitions formally as well as
informally specify the meaning of words and modelling constructs, etc. An ex-
ample of the latter is a table which informally defines the meaning of constructs
in a graphical design notation. Another example is a set of validation formu-
lae for defining whether a design fulfills requirements. The latter exemplifies a
situation in which messing with the semantics can cause serious damage. We
should thus state that the intention of having a language LS is not for loosen-
ing the constraints and framework for validation and verification. Note, that
it is a semantics defining views on a model. Basically, we are all interested in
having meaningful views. Also, introducing LS is primarily for the purpose of
investigating the foundation for conceptual design systems and their application.
Furthermore, although we show how semantic flexibility can be incorporated, it
does not imply that everybody should have access to this feature. There may
here be two extremes: (i) The semantics is fixed and cannot be touched by the
designer/user, and (ii) the designer/user can manipulate the semantics.
The former extreme can be extended by having a set of semantics; i.e. adding
an additional parameter to the interpreting process, for stating the desired one.
In between the two extremes, there are the following possibilities:
• We have a root semantics from which we can make copies that can be
edited. Certain satisfiability constraints are defined for all derived seman-
tic specifications.
• Certain parts of a semantics are accessible for editing; others are not.
• etc.
The second possibility corresponds to parameterized modelling.
Basically, the issue addressed is reduced to “who has editorial access to the
semantics?” This, however, is a discussion separate from that of the relation
between models and their meanings.
We shall not discuss the above issues further in the paper; they are simply a
disclaimer for this paper.
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7.11 Appendix A: Concrete syntax of LM
The following is the concrete syntax of LM .
W ::= M Wopt
Wopt ::= ⊓ M Wopt | ⊔ M Wopt | ǫ
M ::= "model" S Sopt
S ::= id ":" "(" P Popt ")" D
| "(" id "," id ")" ":" "(" P Popt ")"
Sopt ::= ";" S Sopt | ǫ
D ::= "{" id Dopt "}" | ǫ
Dopt ::= "," id Dopt | ǫ
P ::= id "=" Q Popt
Popt ::= "," P Popt | ǫ
Q ::= id | { V VS } | "[" V; V "]"
VS ::= "," V VS | ǫ
V ::= n | id | inf | neginf
7.12 Appendix B: Concrete syntax of LS
The following is the concrete syntax of LS .
SS ::= SM SSopt
SSopt ::= ";" SM SSopt | ǫ
SM ::= template TM TMopt
TM ::= "(" P Popt ")" ":" "{" T "}"
TMopt ::= "," TM TMopt | ǫ
P ::= id "=" Q Popt
Popt ::= "," P Popt | ǫ
Q ::= id | { V VS } | "[" V; V "]"
VS ::= "," V VS | ǫ
V ::= n | id | inf | neginf
T range over unsaturated target expressions.
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7.13 Appendix C: Lattice operations
value
join: Θ × Θ ∼→ Θ
meet: Θ × Θ ∼→ Θ
axiom ∀ θ, θ′ : Θ •
join(θ,θ′) ≡
mk_Θ([ x 7→(σ′′,xs′′) | x:X, σ′′:Σ, xs′′:X-set •
x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧
σ′′ = join(fst(objects(θ)(x)),fst(objects(θ′)(x))) ∧
xs′′ = join(snd(objects(θ)(x)),snd(objects(θ′)(x))) ],
[ (x,x′)7→σ | x, x′:X, σ:Σ •
(x,x′) ∈ dom relations(θ) ∧ (x,x′) ∈ dom relations(θ′) ∧
σ = join(relations(θ)(x,x′),relations(θ′)) ]),
meet(θ,θ′) ≡
mk_Θ([ x 7→(σ′′,xs′′) | x:X, σ′′:Σ, xs′′:X-set •
(x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧
σ′′ = meet(fst(objects(θ)(x)),fst(objects(θ′)(x))) ∧
xs′′ = snd(objects(θ)(x)) ∪ snd(objects(θ′)(x))) ∨
(x ∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x 6∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧
σ′′ = objects(θ)(x)) ∨
(x 6∈ dom objects(θ) ∧ x ∈ dom objects(θ′) ∧
σ′′ = fst(objects(θ)(x))) ],
[ (x,x′)7→ σ | x,x′:X, σ:Σ •
((x,x′) ∈ dom relations(θ) ∧ (x,x′) ∈ dom relations(θ) ∧
σ′′ = meet(relations(θ)(x,x′),relations(θ′))) ∨
((x,x′) ∈ dom relations(θ) ∧ (x,x′) 6∈ dom relations(θ′) ∧
σ′′ = relations(θ)(x,x′)) ∨
((x,x′) 6∈ dom relations(θ) ∧ (x,x′) ∈ dom relations(θ′) ∧
σ′′ = relations(θ′)) ])
value
meet: Σ × Σ → Σ,
join: Σ × Σ → Σ,
axiom ∀ σ, σ′:Σ •
join(σ,σ′) ≡
mk_Σ([ a 7→vs|a:A, vs:VS •
a ∈ dom σ ∧ a ∈ dom σ′ ∧ vs=join(σ(a),σ′(a)) ]),
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meet(σ,σ′) ≡
mk_Σ([ a 7→vs|a:A, vs:VS •
(a ∈ dom σ ∧ a ∈ dom σ′ ∧ vs=meet(σ(a),σ′(a))) ∨
(a ∈ dom σ ∧ a 6∈ dom σ′ ∧ vs=σ(a)) ∨
(a 6∈ dom σ ∧ a ∈ dom σ′ ∧ vs=σ′(a)) ])
value
max: V × V → V
min: V × V → V
value
∩: (V × V) × (V × V) → VS
∩(intv,intv′) ≡
case (intv,intv′) of
((NegInf,Inf),(NegInf,Inf)) → Intv(NegInf,Inf)
((NegInf,Inf),(NegInf,Number(b′))) → Intv(NegInf,Number(b′))
((NegInf,Inf),(Number(a′),Inf)) → Intv(Number(a′),Inf)
((NegInf,Inf),(Number(a′),Number(b′))) →
if a′<b′ then Intv(Number(a′),Number(b′))
elsif a′=b′ then Seq({Number(a′)})
else ⊥
end
((NegInf,Number(b)),(NegInf,Inf)) → Intv(NegInf,Number(b))
((NegInf,Number(b)),(NegInf,Number(b′))) →
Intv(NegInf,Number(min(b,b′)))
((NegInf,Number(b)),(Number(a′),Inf)) →
if a′<b then Intv(Number(a′),Number(b))
elsif b=a′ then Seq({Number(b)})
else ⊥
end
((NegInf,Number(b)),(Number(a′),Number(b′))) →
if a′<b then Intv(Number(a′),Number(min(b,b′)))
elsif b=a′ then Seq({Number(b)})
else ⊥
end
((Number(a),Inf),(NegInf,Inf)) → Intv(Number(a),Inf)
((Number(a),Inf),(NegIng,Number(b′))) →
if a<b′ then Intv(Number(a),Number(b′))
elsif a=b′ then Seq({Number(a)})
else ⊥
end
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((Number(a),Inf),(Number(a′),Inf)) →
Intv(Number(max(a,a′)),Inf)
((Number(a),Inf),(Number(a′),Number(b′))) →
if a<b′ then Intv(Number(max(a,a′)),Number(b′))
elsif a=b′ then Seq({Number(a)})
else ⊥
end
((Number(a),Number(b)),(NegInf,Inf)) →
Intv(Number(a),Number(b))
((Number(a),Number(b)),(NegInf,Number(b′))) →
if a<b′ then Intv(Number(a),Number(min(b,b′)))
elsif a=b′ then Seq({Number(a)})
else ⊥
end
((Number(a),Number(b)),(Number(a′),Inf)) →
if a′<b then Intv(Number(max(a,a′)),Number(b))
elsif a′=b then Seq({Number(a′)})
else ⊥
end
((Number(a),Number(b)),(Number(a′),Number(b′))) →
if b=a′ then Seq({Number(b)})
elsif b′=a then Seq({Number(b′)})
elsif a′<b and also a<b′ then
Intv(Number(max(a,a′)),Number(min(b,b′)))
else ⊥
end
( , ) → ⊥
end
∪: (V × V) × (V × V) → VS
∪(intv,intv′) ≡
case (intv,intv′) of
((NegInf,Inf),(NegInf,Inf)) → Intv(NegInf,Inf)
((NegInf,Inf),(NegInf,Number(b′))) → Intv(NegInf,Inf)
((NegInf,Inf),(Number(a′),Inf)) → Intv(NegInf,Inf)
((NegInf,Inf),(Number(a′),Number(b′))) → Intv(NegInf,Inf)
((NegInf,Number(b)),(NegInf,Inf)) → Intv(NegInf,Inf)
((NegInf,Number(b)),(NegInf,Number(b′))) →
Intv(NegInf,Number(max(b,b′)))
((NegInf,Number(b)),(Number(a′),Inf)) → Intv(NegInf,Inf)
((NegInf,Number(b)),(Number(a′),Number(b′))) →
Intv(NegInf,Number(max(b,b′)))
((Number(a),Inf),(NegInf,Inf)) → Intv(NegInf,Inf)
((Number(a),Inf),(NegIng,Number(b′))) → Intv(NegInf,Inf)
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((Number(a),Inf),(Number(a′),Inf)) → Intv(Number(min(a,a′)),Inf)
((Number(a),Inf),(Number(a′),Number(b′))) →
Intv(Number(min(a,a′)),Inf)
((Number(a),Number(b)),(NegInf,Inf)) → Intv(NegInf,Inf)
((Number(a),Number(b)),(NegInf,Number(b′))) →
Intv(NegInf,Number(max(b,b′)))
((Number(a),Number(b)),(Number(a′),Inf)) →
Intv(Number(min(a,a′)),Inf)
((Number(a),Number(b)),(Number(a′),Number(b′))) →
Intv(Number(min(a,a′)),Number(max(b,b′)))
( , ) → ⊥
end,
value
∈: V × (V × V) → Bool
axiom n, a, b:Num ≡
Number(n) ∈ (NegInf,Inf) = true,
Number(n) ∈ (NegInf,Number(b)) = n≤b,
Number(n) ∈ (Number(a),Inf) = a≤n,
Number(n) ∈ (Number(a),Number(b)) = (a<n ∧ n<b) ∨ a=n ∨ n=b,
( , ) → false
value
join: VS × VS → VS,
meet: VS × VS → VS
axiom •
join(Seq(vs),Seq(vs′)) ≡ Seq(vs ∪ vs′),
join(Seq(vs),Intv(v,v′)) ≡
Seq({v|v:V • v ∈ vs ∨ v ∈ (v,v′)}),
join(Intv(v,v′),Seq(vs)) ≡
Seq({v′′|v′′:V • v′′ ∈ vs ∨ v′′ ∈ (v,v′)}),
join(Intv(v,v′),Intv(v′′,v′′′)) ≡ Intv((v,v′) ∪ (v′′,v′′′)),
meet(Seq(vs),Seq(vs′)) ≡ Seq(vs ∩ vs′),
meet(Seq(vs),Intv(v,v′)) ≡
Seq({v|v:V • v ∈ vs ∧ v ∈ (v,v′)}),
meet(Intv(v,v′),Seq(vs)) ≡
Seq({v′′|v′′:V • v′′ ∈ vs ∧ v′′ ∈ (v,v′)}),
meet(Intv(v,v′),Intv(v′′,v′′′)) ≡ Intv((v,v′) ∩ (v′′,v′′′))
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Part IV
Philosophy
Chapter 8
Object aspects
Abstract: References to objects like buildings, walls, and bricks, ap-
pear repeatingly in descriptions like requirements and design documents.
However, the objects referred to may not have physical presence, which
makes it difficult to claim that the descriptions are meaningful. Applying
a formal approach to mereology reduces part–whole relations to a logi-
cal formalism and seems to avoid such problems, but the connection to
reality is then weak. In this paper, we seek an argument for connecting
object descriptions in language to a causal realm. However, claiming such
a connection introduces a number of mereological problems. Of these, the
problem of arbitrary sums is the most dominant. Basically, we cannot
accept that an object does not fall under any concept. If we wish — as
common in object references in language — to accept arbitrary sums of
objects, we must also accept arbitrary concept and that we cannot. The
paper, suggests the notion of object aspects as the entities referred to
when referring to potential objects. An object aspect is a part existing in
a possible world which is causally reachable from the present world. We
defend our perspective against the major criticisms of extensional mere-
ology. In the defence, we argue that object aspects can contribute to
the meaning of descriptions of objects like buildings, walls, and bricks,
without problematic ontological commitments.
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8.1 Introduction
The relation between parts and wholes is often important ingredients in the
identification of objects referred to in sentences and expressions. If I say “the
roof of the house”, I mean a certain object which I consider part of a certain
house. The naming of the roof by means of the definite article “the roof ”, is one
component in the identification of that object. The reference to the relation in
which the roof stands to the house is another component. This relation restricts
the interpretation space for objects falling under the concept roof.
Part–whole relations are important in a wide range of informal and formal de-
scriptions of things; actual or possible. Such relations may be applied when
talking about objects in requirements and design of artefacts like buildings, or
when talking about the construction processes which build up such artefacts
from collections of parts.
It is tempting to utilize a version of extensional mereology for doing so in for-
malisation or precisely formulated documents. “Extensional mereology” is a
common term which Simons takes to denote formal theories of part–whole rela-
tions [155]. What prominent extensional mereological theories aim at covering
is, however, more far reaching than what is often needed in order for sentences
expressing part–whole information to make sense.
Extensional mereology can be seen as working on two levels: A logical level and
an epistemological level. These are two different levels of abstraction.
The logical level concerns descriptive or prescriptive formulations which intend
to catch a still picture of part–whole constellations of objects. Logical oper-
ations are defined algebraically, and logical names are taken to denote actual
or imaginary objects. E.g. x + y denotes the mereological sum of the objects
denoted by x and y, and x ≤ z expresses that the object denoted by x is a part
of the object denoted by z.
The epistemological level is deeper and more universal but also much more
committing and problematic. It aims at linking part–whole relations at a logical
level, to reality.
One of the two major critiques of extensional mereology is that it does not fit
with reality or how objects are considered in every day life. This means that
extensional mereology fails to establish the link.
In order to bridge the gap, I believe mereological discussions need to consider
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the notion of truth–conditions. It has been shown in other metaphysical areas
that the notion of truth–conditions has an important rôle to play when adding
epistemological perspectives. Thus, it was used by Frege to approach a definition
of the notion of sense, and it underlies much of the discussion on properties.
In a mereological discussion like the one in this paper, I believe, we need to
consider the notion of truth–conditions for whether an object is part of a whole.
Here, we are engaged in solving at least two problems. First, we need to offer an
account for how to handle reference to a plurality of objects which are referred
to as a whole. Second, we need to decide whether conceptually to distinguish
objects which undergo small changes; and if so, how this should be done.
As an example of the first problem, consider the sentence: “walls and ceilings
are painted white”. Objects of two different kinds (walls and ceilings) are here
predicated. The question is whether we should or can consider these objects as
some whole being predicated. The problem is called the problem of arbitrary
sums .
As an example of the second problem, consider the situation of describing the
construction tasks to be performed on a concrete foundation. Anchors are
mounted, small holes and drains are made, the foundation is primed two or
three times, etc. At each stage, the description of a specific task may refer
to the concrete foundation simply as “the concrete foundation” — not as “the
concrete foundation being primed twice”, etc. The question is now whether we
need to commit ourselves to concepts which are abstractions of the concrete
foundation in each stage of development, and of which the concrete foundation,
at each stage, makes the extension of unique concepts. The problem is called
the problem of flux .
Both problems are present in mereology on the epistemological level; only the
second problem is present at the logical level of mereology. I believe, though,
that remaining on the logical level is too shallow an approach — we need more
means for justification of part–whole relations referred to in sentences and ex-
pressions.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 8.2, I motivate the introduction of
object aspects and further in Section 8.3, I argue for their existence in a causal
realm. The argumentation is defended against two other views on reference:
Platonism and empiricism. Section 8.4 and Section 8.5 defend the notion of
object aspects against the two major charges against mereology: The problem
of arbitrary sums and the problem of flux. The remaining sections are appendix
in which I shall discuss some other charges against extensional mereology. These
discussions indirectly relate to object aspects as they concern mereology in gen-
eral.
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8.2 Object aspects
In this paper, I introduce the notion of object aspects . It is a notion which
I have found convenient when needing to refer to parts of potential objects,
without fully committing myself to extensional mereology at the epistemological
level. The notion of object aspects, as a concept of reference, lies between the
complexities of the two mereological levels presented.
By an object aspect, I understand a part of an object existing in a potential
world . A potential world is one which can be causally reached from the actual
world. Objects existing in possible worlds are possible objects and likewise are
objects existing in potential worlds considered potential objects. Object aspects
are special potential objects in the sense that they are proper parts of potential
objects. Thus, an object aspect exists by virtue of there being a corresponding
part of an object in a potential world. The outer surface of an exterior wall
exists as an object aspect because that wall can exist in a potential world and
the surface is a part of that wall. Similar does a concrete foundation exists as
an object aspect because there is a potential building of which it is a part. The
relation between an object aspect and the whole of which it is an aspect, can
be formally defined as:
[[ a aspect-of b ]] ≡ ∃ˆw :W •w0 ≤ w ∧ a ∈ w ∧ b ∈ w ∧ a≪w b
where w0 denotes the actual world, ≪w is the proper part relation holding in
the world w, and ∈ means world membership. The symbol ∃ˆ is taken to denote
existential quantification over the set of possible worlds W. A proper part —
following Simons — is a part of an object such that there exists another part
which does not coincide with the former and which is not the empty part [155].
The notion of parts in extensional mereology can be taken to fit various inter-
pretations, and I shall thus distinguish it from the notion of object aspects for
which I introduce for the reasons already mentioned. Thus, the notion of object
aspects is one specific interpretation of the notion of parts, although I believe
that a distinction between the two is convenient to maintain.
I believe that references to object aspects can contribute to the meaning of sen-
tences and expressions about objects like artefacts, and that its more modest
ontological commitments makes it avoid certain mereological problems. How-
ever, the notion is not aimed at capturing the deepest epistemological issues;
nor is it intended to be as general as that of parts, because its purpose is more
narrow.
Obviously, a theory of object aspects strongly relates to a theory of parts. How-
ever, in comparison, the notion of object aspects is broader in one sense and
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more narrow in another.
It is broader in the sense that object aspects abstract from physicality, time,
and causal connections, and in the sense that I shall allow for what seemingly
is reference to arbitrary mereological sums.
The notion is more narrow in the sense that the objects of which we have aspects
are restricted to what we usually understand by “things” like buildings, furniture,
books, etc. A more correct term is “continuants” which, according to Simons, is
defined by Broad as objects which do not have temporal parts [155] like events
and processes. Objects which do (called “occurrents”), we exclude altogether in
this treatment.
Furthermore, the notion of object aspects is more narrow, as object aspects are
parts of objects in potential worlds; not in all possible worlds.
To some extent, I follow Lewis’ notion of possible worlds, according to which
some worlds are causally connected and others are counterfactual to each other
[120, 119].
Also, I take object aspects to be contextual in the sense that their existence
depend on the existence of wholes of which they are parts (even though these
wholes are only potential). Such a whole restricts the interpretation space of
parts we consider to be aspects of the whole. Consider a ball of solid metal. The
ball considered in isolation is an object but in this context not an object aspect
as it is not a proper part of anything. We can refer to the ball and its properties,
but we do not require any additional knowledge related to its surroundings for
identification. However, if the ball is placed as part of a ball–bearing device, it
is a part of that device. In that case, we may need to refer to the ball–aspect of
the ball–bearing which is an object aspect.
The notion of object aspects is thus intimately connected with the notion of
parts. Therefore, it is only natural to defend it against the standard criticism
directed towards extensional mereology.
8.3 Referring to non–actual objects
A reference to an object aspect is a reference to a part of an object existing
in a possible world which is causally accessible from the actual world. The
ontological commitment of object aspects is thus a commitment to objects and
parts in potential worlds.
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After presenting and motivating this view, I shall defend it against two com-
peting views. The first is Platonism — the second is an empirical perspective
which denies that we can predicate other objects than those being present.
I divide possible worlds into those which are potential and those which are not.
A possible world is potential if it can be causally reached from the actual world.
Worlds in the past and counterfactual worlds are non–potential. If a world
is counterfactual, evolution has turned in such a way that this world cannot
become the actual one. There may of course be potential worlds with much
similarity to counterfactual ones. In 1922, divisional traffic manager Georg L.
Eir predicted a Copenhagen Metro to exist in 1952. However, the Metro was not
implemented until 2001. Thus, the possible world at year 1952 containing such a
Metro were counterfactual to the world which did not; just as it is counterfactual
to the actual world today, cause even though we have the Metro as an actualium
today, other things are different. Thus, a building consisting of certain objects
and with certain properties may exist in a potential world just as well as in a
world counterfactual to that. In that case, the counterfactual condition makes
no restrictions on the existence of that building but concerns the existence and
identities of other objects. Lewis includes counterfactual worlds among the class
of possible worlds without making this distinction like the one above. However,
I believe the distinction is convenient in the present context.
The union set of the worlds described makes the set of possible worlds I commit
myself to. However, this set is not as large as the set which Lewis seems to
commit himself to [120]. Possible worlds in the wide Lewisean sense may include
worlds inhabited by Hobbits and Wizards. Certainly, we could imagine that
evolution had turned differently in ancient times such that creatures like these
exist today. However, in order for such world to be believable, I think it must at
least be possible to properly define the corresponding counterfactual conditions,
based on the natural laws of our actual world. That is, I insist on natural laws
to be necessary as well as consistent in all possible worlds.
Also — but then I might be too severe — I do not see how the existence of such
worlds having other natural laws contributes to understanding the meaning of
informal or formal descriptions of things to be.
8.3.1 Motivation
One of the reasons I introduce the notion of potential worlds is that many de-
scriptions referring to object aspects are of normative kind. Normative descrip-
tions like requirements and designs of buildings talk of something in a potential
world — something which can be realised.
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Consider the sentence “the hole in the wall needs to be drilled with a 5 mm stone
drill ”. We may say that the hole stands in a part–whole relation to the wall.
Obviously, that part (the hole) does not exist physically at the moment the
sentence is uttered. In order to make sense of the sentence, I believe that at
least two issues need clarification.
The first issue is that a hole is something which is not there. A clarification is
here quite easy, though. The hole can be described mathematically, e.g. as a
solid cylinder shape. Whether the filling is of solid material is not of importance
as long as we maintain a proper definition of the concept hole. As argued by
Jubien the distinction between what is substance and what is not may be merely
by convention [114]. The space occupied by a piece of gold covers more space
than the sum of the spaces occupied by each gold atom. In fact, any kind of
material will be sparse in spatial occupancy.
The second issue is that — for convenience — part–whole relations may be taken
to hold between concrete, actual objects which can be observed, compared,
and empirically judged. In the present case, neither of the objects may exist
physically, and certainly the hole does not at the moment the sentence is uttered.
If part–whole relations concern spatial inclusion (and usually they do), referring
to object aspects implies a commitment to possibilia.
Now, consider the sentence: “all exterior walls of the building need to be primed”.
Normative sentences like this one, are like assignments of values to variables in
imperative programming languages. The meaning of the assignment sentence
can be seen as consisting of two components. The first is the side effect which
updates the variable environment with the variable name bound to the value.
The second is the resulting value of the whole expression seen in its context.
The resulting value of an assignment sentences may be defined as either having
no type or having a Boolean type. That is, the truth–condition of the sentence
has not genuine value.
A similar, perhaps naive analysis, claims that the corresponding fregean truth–
condition of the normative natural language sentence will always give true. If
we assume that the expression has fregean sense and allow it to have reference
although that may not be an actual object, the condition for whether the sen-
tence is true looses its power. We cannot falsify such a normative sentence using
this approach — it is like a definition. Instead, we may consider the sentence to
be true when it is the case that the walls have been primed. This is a kind of a
speech act approach (described thoroughly by Austin and Searle [112, 150]) but
in a setting more similar to Smith’s [156].
To imagine a sentence like the above to be true as well as offering valuable
information, requires an ability to deduce the causal connections leading to
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worlds containing the reference. Therefore, we need to commit ourselves to
such causal connections.
In general, a sentence which refers to object aspects makes sense if there is a
potential world such that the corresponding speech act truth–condition is true.
Note, however, that it is not the same as there simply being a potential world
in which the sentence is true, as that sentence may be normative and needs to
be analysed in a speech act way.
The rationality in this view can be seen if we read the sentence as a conjunction
of “there may be such a thing as a building”, “this building contains things which
are exterior walls”, and “all these things are primed ”. Each of these sentences
make sense on their own, simply because it is possible to satisfy their truth–
conditions. Formalising this as a statement over possible worlds gives:
∃ˆw :W • w0 ≤ w ∧ (∃x, y • building(y) ∧ ext-wall(x) ∧ x≪w y ∧ primed(x))
The commitment to object aspects as possibilia calls for a wider definition of
parts than previously considered. An object aspect can also be something like a
surface of a concrete foundation. Such a surface exists spatially when that foun-
dation is actual, as well as before and after its actuality. But the actuality of the
foundation does not make its surface more actual. It is still an abstract notion
just like the intersection point between two straight lines in two–dimensional
geometry.
8.3.2 Platonism
A claim that there are such things as object aspects, just as there are imaginary
and natural numbers, may be justified in a commitment to these as abstract
objects. A prominent doctrine for justifying the existence of such objects is
that of Platonism.
One of the most comprehensive, yet precise, definitions of Platonism, I have
come across is the one given in Crispen Wright’s paper “Wittgenstein’s Rule–
following Considerations and the Central Project of Theoretical Linguistics”
[172]. It says, that Platonism is the view that the correctness of a judgement is
independent of any opinion or conception of ours.
The observable — as through sense impressions — is thus only imperfect images,
and the perfect objects (the platonic ideas like objects of archetypes) are to be
found only outside the scope of space, time, and causal connections.
In mathematics, Paul Bernay’s (according to [43]) characterises a platonist as:
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“[one who] postulates the existence of a world of ideas which contains all objects
and relations of mathematics”.
However, neither definitions claim everything to exist in a platonic heaven. Nei-
ther do they define what exists and what does not in such a heaven. Basically, I
believe that Platonism in these forms needs clarification on at least two issues.
The first is that if platonic ideas — being the objects we refer to — are abstract;
how can we grasp them? To this objection, Balaguer has an answer which
suggests a so–called full–blooded Platonism. Full–blooded Platonism is the view
that for whatever we can cognise, there is a corresponding platonic idea [11].
But this is just then a doctrine which is equal to a possible worlds doctrine
without causal connections and without counterfactuals.
The second objection is that if platonic ideas are abstract concerning space and
cause, how can it be that we can describe the forms of such ideas or reason
about whether their actual counterparts can be produced?
I believe that my possible worlds perspective with its focus on potentiality gives a
better explanation. Primarily, the causal connections are important in the sense
that these facilitate reasoning about object aspects. Just as our experience with
the natural laws of physics guides us in hitting a ball with a baseball bat, so
does causation (in a priori or a posteori) direct the cognition of mental images in
designing and planning of objects like bridges and houses. Thus, object aspects
may be taken to exist outside the scope of time but not outside the scope of
space nor completely outside causal connections. I say completely as object
aspects are not subject to physical change which is the usual understanding of
being within the scope of causal connections.
8.3.3 Empiricism
I take it to be evident that some entities must be universal in order for humans
to learn and make theories about the world. First of all, the natural laws must
be something we can share knowledge about. If this is not the case, I believe that
a common science is impossible. Rooted in the natural laws lies the problem of
causation and in that the notion of necessary connections.
When it comes to object aspects, the question is what kind of entities are com-
mon in a similar sense and thus justify the existence of object aspects even
though these cannot be observed and measured. Derived from this question
comes that of what kind of knowledge we share when we agree on the existence
of object aspects. A pure nominalistic perspective can thus be rejected on the
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basis that the ontological realm we are considering is not rooted in language
and thus cannot be reduced to language construct rearrangements. Following
Lacey, there are two definitions of nominalism: (i) denying abstract entities, and
(ii) denying the existence of universals (particularism) [116]. I take the above
argumentation to apply to both.
It is, though, not unnatural to claim an empiricist perspective. Such a perspec-
tive claims that knowledge must come from experience. The question is now
whether that experience relates to something causal that can be shared; i.e.,
whether we should accept the notion of necessary connection as universal.
There are basically two definitions of causation and these are both rooted in the
notion of necessary connection [157]. The first is that of constant conjunction.
The second is that of counterfactuals . The former says that a cause c is followed
by an effect e, and that all such causes are followed by all such effects. This
definition appears to be a problem for empiricists like Hume because there is
nothing that proves that a necessary connection is not just an idea in our heads.
The latter says that a cause c is followed by an effect e, and if c had not occurred,
then e would not have either.
If there were no such thing as referring to potential objects, how could we make
a distinction between what can be made and what cannot? Then such objects
would just be ideas as would the causal connections leading to the idea being
realised. The fact that we think we can reason about descriptions referring to
object aspects would then be entirely imagination.
I believe that an argument for the existence of causal connections and thereby
for object aspects, is the same as Russell’s argument against nominalism, given
in “The world of universals” and “On our knowledge of universals” [143, 142].
My customized argument goes as follows. When we hit a tree with an axe, we
notice that it makes markings. However, if the axe is very blunt it may take
a long time and a lot of strength to cut the tree. From experience, we know
that we can speed up the process by making the axe sharp. However, we do
not have to make that experience before each hit with the axe. As for Russell’s
universals, we see a patch which classifies an axe as sharp or blunt. From a soft
touch of the edge of the axe, we may even be able to tell whether it is sharp
enough to quickly cut the tree.
What I have spoken of are the causal connections between striking and cutting.
If it is so that based on some experience I can just feel the edge in order to tell
whether it is sharp enough — without cutting myself with the same strength as
when I hit the tree the causal connection must be something more than ideas in
my head. An empiricist view which denies causal connections as universal thus
seems untenable.
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8.4 The problem of arbitrary sums
The distinction between the two levels of mereology presents the problem of
arbitrary mereological sums in two perspectives which differ significantly. If we
remain on the logical level there are no restrictions on the kind of objects we
can put together to form mereological sums. Algebraically, we can define the
sum of any collection of objects, as only the names denoting the objects are
of importance — not what such collections take or can be taken to denote. In
other words, we are not obliged to justify such combinations.
However, it seems that including epistemological issues makes arbitrary sums
a serious matter. We may need to commit ourselves to concepts of which the
characterisation and determination in language gets messy or may not even be
possible.
There is a general principle of compositionality in mereology which says that
the mereological sum of two or more objects is itself an object. It may here be
essential to conceptually distinguish the concept of the whole from the concept
of the individuals constituting the whole. An element in a set (even though
that element could be a set of something) cannot be of the same sort as the
composition or set in which it is an element. I.e. a type T is distinct from the
type T ×S and T−set, etc. This follows from Russell’s paradox and elementary
type theory.
The question is now whether we can have objects (being parts or sums) for
which there is not a concept. To me that would be absurd: Every object must
fall under a concept. However, this also means that every arbitrary mereological
sum (being an object as well) must fall under a concept. The proposition implies
that a commitment to the existence of arbitrary sums on the epistemological
level is also a commitment to the existence of arbitrary concepts under which
such sums fall. That is:
arbitrary-sums⇒ arbitrary-concepts
This is quite a large commitment which — I believe — does not satisfy Occham’s
Razor. Having arbitrary concepts, I believe is a commitment which is difficult
to live with for several reasons. To me, concepts are sparse, and thereby I
agree with Armstrong and Williams who — according to Lewis — believe that
properties and concepts are to be considered in a sparse theory [121]. Also,
Russell considers his universals to be in a sparse realm. The problem of arbitrary
concepts may appear if we try to characterise arbitrary concepts. It may be that
language is simply not rich enough to make such characterisation precise enough
for all such concepts.
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Consider the sentence “exterior walls and exterior surfaces of beams not placed
at the south side, need to be painted twice”. The problem of finding a suitable
concept under which the walls and surfaces referred to fall may be approached
in two ways. One way is to suggest a concept which is general enough. However,
such a general concept may certainly include too many objects. Another way is
to assume the existence of a concept of which the corresponding truth–condition
is a disjunction of two conditions: one for being an exterior wall and one for
being a surface like the ones referred to. We may succeed with the latter way,
but we are then back at the logical level as we have not added any information
about the objects as a whole, which can be connected with reality.
Both ways suffer from the fact that they do not relate the sums to larger wholes.
Even though we are able to characterise the objects in question (as a whole or
not) we have failed to restrict the objects satisfying the truth–conditions, to
only be parts of a certain whole; a certain potential building.
Even if we assume that we succeed in characterising and determining a concept
under which the considered arbitrary mereological sum and only that falls, we
have a problem. Namely to justify the existence of such a concept by stating
why we then need it.
In my opinion, one of the rationalities in believing in concepts being abstract
entities is that we gain a one–over–many principle. The one–over–many prin-
ciple says that many objects may be alike in some way and that their alikeness
is a universal entity.
In the given case, it seems like having the arbitrary concepts we are looking for,
replaces the one–over–many principle with a one–to–one relation between arbi-
trary mereological sums and corresponding concepts. Then the idea of concepts
is lost and we might be better off remaining on the logical level of mereology.
Thus, I reject a commitment to arbitrary mereological sums. However, I believe
that for the considered sorts of sentences and expressions which refer to object
aspects, we do not need a commitment to arbitrary sums. Thus, we can avoid
the commitment to arbitrary concepts.
My solution is simple. For object aspects it is always possible to split up a
sentence or expression such that object aspects of different kinds, are treated
separately. A sentence like the above we can split into: “exterior walls placed
at the south side, need to be painted twice” and “beams not placed at the south
side need, to be painted twice”.
As a general principle consider the following. Construct a number of definite de-
scriptions; one for each exterior wall and ceiling object. Each definite description
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characterises and designates a certain object, and including part–whole expres-
sions restricts the interpretation space of such objects to the whole in question.
Here, topology and geometry are essential notions. Each definite description
should define the exact spatial extension of one object aspect, as well as putting
it into context. Now, consider the conjunction of these definite descriptions.
Just as each description denotes an object aspect, so does the composite de-
scription.
The principle works because the restriction of interpretation space is performed
by part–whole relations to a larger whole which has to be assumed, and not by
unary predication constituting to the definition of concepts. An object like my
front door falls under the same concept door no matter what apartment it is a
front door to. The restriction of it being a part of my apartment is stated by
the fact that it stands in a part–whole relation to it.
Thus, I accept that arbitrary collections of objects can be seen as sums in
language for convenient predication. However, they are not genuine mereological
sums on the epistemological level even though we can analyse them on a logical
level.
8.5 The problem of flux
In a sense, the problem of flux derives from the problem of arbitrary sums.
As I argued in the previous section, a commitment to arbitrary sums implies
a commitment to arbitrary concepts. We may insist that there is a concept
under which an object falls in each stage of its development or change through
its life–time. That could be one concept general enough for the object to fall
under it even though it changes over time. However, if we wish to be able
to distinguish the stages conceptually, we must commit ourselves to distinct
concepts for each stage. This is a huge commitment — a commitment which
clings to the idea of allowing arbitrary concepts. This is a real problem for
sentences and expressions which intensively describe formation and elaboration
of objects as in requirements and design documents. It turns out, though, that
the more modest ontological commitment of object aspects avoids the most
serious charges rooted in the flux problem.
The problem of flux is both an identity problem and a problem of ontological
economy. The problem is rooted in the fact that objects change over time with-
out necessarily changing identity. By change, I basically understand physical
genuine change. Gaining or loosing parts or intrinsic properties of parts are
to me sufficient conditions for genuine change. To a trope theorist like Simons,
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these situations are of the same kind. However, I — who do not believe in tropes
at a conceptual level — shall focus on the gaining and loosening of parts.
The classical example of the flux problem is that of Theseus Ship. Over time
the various parts of a ship are exchanged with new ones: mast, planks, ceiling,
etc. At a stage, all the original parts have been replaced, and the question is
now whether the ship has maintained its identity. We may say that it has, but
not necessarily. Consider now the situation in which a person has collected all
the original parts of the ship and put them together to form another ship. This
other ship may be said to be more original with respect to the parts but not the
form, which has been maintained for the other ship.
Extensional mereology is subject to an objection saying that here we have a
problem of ambiguity concerning the identity of Theseus Ship. Simons defends
extensional mereology against this attack by replying that we should make a
distinction between what is matter–constant and what is form–constant .
I shall defend the notion of object aspects against the attack but with another
argument. First, I shall consider changes to objects as physical entities. Sec-
ond, I shall consider the problem of conceptually capturing and distinguishing
different stages of objects under development and formation. Third, I shall
consider the above problem of identity and in this context a special issue of
ambiguity concerning part–whole relations.
Consider the issue of physical change of objects. Since object aspects are ab-
stract, I shall not consider situations in which physical objects undergo tiny
changes over time. Time is not an issue for me here. This means that changes
which occur like when I accidentally scratch the surface of a wall and get dust on
my arm, can be avoided. It is a change of the wall in the sense that molecules are
removed from the wall as a whole. However, object aspects necessarily need to
abstract from such small causal changes due to the rejection of arbitrary mere-
ological sums. The only causal connections which are necessary are those of
which our knowledge makes the foundation for rational thinking and reasoning
about objects.
Consider the issue of distinguishing objects in a development process. We may
here face the problem that we cannot allow that an object’s obvious change in
development or formation is not reflected by well and precisely defined concepts
for each of the object’s stages. I shall here split up the discussion in three parts;
each being a rejection of a commitment to such arbitrary concepts. As a result,
the notion of object aspects is suggested to be distinguished from that of objects.
Consider the sentence: “This bike is painted green”. One mereological under-
standing of what it means to paint a bike green is that it is the mereological
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sum of two arguments: the bike and the green paint. Spatio–temporally this
seems to be true; but it is not necessarily a convenient conception. The under-
standing of the sum as an operation which takes argument objects and gives a
result makes us rashly commit to a new concept: that under which the painted
bike and only that falls. The rôle of that concept is to define a clear distinction
between the arguments — the bike and the paint — and the resulting green
bike.
However, we cannot know how small the change from argument objects to re-
sulting objects may be. Also, which one of the argument objects is conceptually
closest to the result? That is, which argument is the object being painted? Or
is it the paint which is being “biked”? We cannot tell as mereological sum is a
commutative operation which treats its arguments equally. In many situations,
the operation simply modifies one of the argument objects. In order to answer
the questions, we thus need a means for measuring similarity conceptually. An
approach for doing so is given by Gärdenfors in “Conceptual spaces” [86]. I shall
not follow this approach as I do not believe that properties and concepts can be
put into a metric space, epistemologically. It is, though, an interesting idea —
not without applicability in a formal definition–oriented context.
If we insist on distinguishing sums from their parts, no matter how small the
difference may be, we have quite an expensive commitment. It is not only
expensive according to Occham’s Razor. It is expensive due to the possibility
that language may not be rich enough to make the distinction explicit. We
might call for a simpler solution with a more modest commitment.
It is tempting to see a building as made up by a number of individual parts and
understanding structure as appearing from something like mereological sum.
The problem of identity, however, arises if we identify the same object with a
component in a mereological sum as with the sum itself. Our conception of
a wall may be nearly the same even though that wall has undergone changes
like priming and painting. We may still refer to it as “the wall ” in which case
we would have something like [[ a ]] = [[ a+b ]]. But this is absurd if a and b
are taken to be proper parts. My suggestion is that the wall as a bare object
and the wall predicated with how many times it has been primed or painted,
are simply different object abstractions. What remains — even though the
object undergoes small changes — is our apprehension of it at a certain level
of abstraction. This apprehension couples to it a general concept under which
the object falls and a context to which it belongs. This context is a part–whole
relation.
Finally, consider the issue of identity. The ambiguity of identity which arises for
Theseus Ship is not an issue for object aspects. The reason is that we do not
have the situation in which an object aspect is replaced with another and then
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being part of another whole. That would undermine the idea of object aspects
as being abstract. Certainly similar object aspects may be referred to in the
description of distinct objects; even in descriptions of a certain object in different
stages of development. However, we can never have the identity ambiguity as
for Theseus Ship. The reason is that object aspects are not something an object
gains or looses physically — only conceptually.
However, we may need to explain the fact that a part of a potential object can be
considered to be part of several different wholes; depending on what perspective
we apply.
Consider the relation in which hinges stand to a door. We might say that the
hinges are part of the door frame in which the door is mounted. We can take off
the door; then the hinges, the door frame, and the wall in which it is inserted,
can be considered a whole. However, the door can also be considered a product
in which case it may come with the hinges in a package. Thus, the hinges might
as well be considered parts of the door. We say that the hinges overlap the wall
as well as the door.
The case shows that we can have many different views on an object. Each view
may consider it to stand in a part–whole relation to a certain whole. However,
the descriptions which express such part–whole information should not be con-
sidered to be in conflict. As I see it, there is nothing conflicting in both seeing
the hinges as part of the door frame and of the door. To me, part–whole re-
lations are simply constituting to the identification of objects. Each of them
is a view on the object, and a number of such views contribute knowledge for
reasoning and identification. Thereby, an object aspect — with its relation to
a certain whole — can be seen as a mode of presentation. That is, an object
aspect is what is grasped when understanding a description concerning part–
whole knowledge. Object aspects can thus be seen as mereological counterparts
to fregean senses — what is expressed when referring to an object aspect are
conditions for something mereological to hold for an object in a potential world.
8.6 Appendix: Other mereological issues
Besides the problem of arbitrary sums and the problem of flux, extensional
mereology has faced other less serious charges. Two of these are the claim of
non–transitivity and the claim of sum ambiguity. In the next sections, I shall
give my perspectives on these issues. The section is, however, not really part of
the defence of object aspects, but a general defence of mereology against these
charges.
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8.6.1 Non–transitivity
The question of whether part–whole relations are always transitive, I believe,
is rooted in the question of how we understand functionality of objects. The
understanding of a part as something being spatio–temporally included in some-
thing else, rules out odd cases of non–transitivity. In this respect, if a lock is
not part of the house containing the door in which the lock is placed, something
is wrong.
Objects are often seen as playing a certain rôle. The misunderstanding, I think
(following Simons [155]), appears when confusing such rôles with the spatio–
temporal distinction between parts and wholes. A rôle defines some restricted
area of functionality. A connection between part–whole levels serves as some
sort of path for what I would call potential actions. The connections are like lines
of causal commands. A handle and a lock as a whole offers the functionality of
maintaining the door closed even though it is exposed to wind pressure. Opening
and closing the door are actions, but they are potential as they do not have to be
performed. Pressing down the door handle which triggers the lock mechanism
is a potential action all the same. If the handle is pressed down, the door
can be opened without using destructive force. Thus, performing a potential
action makes a set of other actions ready to be performed. This line of actions is
different from the relation between the door and the house. That is, the rôle the
door plays — the functionality it offers — is different and the effect of performing
it is different as well. The door facilitates letting persons get in and out while
still having the possibility to protect against cold winds and temperature drop.
However, these lines of functionality between parts and wholes are not the part–
whole relations themselves but causal connections between action and reaction.
8.6.2 Ambiguity of mereological sum
The problem of ambiguity of mereological sum arises when considering the same
parts to constitute distinct wholes. Two versions may here exist. One in which
we simply have an overlap like two sets having a non–empty intersection set,
and one in which we have genuine incidence. It is the latter with which I
am concerned. What is criticized is the extensional principle that wholes are
equivalent if they have the same parts. An example given in [155] is that Family
Robinson and Basketball Team Robinson are wholes which consist of exactly the
same objects, namely the family members. However, the wholes are conceptually
different; they play distinct rôles or have distinct functions. They may not just
be two names for the same.
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In the following, I shall assume that the collection of parts remains the same.
The opposed case is treated under the problem of flux.
It seems reasonable that a collection of objects can be given a name by definition.
Still, the name “Basketball Team Robinson” does not capture all truth of the
fact that the family members make up a team with that name. We may have
two categories of such a whole. The first is the whole which exist purely by
virtue of having certain parts, and that the parts existing are sufficient for the
whole to exist. The second is the whole for which we, in addition, require that
the parts relate in a certain way.
The distinction between wholes in the two categories seems to be that wholes
in the second also may contain possibilia; i.e. abstract objects. This seems
strange as the second in some cases is defined by a stronger criterion of truth.
However, consider the following. The Basketball Team Robinson is a certain
constellation of the objects, which we name. But so is Family Robinson. The
only difference is that we assumed the latter collection’s actuality. Assume that
Family Robinson exists and that we can point to the members. The Basketball
Team Robinson then only exists as a possibilium. It can be formed for certain
occasions but it does not have to.
Naming the collection of family members “Basketball Team Robinson” seems
not to add further meaning of the collection besides a compositional meaning of
words in the name. The same goes fore Family Robinson. In a sense, descriptions
of object aspects are names for certain arbitrary spatial extensions. It is only
the name which lays down the criteria for recognition.
Let us try to explore this further. Basketball Team Robinson is distinguished
from Family Robinson by contextual activities: The members play basketball,
e.g. at a tournament and are therefore referred to this way. But so is the
Family Robinson because every member of Basketball Team Robinson is also a
member of Family Robinson, and vice versa. The former seems to be a kind
of subset — but not a subset of members. Perhaps a subset of properties or
skills. However, each member of the family does not gain nor loose properties
by being a member of Basketball Team Robinson, although training as such
a team may increase the member’s ability to coordinate their movement and
team play. However, this would be equivalent to the increase of such ability
for the members of Family Robinson. Rather, I think certain properties are
emphasized when we grasp the meaning of “Basketball Team Robinson”. That
is, Basketball Team Robinson may work as a kind of filter through which we
see Family Robinson and the family members. This filter may exclude certain
properties and relations and thereby emphasize others: The member’s ability to
play basketball, their individual skills in this matter, their team work, etc.
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Such a filter thus determines under what conditions something is included in
something else. Mereologically, under what conditions an object is part of a
whole. But this is not enough. What space extension of an object makes
a part? Is there something more besides spatial inclusion and this filter of
properties which justifies a part–whole relation? For the above case there is
not, but what about others?
A justification of this kind is certainly not trivial as argued by Artale et al in [7].
Artale takes some kinds of parts to be quite similar to object aspects, and some
of them are mereologically problematic. E.g. “the top surface of the car” and
“the right side of the table” are descriptions denoting parts. The descriptions
(as the ones denoting my object aspects) strongly need context in order to make
sense. But notice that there is reference to some whole of which we consider a
part.
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Chapter 9
Properties and design
Abstract: Design is a notion in which language, metaphysics, and cog-
nition merge. In order to establish a theory of design, three philosophical
questions need answering. These questions concern what it means to de-
scribe, how we can refer to non–present objects, and on what basis we
can predict the behaviour of the objects we describe. The questions are
rooted deep in the philosophical issues of properties which are consid-
ered essential in any design process, and design representation. The three
questions are treated by discussing a number of philosophical writings
on concepts, language and meaning, the problem of sense without refer-
ence, and the notions of shared entities in context of communication and
prediction. An ontological basis for relating designs and requirements is
sketched, based on Shoemaker’s ontology and epistemological approach to
properties. Furthermore, the process of designing is related to the pro-
cess of predicting and reasoning over objects existing in possible worlds
which are causally reachable from the present world in which they are de-
scribed. Discussions lead to a thesis which aims at breaking the classical
word–world dichotomy. The thesis suggests that between descriptions in
language, a denotational relation may hold and that objects (which are
usually considered the denotations of descriptions), themselves may have
denotations; namely the causal dispositions they possess.
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9.1 Introduction
The theme with which I shall be concerned in this paper contains a number
of the philosophical problems which underlie research and practice of design. I
shall take the notion of design to be the intellectual and practical elaboration
of representations of artefacts like houses and bridges.
The name “The Eiffel Tower ” is usually taken to denote the Parisian tower
constructed for the World Exhibition in 1889. The name is a representation of
that tower, but the name alone may hardly have been sufficient for constructing
the tower in the first place. Neither may it be sufficient for verifying its design
according to requirements. Instead, a set of properties may have been stated,
like “a height of 115m” and “made of steel ”. Properties like a–height–of–115m
and concepts like tower are crucial in any requirements and design processes of
artefacts like buildings.
An ontological treatment of a domain — like that of civil engineering and design
— must address at least two questions: What entities are there, and which are
the fundamental, atomic ones? Answering these questions defines a collection
of categories of being — also known as an ontology. An ontology is the range
for variables in a formalized mathematical discourse, and it is the collection of
objects referred to by words and phrases in language [151] (s.46).
Ontological work is of interest when it comes to requirements and design in
civil engineering. The reason is that we are here dealing with descriptions and
communication of ideas, based on conceptions. Communicating knowledge of
artefacts like the concept of a 12"–concrete–wall depends either on a common
understanding of the concept or of the properties characterising it. Therefore,
a thorough study of the domain of civil engineering and design should be sup-
ported by a study of the fundamental ontological entities which make descrip-
tions of artefacts meaningful and useful.
9.1.1 Design related problems
The process of designing can be seen as a problem solving process in which a
number of properties are ascribed to a potential object in order for that object
to offer certain functionalities (see Chapter 5). Thus, the design process involves
descriptions, communication, reflection, and reasoning over knowledge of objects
which may not have physical presence. In all of these processes, the notion of
properties seems to be elementary.
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A study of the philosophical foundation for design must at least address the
following questions: (i) What does it mean to describe something?, (ii) how
can we describe something which is not present?, and (iii) on what basis can
we predict behaviour and functionality of described objects? I shall consider
these three questions as design related problems. They are problems rooted in
philosophy of language and in metaphysics.
The first problem, I shall call the problem of describing. Treating this problem
requires clarifications on three issues: The issue of concept and property, the
issue of how meaning arises, and the distinction between abstract and concrete
entities.
The second problem, I shall call the problem of the absent artefact ; thereby
following Galle’s terminology [80]. The discussion is centered on how to refer to
objects which are not present.
The third and last problem, I shall call the problem of prediction. It comprises
several issues including that of objectivity, communication, resemblance, and
the epistemology of properties.
9.1.2 Objects and properties
Properties are often considered essential ontological entities in characterisation,
description, and distinction of objects in formal sciences as well as in daily life.
The distinction between objects and their properties is a well known philosoph-
ical subject with roots in metaphysics and in philosophy of language.
In informal systems like natural language, properties play the rôle of representing
and characterising things, ideas, and phenomena. This is done through what
Church calls naming [46]. That is, properties are entities which are referred to by
nouns or phrases in language which have certain meaning in characterizing the
thing, idea, or phenomena in mind. Such characteristics are descriptions but not
the characterized themselves. Therefore, the characterisation may cover not just
one object but classes of objects as the descriptions necessarily are abstractions.
A formal representation of an artefact must get its meaning from somewhere. In
a model–theoretical framework, we might assign meaning to artefact represen-
tations by paraphrasing these in terms of properties. In fact, I should here say
’representations of properties’, as properties may be considered to be abstract.
That is, properties may not be linguistic constructs, so we need to represent
them nominally; e.g. as pairs of names (attributes) and value signs. Such signs
may denote atomic entities which need to be taken as primitives and thus as
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commonly understood concepts, and objects. These could be natural kinds like
water and wood. The problem though is that formal systems cannot have any
a priori knowledge of such notions; they need a nominal definition like repre-
sentations of the extension of the concept or representations of characterising
properties which then need to be assumed, or similar. The problem may start
a regress here, and the question is thus to what extent we need to paraphrase.
In formal systems like software and hardware systems, representations of pro-
perties are essential for capturing the interaction between the tools, and the
surrounding world being sensed, represented and simulated. The reason is that
they are the only means for representing and processing real world knowledge.
That is, we can only store and manage descriptions or models of world aspects.
We cannot store and manage the world or world parts as physical objects in the
causal realm.
9.1.3 Objectives
The present paper concerns ontological perspectives and commitments to pro-
perties, and their application as foundation for formal descriptions of artefacts
as in requirements and design of buildings in civil engineering. By formal I here
understand non–ambiguous with respect to semantics.
Most philosophical writings have the form of perspective—defence. However,
for this paper I have chosen a different order as I see the various philosophical
doctrines as each contributing to the discussion and understanding of properties
in design. For each design related problem, I present and discuss a number of
important philosophical doctrines and critiques which contribute to an under-
standing and clarification of that problem. However, the selection of doctrines is
far from thorough and I have tried not to let this paper be just another general
treatment of property theories; although it is difficult to avoid. But this also
means that I had to be quite selective concerning the doctrines presented, and
also that I cannot go into all details or include all critiques, replies to critiques,
etc.
My own perspective is built up throughout the paper and approaching the three
problems can be seen as three steps towards it. The discussions throughout the
paper stepwise lead to my position that denoting phrases in language and the
objects they denote may not be two separate categories. Objects may also
be taken to denote something, so in the area of design of artefacts, the often
assumed word–world distinction seems unsatisfactory.
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9.2 The problem of describing
The problem of describing concerns how meaning arises from sentences, expres-
sions, and descriptions which we take to denote design objects or their proper-
ties. Central to the problem is the notion of concept as in any area based on
abstraction. I believe it is reasonable to require that there is something gen-
eral to say about collections of objects, and that generality must be rooted in
something.
The discussion of concepts (and thus also of properties) divides the problem
of describing in two. The first is that of the connection between concepts and
the linguistic structures of language, and how meaning arise as a connection.
The second concerns whether concepts referred to in language can be abstract
or need to be concrete. I shall call it Benaceraff’s Dilemma after the similar
problem of reaching the abstract entities of mathematics [151]. I shall exercise
a similar problem for objects of design when treating the problem of the absent
artefact.
9.2.1 Concept and meaning
I shall start with Frege’s definition of concept, his distinction between concepts
and objects, and his compositional approach to define meaning. Frege’s perspec-
tive is subject to several critiques of which I shall present Kerry’s, Ramsey’s and
Davidson’s; followed by my own.
9.2.1.1 Frege’s notion of concept
Frege takes an important step in analytical philosophy in “Function and Con-
cept ” [71]. The notion of analytical philosophy is the priority which puts lan-
guage over thought. The only path to a philosophical account is thus through
analysis of expressing such an account in linguistic constructs [58] (p.17).
According to Dummett, the paper marks a breakthrough by identifying truth–
values as objects and by indicating a distinction between sense and reference —
a distinction which was thoroughly examined in the succeeding work “On Sense
and Reference” [58].
In “Function and Concept ”, Frege shows how logical analysis — like in math-
ematics — can be applied to natural language. He does so by first making
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a distinction between functions and numbers. A function like x2 = 4 is an
equation which is satisfied by the numbers {−2, 2}. This set is considered the
extension of the function. Usually, we would say that a distinction between
functions and values lies in that functions contain placeholder names like x.
However, to Frege this is an unsatisfactory definition as it confuses form with
content — name with denotation. It may lead to the misunderstanding that
22 = 4 is a function of 2 or of 4.
Replacing x with a value, establishes an instantiation relation between x and the
value of which the sign replacing x denotes. However, as a general principle of
syntactical substitution, this seems to start an infinite regress [51]. The reason
is that only a name — not a value — can take the place of x. Frege tried to avoid
the regress by saying that what surrounds x is a predicate and that predicates, as
functions, are unsaturated (i.e. incomplete). They are so in the sense that they
need instantiation of arguments in order to denote a single value. For functions,
such a single value is a truth–value stating whether the argument satisfies the
equation of the function. Contrary, numbers are self–contained objects and do
not need such instantiation. The notion of unsaturation, Frege takes to apply
both to functions and function–signs.
From mathematics, Frege moves to natural language in order to apply a similar
logical analysis. The sentence “London is the capital of England ” is a fact.
However, it can be turned into a function by substituting “London” — denoting
an object — with a logical name x. We have: “x is the capital of England ”.
To Frege, such a sentence denotes a concept; namely the concept of being the
capital of England. A concept is thus a special kind of function: One which
yields a truth value.
Meaning in language now arises in a compositional way. Nouns like “London”,
“8 ” and “Waverly” denote objects, and verbs and adjectives denote or contribute
to denoting concepts1. I shall call this Frege’s “rule of distinction”. Analysing the
expression “Scott is the author of Waverly” recognises “Scott ” and “Waverly” as
words denoting objects, whereas “author ” has a predicative nature and thus de-
notes a concept. Objects are said to fall under concepts. Thereby, we mean that
applying the concept as a function to the objects yields the value true, meaning
that they satisfy their truth functions; false otherwise. In the above case, Wa-
verly, which is an object denoted by the name “Waverly”, is part of a more precise
concept; that of being the author of Waverly. Under this concept the denotation
of “Scott ” falls. If we represent that concept by the predicate author-of-waverly,
we have the predicate logical expression author-of-waverly(Scott) which is true
1In general, Frege’s notion of concept can be taken also to mean property as noted by Mellor
and Oliver [55]. However, Frege also introduces the notion of Characteristics (“Merkmale”) in
“On Concept and Object”, which are notions having predicative nature on certain concepts.
A distinction may therefore be suggested. However, I shall not do so in this work.
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if “Scott ” really is the author of Waverly. Thus, the meaning of a phrase in
natural language is a function of the meanings of its components.
Frege’s work revolutionised the Aristotelean logic by introducing logical implica-
tion and quantification. Thereby, we are able to analyse general phrases like “all
mammals are vertebrates”. Such logical analysis and the calculi for expressing
it is essential to description sciences which aim at characterising and reasoning
over characteristics of objects. Computer science and design of artefacts are
such sciences which are similar in this sense.
In design, logical descriptions and analysis, based on the notions of predication
and concept, are crucial. They are so in the sense that design can be seen
as a process in which ideas are sketched and communicated as representations
of objects not yet physically existing. Self–communication involving reflection
is here a special case. Furthermore, the notion of predication is important
in any formal representation of design ideas and design reasoning. Following
the Fregean notion of concepts, we may say that certain concepts are design
concepts . A design concept could be something of which the extension contains
the possible realisations of a design idea (simply understood as some mental
image, abstract entity, or similar — in this case it does not matter which doctrine
to apply).
However, Frege’s sharp distinction between concepts and objects, and his com-
positional approach to semantics, are not without problems.
Besides what led to Russell’s paradox and besides the problem of co–extensionality
— which I shall not examine here — Frege’s approach faces two other charges.
The first — stated independently and differently by Kerry and Ramsey — is the
objection that a sharp distinction between concepts and objects can be based on
linguistics. The second — stated by Davidson — questions the informativeness
of names in Frege’s compositional approach to semantics.
9.2.1.2 Kerry’s objection
Kerry is concerned with Frege’s sharp distinction between concept words, and
words denoting objects. The reason is that in language we often treat concept
words as subjects in predication. An example is “the concept horse”. The word
“horse” denotes a concept under which all objects that are horses, fall. However,
in the present case it is the subject, and thus it fails to fit Frege’s distinction
rule.
The problem is of ambiguity which seems to arise from the fact that a concept
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cannot appear in linguistic form. The concept needs to be expressed in some
syntactical form using predicates. According to Frege this is a limitation in
language. In other words, concepts cannot be presented alone because of the
predicative nature of names denoting them.
In “On Concept and Object ”, Frege defends his view although he admits a cer-
tain vagueness in his original presentation of the distinction [74]. His reply to
Kerry is as follows. Let Φ denote a concept under which an object x falls.
Furthermore, let us assume that x has (at least) the properties A, B and C.
These three properties we could collectively denote by Φ. The three properties
are characteristics (“Merkmale”) of the concept denoted by Φ. Thus, we have
introduced two levels of predication where A, B and C are first–level concepts
and Φ is a second–level concept [47]. However, also A, B and C may be charac-
terised and thus subject to predication. Continuing in similar fashion may start
an infinite regress — a regress Frege tried to stop by making the distinction
between saturated and unsaturated entities [51].
9.2.1.3 Ramsey’s trinity
In “Universals”, Ramsey argues that a distinction between concepts and objects
faces a more serious charge namely that such a distinction cannot be based on
linguistic terms.
Ramsey’s argument goes as follows. Consider a proposition aRb, where a denotes
an object like Socrates and b denotes a universal like wisdom. R denotes the
relation of a to b like in “Socrates is wise”.
The proposition states a trinity: (i) that R holds between the terms a and b,
(ii) that a has the property of standing in the relation R to b, and (iii) that b
has the property that a has R to it. We might use the abbreviation φx ≡ xRb
making φ a predicate symbol meaning that the argument x has the property
denoted by b.
The problem is now that if φ is a name for the property of x having relation R
to b, then φx will be the assertion that x has this property. That is, it will be
a predicate–subject proposition with subject x and predicate φ. This, however,
is not identical to the relational proposition aRb; only one of the three ways of
understanding the relation, namely (ii). We might as well treat b as the subject
and a as the name having predicative nature. In (iii) b seems to be the subject
— in (i) the relation is purely syntactical.
A predicate symbol φ can only stand alone when it corresponds to a real uni-
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versal and not an abbreviation like 〈has R to b〉. This should be 〈φx〉 in order
to distinguish it from the two–argument 〈has R to b〉; i.e. R(x, y).
Thus, from a linguistic view point we cannot really make the sharp distinction
between concepts and objects which Frege claims to be essential.
9.2.1.4 Davidson on informativeness
Frege’s compositional approach to semantics is undermined by Davidson in
“Truth and meaning” [51]. Davidson argues that a theory of meaning should
take the form of a theory of truth. From Tarski, we know that if we have a
sentence S which is placed in a context P, we can apply the filling: S is true
iff P2. An example is “an animal is a platypus if and only if it lays eggs and is
a mammal ”.
2In the paper “The semantic conception of truth”, Tarski defines an infinite hierarchy of
meta–languages where each language talks about another language on a lower level [160]. The
claim is that the hierarchy is indeed infinite in height and we thus cannot reach a language
for defining the meaning of everything.
Tarski’s aim is to solve logical paradoxes in language. However, I shall not focus on that
part of Tarski’s contribution. Rather, I shall focus on the contribution of Convention T which
shows that there cannot be an informative theory of truth.
The argument of Convention T goes as follows. Given a sentence in a language, there are
many things we can say about that sentence. We can say that it is grammatically correct or
incorrect, we can say that it consists of a certain number of words and letters, that it has no
verb in it, and so on. For each such kind of judgement we can define a predicate which holds
true in certain situations; false otherwise.
A special thing we can say about a sentence is that it is true. Actually, we might want to
abstract from the notion of truth and simply replace “is true” with a predicate T. We can now
try to define the predicate T. This is done by establishing a defining sentence of the form “〈x
is P〉 is T if and only if x is P” (a T–sentence). Examples are: “〈Snow is white〉 is T if and
only if snow is white”, and “〈Giraffes live on Mars〉 is T if and only if Giraffes live on Mars”.
The principle is called Convention T. Armed with Convention T, we can pick up any theory
of truth and test it. For example we can test whether King James Bible candidates to be such
a theory of truth. Consider for example: “Tony Blair is Prime Minister”. Since King James
Bible nowhere mentions Tony Blair, it does not apply to the sentence just given. This means
that the predicate T cannot be equivalent to “is found in the King James Bible”. King James
Bible thus fails the test of Convention T.
Tarski makes, however, an even stronger claim which is the one I am interested in here.
Convention T is a so–called correspondence theory of truth. Consider again the form “〈x is
P〉 is T if and only if x is P”. The left–hand side talks about a sentence — the right–hand side
about the world. However, this will not do as elimination of the syntactical quotation marks
to the left of “is T if and only if ”, leaves us with two identical sentences. Convention T is the
strongest test for judging whether a theory of truth holds. It is itself the closest we can get
to a theory of truth by means of the T–sentences, but it fails to be informative as we simply
have “x is P” on both sides. That is, it does not contribute with knowledge of what it means
for a sentence to be true and neither what it means for x to be p. The conclusion is therefore
that truth is indefinable.
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But why not settle with S means that P then? Davidson’s project is to ap-
proach a theory of meaning which establishes a word–world relation. Such a
relation unavoidably involves the notion of truth. However, I shall concern
myself only with Davidson’s introductory observations which concern Frege’s
compositional approach to define meaning; not Davidson’s own contribution.
Davidson’s claim is that understanding the meaning of a sentence in terms of
the meaning of its components may not always be informative. The problem
appears if we wish to define the meaning of a sentence like “Theaetetus flies”
in a compositional way. The meaning of “Theaetetus” could be represented
by the name Theaetetus denoting an object. The meaning of “flies” could be
represented by the predicate flies. We thus have something like the predicate
logical expression flies(Theaetetus) as representing the meaning of the sentence.
However, this formula does not contribute with any real semantic information as
it is simply a syntactical rearrangement of the sentence in question. If we really
want to capture the meaning of the expression we need to express or paraphrase
what it means to be Theaetetus and what it means to be flying. Here, we may
again face an infinite regress. However, I shall later argue that such paraphrases
can contribute informatively, even though they cannot escape Tarski’s result of
truth being undefinable.
9.2.1.5 What does x falls under c mean?
Frege’s understanding of concepts as truth functions is an important step in
the development of formalisms for expressing designs. However, I believe an
important point will be missed if we do not seek to elaborate further on the
understanding. In a sense it may give an unsatisfactory account for the rôle
played by concepts and properties in design of artefacts. The reason is that
what we have with a fregean view is not completely what we want. Let me
illustrate this by an example.
Consider a CD-player and a compact disc containing the first symphony of
Beethoven. When playing the compact disc, we are able to verify that it is
indeed this symphony which is on the disc. Playing the disc and hearing the
music is (besides the subjective aspects) like a truth function. We can answer
yes or no to the question: “Does this compact disc contain the first symphony
of Beethoven?” The same goes for a Fregean understanding of concepts and
properties. These are truth functions which answer questions like “is this a
table” or “is this chair made of wood ”. The test of whether x falls under the
concept c follows sequentially after interpretation of descriptions denoting x and
c respectively.
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However, in design, we need a means for going the opposite way. The goal
is not the truth value of a sentence but to build that sentence. Following the
example above, we need a means for producing the compact disc such that it
does contain the first symphony of Beethoven.
Frege took his truth functions to be a kind of primitives in the sense that
there was alot hidden in the functional arrow of the signatures representing the
concept functions. We do not, with fregean concepts as functions, have explicit
function definitions which state how to judge whether an object falls under a
certain concept. If I write a computer program for sorting a list of natural
numbers, the code expresses exactly how this is done. If we are going to express
how to decide whether an object x falls under a concept c, additional ontological
entities may be required. An account due to Shoemaker seems to provide an
theory which is closer to what we want, and I shall therefore treat a part of
Shoemaker’s ontology in Section 9.4.3.
9.2.2 Benacerraf’s dilemma
Just as numbers are abstract, so may properties and concepts be considered
to be abstract entities. The problem is, however, to explain how we can have
knowledge of such abstract entities which are outside time, space and causal
nexus. The problem is known in philosophy of mathematics as Benacerraf’s
dilemma [151]. The dilemma is that of maintaining a realism to mathematical
entities being abstract, and at the same time justify that mathematicians can
have knowledge of what they talk about.
To me, Benacerraf’s dilemma is just as important for objects in design as it
is for objects in mathematics. The reason is that objects in design may not
have physical presence, and thus we may need to accept reasoning over abstract
objects as in mathematics. However, I believe that design is somehow linked to
reality and thus we cannot accept a theory which reduces it to a nominalistic
realm.
I shall start with Russell’s commitment to universals — roughly his concepts —
and his argumentation against nominalism. Then follows Quine’s principle of
paraphrasing as an escape from a commitment to abstract entities like Russell’s
universals. I shall include some of Quine’s holism as well. Finally, I shall
consider trope theory which I shall reject as an informative theory of properties
in context of design. To me, there appears not to be any of the theories which
really solves Benacerraf’s dilemma — but each of the presented perspectives
contributes various clarifications.
266 Properties and design
9.2.2.1 Russell on abstractness
Russell elaborates on Frege’s notion of concepts and calls these universals . He
does so both in “The world of universals” and in “On our knowledge of uni-
versals” [143, 142]. The notion of universals arises from the idea that many
individual objects may fall into the same category of being. E.g. all yellow
objects fall into a category of yellow and all objects tasting sour fall into a cate-
gory of sour. The question of whether an object falls into a certain category is,
Russell says, independent of human thinking or convention.
Russell thus attacks the nominalist rejection of concept and properties as being
abstract entities. We may need to perceive an object in order to categorise
it properly, and different people may have different conceptions or criteria for
doing so. However, it is evident to Russell that the categories and the rela-
tion between objects and categories are universal. This means that an object
possesses a property independently of any knowledge of the object or of the
property. Similar remarks apply to relations like being south of Chicago. The
notion of universals comprises concepts, properties and relations.
To Russell, a universal is abstract in the sense that it is outside the scopes of
time, space and causal connections. E.g. the universal of human exists indepen-
dently of our conceptions, knowledge of it, and of the objects falling under it.
Also, it exists even though there might not be or might not have been humans.
Frege assumed his concepts to be abstract as well, so both Frege and Russell are
realists in this sense. However, Frege did not put much focus on the distinction
between abstract and concrete when defining the notion of concepts. But Russell
did, as the one–to–many relation between universal and objects was essential
for his argument against nominalism. If we wish to predicate an object as being
yellow, that property is something which is not associated solely with one but
with many objects at the same time.
Escaping from a commitment to a property denoted by a predicate like white
requires instead a commitment to a patch for judging whether objects are white
and for defining resemblance. Such a patch is a “particular ” which we consider
a kind of archetype; a typical example of something being white. But such
a patch is itself universal then — so the attack on nominalism seems to stay
strong in this sense. At this point it thus seems that the platonic principle of
one–over–many remains.
Still, Russell does not explain how it can be that as sensing individuals we have
the ability to reach abstract entities like universals. Thus, it seems like we are
still trapped in Benacerraf’s dilemma.
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9.2.2.2 Quine’s principle of paraphrasing
Quine denies the existence of concepts and properties as abstract entities in
“On What There Is” [133]. He does not reject the notions of concepts and
properties though, but believes that as abstract entities these harbour a prob-
lematic and unnecessary ontological commitment. An ontological commitment
is the required existence of ontological entities necessary for a certain ontolog-
ical perspective or representation to be consistent. Using the word “Pegasus”
may commit us to a fact that Pegasus — the winged horse from the legend —
exists. There are here two known solutions: (i) Pegasus just exists as a mental
idea, or (ii) Pegasus exists as a possibilium (a platonic idea or an object in a
possible world). Neither of these solutions are satisfactory to Quine. Using the
word “Pegasus” does not have to be accompanied with a commitment to the ex-
istence of the creature. The reason — Quine says — is that we can avoid such
a commitment by paraphrasing the name into a description. For “Pegasus” it
could be “whatever pegasizes”. Even though the example may seem silly, Quine
has a point here.
What we often do in order to add meaning to words denoting concepts or pro-
perties, is to paraphrase what these concepts or properties are about. In many
situations, we may succeed in replacing a name with a number of descriptions
characterising the reference of the name. Thereby, even though not capturing
all truth about an object, we capture several aspects which together may con-
tribute to further knowledge and understanding. Thus, predicating an object
as red does not necessarily commit us to the existence of redness — only to the
object in question possessing that property.
Still, I believe that many objections have been and can be directed towards
Quine’s perspective. One of them is due to Jackson who believes that Quine’s
paraphrasing principle can lead to an infinite regress [105]. The words and
expressions in a paraphrase may themselves refer to something which calls for
further paraphrasing.
Jackson thinks that notions like concepts and properties should not be under-
stood with language as the only source. E.g. the blue colour of the sky was
present way before any descriptions or names in language existed. Also, nom-
inalism faces some problems when it comes to resemblance. The sentence “red
resembles pink more than blue” may commit us to the existence of these three
colours. Paraphrasing it into “anything red resembles anything pink more than
anything blue” yields trouble as a red ball is then taken to resemble a pink ele-
phant more than a blue ball. Such inconsistencies may be possible to overcome
if various incomparable properties are taken into account; here both colour and
shape. We may then — again following Jackson — say “colour–resembles” in-
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stead. However, for anything more than toy examples I believe it to be no easy
task. Paraphrasing is thus a complicated but unavoidable task in descriptions
of artefacts.
However, Quine’s perspective cannot entirely be considered nominalistic even
though he tries to escape a commitment to abstract notions like concepts by
nominal paraphrasing. As an example, he allow sets which are abstract too. In
“Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, he argues for a more sophisticated perspective
which lies between realism and anti–realism. His ontology, which he admits
is not a deep one, puts existensional quantification in the middle. A term is
said to denote something if and only if it can be replaced by a variable in
existential generalisation. An object exists if and only if it is in the range of
some variable. In fact, we may then say that everything can exist in which case
Quine’s perspective is like Platonism or possible worlds. However, he insists on
a certain level of ontological economy, like reducing (if possible) everything to be
sets. Thereby, he believes that phrases of a whole language can be paraphrased
to refer only to sets [151].
In some sense, Quine’s focus on existential quantification makes his perspective
similar to my perspective of object aspects ; see Chapter 8. However, whether a
variable could be assigned was to me not the criterion for the existence of refer-
ence; rather it was the existence of causal connections leading to the existence
of the reference.
9.2.2.3 Tropes
The introduction of trope theory can be seen as an objection to properties as
abstract entities and seemingly as a solution to Benacerraf’s dilemma for proper-
ties. If properties are objects for sensing, characterisation and comparison, then
how can they be abstract and thus outside causal nexus as Frege and Russell
claim? A Fregean—Russellian perspective is thus unsatisfactory for epistemo-
logical reasons. On the other hand, a nominalistic perspective seems to be too
restrictive, and both doctrines may be accused for linking language with a mi-
rage of reality. Trope theory attempts to solve the problem of reachability by
suggesting that physical objects posses, not properties, but instances of proper-
ties. E.g. the yellowness of this flower and the sweetness of this candy. Such
instances are called tropes by Williams, Campbell, Daly, et al [171, 41, 49].
What is sensed of an object is its tropes which are intimately connected to the
object. Thus, tropes are what is measured in comparison, distinguishing, and
judging similarities of objects. The tropes of an object is only connected to that
object and remain even though similar tropes of other objects are lost. A trope
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can belong to many different sets of tropes where a set of tropes corresponds to
a property or concept.
There are basically two theories of tropes: the substratum theory and the bundle
theory. The substratum theory says that objects consist of a so–called substra-
tum to which tropes are attached. The substratum is a bare particulum which
does not have any properties but exists on its own. The bundle theory rejects
the existence of substrata and says that objects simply are collections (bundles)
of tropes [49]. Both Williams and Campbell favour the former theory, while
Daly prefers the second.
Williams suggests a the theory of tropes in “On the Element of Being” as he
recognizes that the relation between parts and wholes as in mereology has sim-
ilarities with the relation between characteristics and the objects they are char-
acteristics of [171]. In his argumentation, he names the parts of a number of
lollypop sticks; among these their flavours. Thereby, he applies a Simonsean
part–whole perspective [155]. This perspective says that having the colour yel-
low is similar to have be composed of objects of which one is the yellowness,
similar to a window being composed by pane and frame. Such yellowness can
thus not be something shared in fitting a one–over–many principle. Just as the
lollypops have distinct names — one unique name for each lollypop — so are
their flavours unique instances of properties. If one lollypop is destroyed, the
others still have their flavours. If a one–over–many principle is applied, it should
apply as a relation between properties and tropes — not between properties and
objects.
Tropes have two sorts of connection points: location and similarity. Any trope
can belong to as many sets as there are combinations. Williams abandons the
traditional set–inclusion understanding of concepts. He accepts the existence
of properties and concepts, but these are not sets or classes of objects in pos-
sible worlds or platonic heavens. Nor are they truth–functions stating object
containment. They are sets of tropes and the semantics of an object is simply
its set of tropes; i.e. its roughness, whiteness, roundness, etc. The elements in
the set are the objects for judgements of e.g. resemblance. In other words: In
stead of putting Socrates into the class of humanity, we put the human trope in
Socrates.
9.2.2.4 Trope theory and descriptions
Trope theory raises an important question about the reachability of properties.
Thereby, the theory justifies itself on the empirical front, but I believe there
are problems rooted in the theory when it comes to certain kinds of descrip-
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tions. The question is whether trope theory really offers more than Frege’s and
Russell’s theories of concepts and universals as abstract entities or Quine’s per-
spective centred on variable assignment. My argumentation that it does not,
goes as follows.
Let us assume the existence of something like tropes being somehow instantiated
properties that we can sense. If we want to describe that a certain wall is
grey, we could — following Williams — associate a name with it’s greyness
trope. However, because of the abstraction ingredient in any description like
in requirements and design of artefacts, the name applied as predicate in such
descriptions may range over many objects and not just one. E.g. the description
“my front door is brown” applies to my current front door and the front door I
need to get if the current one is destroyed.
Each object referred to in a design or requirements descriptions is a potential
object . It is so in the sense that it can be taken to exist in a possible world
which is causally reachable from the actual one (see Chapter 8). Such potential
objects are taken to satisfy the described criteria, and the justification that they
do so, I believe is rooted in causation rather than in empiricism. It is essential
to formal and informal descriptions that what they represent is knowledge of
objects to be and that such objects can be produced in many copies based on the
same description. In other words: the description is an abstraction aiming at
approximating a design idea nominally. However, then our name for the greyness
trope simply is a predicate as it may apply to many distinct objects and not
intimately be associated with a single object. If thereby, our identification of
tropes by use of names is simply a way of predicating objects, we might as well
commit ourselves to nominalism or realism with respect to properties.
I believe that what appears from the discussion is that when it comes to descrip-
tions of potential objects like in requirements and design of artefacts like houses
and bridges, trope theory just adds an extra ontological level, which does not
do anything for us. Furthermore, I doubt whether all properties — represented
by predicates — fit into a trope theoretical framework. As an example, take a
red wall of 7 inches which is made of wood. Surely, we can talk of the redness
of that wall. However, I believe it to be artificial to talk of the wood–ness of the
wall. Talking of the 7-inches–ness of a wall is necessarily an abstraction as we
can never have exactly a width of 7–inches. Thus is cannot be a trope.
An ontological realm, like a doctrine of properties, should be judged on its
applicability in the current sciences as well as on its ability to explain essential
epistemological phenomena. Therefore, I agree with Daly that trope theory faces
similar charges as Frege’s theory of concepts and Russell’s theory of universals
[49].
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9.3 The problem of the absent artefact
The problem of the absent artefact — as presented by Galle in “Design as
intentional action: a conceptual analysis”— arises when trying to assign to
a design description some sort of object which is to act as the reference of the
description [80]. However, it is essential in the area of design that such references
do not have actual presence and thus the question is whether design descriptions
are meaningful.
In approaching the problem, my point of departure is Frege’s important distinc-
tion between sense and reference. Frege, though, seems to abandon the idea
that references to non–actual objects are meaningful. This leads to Russell’s
claim that they are, if we understand the descriptions differently. Lewis, tak-
ing a drastic position, also believes that references to non–actual objects are
meaningful — we just need to quantify over possible worlds instead. Finally, I
shall elaborate on the doctrine of possible worlds by making a distinction be-
tween potential and non–potential objects, as well as considering the notion of
having meaning or making sense, to be a matter of whether the reference can
be causally reached.
9.3.1 Frege’s puzzle
In “On sense and reference”, Frege takes the philosophy of language to a new
level [72]. He does so by claiming a distinction between the sense and the
reference of an expression. The sense of an expression is what is grasped when
trying to understand the expression.
Frege is interested in how knowledge can arise from the relation of equality or
identity. The relation in an equation like a = b can easily be understood as a
relation between the two symbols a and b, but that does not necessarily offer
any valuable information. If a = b states the fact that whatever a denotes is the
same as whatever b denotes we may use the symbols interchangeably. That is, we
could write a = a and b = b. However, such expressions are logically tautologies
and do not express valuable information, whereas a = b is informative. The
problem is also known as “Frege’s Puzzle”.
The meaning is not only defined by the relation between an expression and what
that expression refers to. We need an intermediate ingredient in meaning which
Frege calls the sense (Sinn).
An alternative way of presenting a Fregean argument for the introduction of
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sense is by use of literary figures in disguise, like Dr. Jekyll vs. Mr. Hyde,
Superman vs. Clark Kent, etc. I shall use Alexander Dumas’ figure from “The
Count of Monte Cristo, namely the young sailor Edmond Dantes who is cast
into prison, but returns as the rich and powerful Count of Monte Cristo (Monte
Cristo for short)to take revenge over those who falsely accused him. The Fregean
argument for introducing sense as a solution to the puzzle goes as follows:
1. The sentence “Monte Cristo is Monte Cristo” is trivially true.
2. The sentence “Monte Cristo is Edmond Dantes” is, however, informative
and surprising.
3. If (1) and (2) differ this way, although not on their truth value, they must
possess different cognitive significance.
4. If the meaning of a word is directly the thing referred to, the two sentences
cannot differ in cognitive significance.
The distinction between (1) and (2) comes from the fact that the enemies of
Edmond Dantes in the beginning know and believe (1) but certainly not (2).
When they are confronted with (2), it has a tremendous impact on them and
their lives3. However, it is not because these persons are irrational that they
believe (1) but not (2). It is simply because the two names “Edmond Dantes”
and “Monte Cristo” represent different modes of presentation and the connection
between them is not established.
The sense of “Monte Cristo” is the incredibly rich, mysterious person who seems
to come from all around the world and who is admired by everyone. The sense
of “Edmond Dantes” is the young sailor who is believed dead in prison.
Frege suggests that the notion of meaning is a two component entity consisting
of sense and reference. Thereby, we have a trinity of relations: (i) between signs
(phrases, words, symbols, etc.) and sense, (ii) between sense and reference, and
(iii) between sign and reference. The third may, however, be considered artificial
as we cannot reach the object being referred to but the sense of it.
Frege’s theory is now based on the notion of sense. When trying to understand a
phrase, the person grasps its sense. Sense is objective as is the thought to which
it constitutes. Thereby, sense is to be distinguished from the idea which is the
mental construct or “image” of the person and thus subjective. Thus, people
3Though it should be stated that it is in fact one of the conclusions in the book that these
persons themselves have lead their life into misery; not solely because of the disclosure of (2).
However, this is another matter.
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may share the same senses and thoughts when trying to understand phrases,
but they may have individual ideas4.
According to Dummett, the notion of sense is intimately connected to the notion
of truth [58] (p.15). When trying to understand a phrase, we grasp its sense
which means that we try to apprehend what the reference is. There can here be
many possible ways of apprehending and adding several non–conflicting senses of
the same reference constitute to build up knowledge or believe of the reference,
although it does not guarantee any full understanding.
Grasping a thought — as through grasping the sense of a phrase — is our way
of apprehending the condition for something of the reference to be true. That
is, sense is the ingredient in the component called meaning which is relevant for
making truth–judgements over phrases in language [59] (p.233).
The notion of sense — in context of designing — can be seen as truth conditions
for artefacts being described. The definite description “the Copenhagen opera
house at the harbour ” has senses which can be grasped. One could be the condi-
tions for what an opera house is. These conditions may include the existence of
certain walls interrelated so and so, acoustic features, or simply the possibility
of opera events to take place in the building.
The question is now whether we should rush to the conclusion that design de-
scriptions express Fregean senses. If we insist that such descriptions should be
meaningful, I believe that Frege would say that we should not. He takes it to be
a leak in language that we can have phrases with sense but not reference [72].
The thoughts constituted by such senses are — following Sainsbury — at best
mock thoughts which are to be distinguished from real thoughts [144].
Still, I think that there is a certain fairness in having such a distinction. It
seems fair that design descriptions do not have the same cognitive significance
in value as descriptions which can be justified empirically. Often design ideas
are unclear and vague which may be why certain iterations of describing and
reflection are necessary.
Also, we should see Frege’s denial in context of his quest when he wrote “On
Sense and Reference”. At that point, he was looking for ways to define the
perfect logical language. In a perfect logical language, all proper names must
refer to something in order to be object for justifications which are not merely
nominalistic and syntactical. Such a language was to be a candidate for being
4Note, that Frege’s notion of idea (“Vorstellung”) which he — according to Kenny — takes
to mean a person’s mental image, should be distinguished from the notion of platonic idea
[115]. In Platonism, ideas are abstract, idealised counterparts to objects in the actual causal
realm.
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part of a foundation for mathematics — a foundation Frege never managed to
establish because of Russell’s paradox [58].
9.3.2 Russell’s definite descriptions
Russell’s commitment to objects falling under universals (roughly his concepts)
is essentially distinct from Frege’s. In “Descriptions” and “On Denoting”, he
defines the notions of definite and indefinite descriptions in order to solve the
referential problem [140, 141]. A definite description usually includes “The”
as in “The author of Waverly” and thus denote objects, whereas an indefinite
description like “beam of wood” is usually taken to denote a universal (i.e. a
concept or property). In a sense, the distinction is similar to Frege’s distinction
between saturated and unsaturated, but I believe Russell’s notions are restricted
to a linguistic scope and are aimed to clarify logical analysis — not to serve as
an ontology like Frege’s.
The referential problem appears when we analyse definite descriptions. The
sentence “The planet between Mercury and the Sun” is one which to Frege has
sense but certainly not reference. Thereby, all definite descriptions in design
have sense but not reference.
Frege’s claim that such descriptions do not possess real cognitive value and may
even be meaningless, is absurd to Russell. They are perfectly meaningful —
they just have to be analysed differently.
Descriptions like “The bridge connecting Denmark and Germany across Femarn
Belt is 18 kilometres long” is a definite descriptions with sense but lack of ref-
erence. At the time these lines are written the bridge is still only a political
agenda.
A Russellian argument for why the description is still meaningful would go some-
thing like this. Splitting up the description gives the sentences (i) “There is at
least one bridge which connects Denmark and Germany across Femarn Belt ”
and (ii) “There is at most one bridge which connects Denmark and Germany
across Femarn Belt” and (iii) “Whatever bridge connecting Denmark and Ger-
many across Femarn Belt is 18 kilometres long”5. The sentences (i) and (ii) are
false but meaningful as we can assign truth values to them. The expression (iii)
is likewise meaningful and furthermore it is true if we assume a certain margin
of precision on the measurement of the minimum distance6. It seems to me that
5The measurement of 18 kilometres has been based on the estimate of 17.7km found in the
Femarn Belt pre–investigation [159].
6We might have used the phrase “ [. . .] at least 18 kilometres long as this is the minimum
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Russell’s does indeed clarify certain things concerning our analysis, but I believe
we need more.
9.3.3 Quantifying over possible worlds
In “On the Plurality of Worlds”, Lewis argues that from a metaphysical point
of view there is no such problem as sense without reference. In his possible
worlds doctrine, we can simply quantify over the sets of objects existing in
possible worlds. Thereby, there will always be a possible world which contains
the reference in question.
Lewis’ thesis goes as follows7. The world we live in is just one of many possible
ones. We can easily imagine that some state of affairs in this world could have
been different; namely if certain things in history had turned out differently.
Also, from the world we live in things happen due to causes and effects. Thereby,
at least some worlds are causally connected.
Objects exist in various possible worlds but may have different properties in
each. Thus Lewis’ fictive monkey Brownie may be able to talk in one world —
i.e. in one counterfactual world — but not in an other. A counterfactual world
is one which is contrary to another (e.g. the actual one) due to the fact that
certain events turned to a path leading to the counterfactual world, instead of
to a path leading to the actual one. The conditions which determine the ways
of turning are called counterfactual conditionals.
Following this doctrine, the world is constantly changing; in one sense into other
worlds — in another into other states of affairs. In such other worlds things are
different, have different properties, lions loose their appetite, people get older
and babies are born.
When referring to objects, we simply refer to possibilia which are objects that
exist in a possible world. For Lewis, there is not limit. If there is a world
in which “a exists” is true, there is also a counterfactual world in which it is
not. More controversial it becomes when Lewis claims the symmetry of this
counter–world relation. If there is a world in which a exists is false, there is also
a counterfactual world to that in which it is true. The various worlds containing
distance for a connection; a bridge across Femarn Belt could certainly be longer. However,
it does not ruin the logical argument as such a description would be likewise true and thus
meaningful. Thus, the Russellian argument stands.
7Lewis’ theory of possible worlds and its foundation for semantics has much similarity with
Kripke’s. It is, however, by chance I came across Lewis’ theory before Kripke’s. Hence, it is
Lewis’ account which is treated in this paper. The context in which the notion of possible
worlds is introduced in this paper, might as well consider Kripke’s account, I believe.
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the things inhabiting these worlds are thus to be understood asmodes. Modality
is a question of quantification for the following reason. When claiming the
existence of blue swans, we quantify over the possible worlds for which there is
one in which such swans exist [120] (p.5).
One of the standard critiques to possible worlds in Lewis’ setting is that we may
refer to anything then. There seems no ways of judging whether referring to a
hospital with 10.000 storeys or a floating ceiling is rational or believable. This
is a critique which is important to the problem of the absent artefact. However,
Lewis (who does not focus on language like Frege and Davidson) does not pay
much attention to this issue.
The commitment of Lewis’, I believe, has similarities with a commitment to
platonic ideas. The reference of a proper name may be taken to denote an
object existing in a possible world or it may be taken to denote a platonic idea.
A basic form of Platonism may here restrict to a platonic heaven only consisting
of certain objects; not all objects we can name in language. However, in that
case we again have the problem of sense without reference; namely if idealisation
is needed in order for a representation to be connected to a platonic idea. That
is, we still need an instantiation relation. Balaguer has a solution to this problem
of sparse platonic ideas , which suggests what he calls full–blooded Platonism.
By full–blooded Platonism, he understands Platonism such that whatever we
can cognise, there is a corresponding platonic idea.
In my opinion Balaguer’s full–blooded Platonism and Lewis’ possible worlds are
quite close to each other. They both permit reference to non–actualia by taking
a relation between representations (mental or written) and the objects denoted,
as a primitive.
However, there is a crucial difference between them which calls for favouring
the latter. Platonism does not offer any ordering of worlds nor any causal
structuring. This means that we have a problem explaining the rationality in
committing to design objects if these are platonic ideas. In possible worlds, we
could say that an artefact being designed exists and that the description of it is
meaningful simply because there is a possible world succeeding to ours in which
that artefact is present. In the following section, I shall elaborate on this idea.
9.3.4 Justification of exists based on causal nexus
What makes a design description of an artefact meaningful is not that its refer-
ence exists, but that its creation can be causally justified. This is the perspective
I shall justify in the following.
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Let us solely consider design descriptions which are meant to refer to artefacts.
By an artefact, Hilpinen understands a physical object which is the product
of human actions and which has been produced intensionally for some purpose
[100]. I shall here make a (perhaps for a moment odd) distinction between
actual artefacts and non–actual artefacts. As a subclass of the latter, I define
the notion of potential artefacts .
Artefacts can be actual in which case we do not have any problems of lacking
reference. The properties of such objects can be sensed and measured and
thus be subject to reasoning and tests. If the artefact referred to is non–actual
we could pose the existential question: Is there a series of causal connections
which leads to a possible world in which the artefact is actual? If so, the artefact
referred to is potential. My perspective follows a possible worlds doctrine which,
however, is more restrictive than Lewis’. It is so in the sense that I shall not
consider all the possible worlds Lewis does. That would include worlds in the
past and counterfactual worlds — worlds in which objects hardly relate to design
descriptions. I shall only consider worlds which are causally reachable from the
actual world. These worlds, I name potential. This, however, does not mean
that I totally reject the existence of other Lewisean worlds — just that they are
not of interest to me in context of design.
My argument for introducing causal nexus on the agenda is as follows. Potential
artefacts are the objects referred to in design descriptions. The description “my
wood–house placed at the lake”, I take to be meaningful because the creation
of a house made of wood and placed so–and–so at some lake, can be justified
causally. From experience, we know that houses can be made of wood and from
observation and reasoning over various maps, we can show what placements the
house in question can have in some future. Our knowledge and experience are,
however, only vague conceptions of what is true.
It is our knowledge of causes and effects, based on properties and change, that
guides our judgement. Still, these causes and effects I take to be universal and
thus independent of human thinking. Thus, I believe in there being objective
truth which relies on natural laws. E.g. it is a fact that in order for a beam to
resist a certain load on the middle, its dimensions must be at least so–and–so.
However, not all design descriptions have meaning. Many of the trick–paintings
of Escher depict so–called impossible building structures [102]. These paintings
have Fregean sense but they do not have meaning as there cannot be a series
of causal connections (physically, financially, etc.) which leads to the creation
of such structures. And I am not talking about the possibility of these existing
if the history or the natural laws had been different. Such speculations are
hardly of any benefit to the design practitioner, besides as psychologically based
inspiration, perhaps.
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I take design descriptions to be linguistic approximations. It is only natural then
to allow for certain assumptions in a justification of whether a design description
has proper believable reference.
Schön argues in “The Reflective Practitioner ” that in design processes, certain
restrictions like being too close to a highway or fitting bearing elements into
an apartment design, may be ignored such that the design process flows more
freely [149]. Then, more sophisticated or even radical solutions may be reached.
However, when I speak of reference, I speak of the reference of a final design. But
even so, there may be design descriptions which may be considered meaningless
because of certain restrictions in the surroundings. However, note that I am
talking about causal referents and in the worlds containing these, conditions may
indeed be different and perhaps so that they accommodate earlier assumptions.
E.g. we may assume a suitable building site, even though no such thing exists or
seems likely to come into existence. That is, I believe we are allowed to ignore
certain criteria when reasoning over the potentiality of artefacts.
9.4 The problem of prediction
Predicting the behaviour of an artefact can be seen as the act of applying a cer-
tain pattern. When we experience the flexibility of a number of beams we may
deduce what properties are needed in order for a beam to have such flexibility.
If such a pattern is not just a mental construct, there must be something which
is shared and which explains that we can communicate and agree on this pre-
diction. That is, there must be such notions as objectivity and shared entities
in order to establish scientific theories about flexible beams — or other kinds of
artefacts.
The notion of communication seems central to this discussion as the design
practitioner works in a self–communication process and perhaps in collaboration
with other practitioners. The designer is constantly reflecting over the design
and the abilities of artefacts satisfying the design. Thus, communication and
prediction are intimately related as predicting behaviour is a communication
process with the design situation. Therefore, I agree with Galle as I agree
with Schön, that communication is essential to the process of designing [149].
Prediction also enters into our discussion as the communication in design is
directed. It is directed towards ascribing exactly the properties which will make
the artefact behave in certain ways in certain situations.
However, in order for communication to be possible, something needs to be
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shared. There must be ontological entities of which the knowledge guides our
thinking, reasoning, analysis, and description. Thus, the problem of prediction
is closely related to the subject of how we acquire knowledge and inductively
apply it, and it is closely related to the epistemological issues of knowing what it
means for an object to possess a property — a problem which briefly introduces
the notion of causation into the discussion.
I shall approach the problem as follows. Frege’s notion of sense can be seen
as an argument for requiring something to be objective and shared in order
for communication to be possible. From Frege and the notion of objectivity,
I present Russell’s argument for accepting universals in order to explain that
we can have a priori knowledge. A priori knowledge is the kind of knowledge
which has its justification independently of any experience of ours [116].
From Russell, I move to Shoemaker’s perspective on properties which seeks to
explain how we can know that an object has certain properties. I shall here
focus on the part of Shoemaker’s ontology which concerns what it means for an
object to possess certain properties; a part which brings aspects of causation
into the discussion.
From Shoemaker, I go further into the problem of how descriptions relate to
what they describe. My intention is here to challenge the classical distinction
between word and world as two separate categories of being.
A linguistic construct like a sentence or a description may have denotation but
may itself also be a denoted entity. The same goes for physical objects like
houses, walls, and doors. Such objects, which are often taken to be denoted
entities of descriptions, may themselves be considered as such syntactical entities
having denotations of their own. The notion of syntax and semantics thus seems
to be a matter of mode.
9.4.1 Objectivity and shared entities
Communication is a central issue in design as design representations would be
useless otherwise. During the design process, self–communication — as a special
kind of communication — is performed. It involves analysis and reflection over
descriptions intended to denote artefacts or aspects of artefacts. The question is,
however, on what basis communication is done. I believe that stipulating com-
munication as a central and necessary ingredient in design calls for values which
are universally shared. By shared, I understand that they are within a com-
mon referential framework and not just private to one person. The knowledge
of such entities are necessarily subjective, but I believe that some connection
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to objectivity is needed in order to explain basic design issues. Such issues in-
clude meaningful prediction of the behaviour of artefacts by ascribing certain
properties to them, and that communication included in the prediction process
is possible at all.
Shared entities could be Frege’s notions of concepts or sense, Russell’s notion
of universals, or notions not directly related to language. To Frege, sense is
essential in explaining communication. Passing knowledge from generation to
generation is one kind of communication process. The reason it can be done —
Frege says — is that: “Man–kind has a common store of thoughts” [73].
Accepting Fregean sense to be included in this store or at least constituting to
the elements — the thoughts — in the store, I take to imply that there is such
a thing as universal truth. If two persons understand a phrase in similar ways,
it is because they grasp similar senses. An equal account holds if information
is communicated from one person to another. One person expresses an idea
by means of symbols which have Fregean senses. The symbols are read and
interpreted by the other person who grasps these. In that case, we shall say that
the message has been delivered, but whether it has been understood correctly, we
cannot say as we have taken the relation between thought and idea as primitive8.
Here, Frege’s anti–psychologism seems to pay off [58]. If we had followed psy-
chologism, the judgement of whether a phrase in language had a certain meaning
would be completely up to the interpreter. In that case, we would have difficulty
explaining why interpretation is not just a random cognitive process, and the
communication foundation would thus be on weak ground.
9.4.2 Russell’s induction
In “On our knowledge of universals” and “The world of universals”, Russell is
interested in the learning part of properties and thereby he shifts to a more
epistemological agenda [143, 142]. Through senses9, we observe things and
phenomena in the world. Of these things and phenomena we perceive various
properties which we abstract to fall under certain universals. When observing
additional things or phenomena having similar properties, we apply a principle
of induction to recognize these as being similar. The means for performing the
induction, Russell takes to be universal.
Russell applies his principle of induction in an explanation of why we can have a
8A model of communication in design due to Galle has been presented in “Artefact Speci-
fication, Design, and Production as a Process of Communication” [79].
9Not Fregean senses though.
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priori knowledge. For example, how can it be that we see a resemblance between
two pieces of white paper? This, Russell argues, is not because we have been
told that they share the property of being white. That would yield explanation
problems when regarding the first human being observing and reasoning about
the world. The explanation is to be found in the existence of universals and
the notion of one–over–many. The two pieces of paper are as concrete objects
interpreted involving thoughts of which the semantics are non–mental ideas on
an abstract level; the objects that fall under the concept white.
But to perceive the relation in the equality 2 + 2 = 4 or that a specific house
is white hardly explains our a priori knowledge of such propositions. We need
an account of how we perceive and how the connection between the concrete
(although perhaps potential) world and the abstract world of universals is es-
tablished.
Thus, Russell’s theory of properties as universals has some of the same problems
as Frege’s theory of them as functions.
9.4.3 Shoemaker’s causation perspective
Shoemaker adds some new perspectives to the discussion on properties — per-
spectives which I believe clarify a number of issues in the area of design of
artefacts.
In “Causality and properties”, Shoemaker prompts the epistemological question
of how we can know that an object has certain properties [153]. His answer
also aims at explaining what it means for that object to possess a property
— an issue which is important in the context of design, I belief. However, his
treatment does not lead to a discussion of knowledge and believe but involves
causation, although the notion of necessary connection is not in focus10. The
main principle is that observing a property is to be affected by it.
Shoemaker concentrates on properties that are genuine. The broad notion of
Cambridge Properties satisfies the criteria that loosing or gaining such a prop-
erty results in a Cambridge Change11 — simply that Fx at time t and ¬Fx
at time t′ > t. This definition also applies to so–called Mere–Cambridge pro-
10A necessary connection — in causation — is a connection between causes and effects,
claiming a genuine relation between causes and the effects they invoke. A first question in
causation is whether there really is a connection which is necessary, or whether such connec-
tions are just imagined and ideas in our heads, based on our desire for a deterministic and
reliable world.
11In “The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy” the notion of Cambridge Change is, how-
ever, defined more restrictively as a non–genuine change [8].
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perties like me being such that a barn is burning 100 miles away. Thereby,
Mere–Cambridge properties is a sub–class of the class of extrinsic properties.
However, the topological relation between the barn and I, are hardly part of
my identity. Thus, Shoemaker is only interested in properties of which gaining
or loosing, results in genuine change of an object. That is, a change in the
object’s intrinsics and not for example a change of the objects position in space.
Extrinsic properties, he excludes altogether and replaces them with relations.
The link between properties and the world is due to what Shoemaker calls
causal powers. Thereby, properties can be thought of as functions from sets
of properties to sets of powers. The definition is recursive but not cyclic as
properties are not defined in terms of themselves. Causal powers can be thought
of as functions from circumstances to causal effects.
For most such functions from state to state there is a range of values for which
the state does not change. The important step is when the state does change.
What makes the function from state to state informative is the fact that cer-
tain values mark limits at which e.g. a beam collapses because the load is too
high. It is the investigation of such limits — lying at the heart of material and
civil engineering sciences — which make our ontological perspective useful and
applicable in systems aimed for design and modelling.
We thus have that properties can be considered to have denotations and likewise
for causal powers. The approach — if put in a formal setting — has similarities
with denotational semantics of programming languages.
A property (p:P) is thus constituted by powers (q:Q) defining the change in
world state (s:S). Shoemaker’s notion of circumstances could roughly be assumed
to be of the same sort as the effect; i.e. (s:S). Formally, we could write the
signatures of the semantic functions as:
MP : P → (P -set→ Q-set) (9.1)
MQ : Q→ (S → S) (9.2)
As an example, the meaning of being knife–shaped is that if the object possessing
that property in addition has the property of being made of steel (for instance)
the object has potential functionality to cut wood; cf. (9.1). And having the
power to cut wood means that it is able to partition a block of wood if the
object is stroked so–and–so towards the block; cf. (9.2).
We thus have a perspective in which properties are not the atomic entities to
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which we commit ourselves. They are entities which only potentially can make
a world change and they need circumstances in order to activate the causal
powers.
What defines the identity of objects and thus the distinction is not the properties
as shared entities but the causal powers as shared entities.
In this sense two individual objects have similar potential for functionality if
they possess properties of which the causal powers denote similar changes. E.g.
an instrument shaped like a star and an instrument shaped like an arrow may
make similar markings in a plate of wood. This is not due to the shape properties
being co–extensive but due to the fact that the causal powers they invoke are
alike in denotation.
9.4.4 Elaborating on Shoemaker
In Shoemaker’s ontology, I see at least three ideas which may clarify the notion
of design and approach a solution to the problem of prediction.
First, properties and causal powers (which we shall call causal dispositions) seem
to be the ontological entities referred to in design and requirement descriptions,
respectively. The denotational relation between properties and causal powers
thus seems to clarify the problem of design verification. By design verification
— in context of artefact making — I understand the process of checking or
proving whether a design meets a set of requirements.
Second, it may be that properties are of secondary importance in design cog-
nition even though they are primary in design description. The denotational
relation between properties and causal dispositions, I take to be the very essence
of design rationality and the knowledge (even tacit) of it is what seems to guide
us as rational practitioners. The dispositions are abstract in the sense that they
are outside time, space, and causal connections, but they appear concretely in
causal scopes as they are intimately connected with natural laws consistent in
all possible worlds.
Third, the introduction of causal powers as something closely related to objects
in the causal world, seems to break down the traditional dichotomy which clas-
sifies entities (objects or phrases in the realm of language) as either of denoting
or denoted kind.
The meaning of an object can be considered to be a set of properties, and the
meaning of these, a set of causal dispositions. Thus, indirectly, the meaning of
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an object is its dispositions. Often objects are considered to be the references of
descriptions. However, objects may themselves be denoting entities. Thus, the
classical dichotomy dividing entities into either denoting kinds or denoted kinds,
seems to be on weak grounds. The distinction between syntax and semantics
may then be modes in which descriptions or objects are considered.
The idea seems to apply well to the context of artefact development. Here, we
have descriptions at various stages. These descriptions may relate denotation-
ally like requirements denote designs, designs denote potential artefacts, and
artefacts denote causal dispositions.
I shall further discuss these elaborations on Shoemaker’s ontology in the follow-
ing sections. However, the ideas presented are tentative and are not supported
by systematic argumentation as the discipline of philosophy requires. They are
to be seen as propositions for future work.
9.4.5 Design verification
The problem of verifying designs comes out the problem that requirements (es-
pecially functional requirements) are expressed in terms which belong to a dif-
ferent set than the terms used for expressing designs. E.g. “the wall must reduce
noise by 25% ” is a functional requirement whereas “the wall is to be made of
concrete” is usually considered a design choice. Only the latter sentence refers
to the intrinsic properties of the wall considered. Certainly, we may have re-
quirements which do refer to intrinsic properties like dimension properties and
in these cases, the corresponding design statements delimits to single values in
the property range, so I believe there is still a difference. In general, though, we
cannot be sure that we can express the relation between design and requirements
by set–inclusion of properties.
It seems though that Shoemaker’s ontology, in which properties denote causal
dispositions, opens up for a solution. The argument goes as follows.
A set of requirements to a building denotes the infinite set of possible designs.
Each design satisfies the set of requirements by stating a composition of objects,
properties of these objects, and relations between objects. Ideally, this is the
case. However, we may not be able to express all design aspects in terms of
formal, nominal, property designators. For now we shall assume that we can
and that it is rational to do so.
The properties of the artefact being described have a meaning. Following Shoe-
maker, this meaning is the causal powers possessed by the artefact once pro-
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duced. Also the causal powers denote something; namely functions from state to
state which is the potential behaviour. Potential behaviour is in fact what we try
to express in requirements — and especially in functional requirements. Thus,
we can say that the causal powers of the artefact, justifies the requirements, and
we have a structure as depicted in Figure 9.3. In the figure, the relation refer–to
between design and properties means that designs are expressed in terms which
refer to properties; it does not mean that designs denote properties.
Requirements
denote
−−−−→ Designsxjustify / refer to yrefer to
Causal powers ←−−−−
denote
Properties
(9.3)
Properties of objects denote causal powers (dispositions) which are what is ex-
pressed in requirements. Expectations or aims at acquiring specific dispositions
for objects is finding a certain constellation of properties such that it will be
the case. Knowledge of the link between properties and dispositions is what
construction and material science is all about, and these sciences aim at finding
and describing such connections between properties and causal powers.
9.4.6 Prediction and causal nexus
The entities which are universal and thus explain communication, reasoning, and
the rationality in prediction, may be causal dispositions rather than properties
of things. Such dispositions are rooted in natural laws and I take them to be
rigid in all possible worlds. If I design a beam for a load–bearing structure, I
may ascribe it certain material and certain dimensions. These are properties
intrinsic to the beam in mind. Thereby, I predict its behaviour and the reason
it is rational is due to how elasticity and strength of such objects derives from
the chosen material and dimensions. My knowledge thereof makes it possible
for me to judge the rationality of my design.
In “On the elements of being”, Williams claims that “Metaphysics is the thorough
empirical science”, and continues [171]:
“Every item of experience must be evidence for or against any hypoth-
esis of speculative cosmology, and every experienced object must be an
exemplar and test case for the categories of analytic ontology.”
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In some sense I agree — here we have an example of metaphysics meeting empir-
ical technical science. When I know p(x), I can reason — following Shoemaker
— about certain dispositions of x. What are universal and abstract are the
dispositions; not necessarily the property p. Thus, it does not matter whether I
put on a trope theoretical perspective or a Fregean–Russellian perspective.
Properties can be referred to by linguistic structures, but an important meaning
of design descriptions are the dispositions they indirectly denote for an object.
That is, the truth–conditions for whether artefacts satisfy the requirements.
Thereby, prediction in design as well as in daily life, is justified by following the
causal connections of artefacts put in certain situations. In one sense, we again
have something like Russell’s induction principle. Though it is not directed
towards his universals which were properties, concepts, and relations. Rather it
seems directed towards causal dispositions. In another sense, it seem like causal
dispositions — in a denotational Shoemakerian setting — clarifies Schön’s notion
of seeing as [149]. In design and research, we may benefit from seeing certain
dispositions of functionalities in objects rather than their properties. Schön
exemplifies this by mentioning the case which showed that paint brushes of
natural fibres were more functional than those made of artificial fibres. The
reason for the discovery, Schön says, was that the brushes were seen as some
kind of pump which lead to the distinction. Thus causal dispositions seem to
be central to many sorts of reasoning in design as well as in science.
9.4.7 Escaping the word–world dichotomy
Consider a production drawing for a building. The drawing is an abstraction of
the building it describes. The production drawing for The Øresund Bridge is
a collection of symbols placed so–and–so and which means something. It has a
meaning because workmen and engineers are able to construct the bridge, based
on their interpretation of the drawing. Thereby, the drawing can be seen as a
piece of syntax which has a denotation. Since the drawing on some points is
open for interpretation and since we could build the bridge many times based
on that same drawing, the drawing may denote an infinite collection of such
potential bridges.
Once constructed, the bridge also has a meaning (and potentially also before its
construction). It represents the function of effectively transporting people and
go[o]ds across the belt. Observing this function over time gives a measure of the
traffic over the bridge.
Let me try to go backwards too. What kind of entity denotes the production
drawing? That may be the functional and space related requirements to the
9.4 The problem of prediction 287
bridge. Going further backwards, we may observe some needs or political de-
cisions aiming at releasing traffic across the belt, strengthen cooperation, etc.
Indirectly, it could be a desire for placing Denmark on the technological map.
It seems that considering an entity as syntactical, from a given object or linguis-
tic form we can have one of many denotations. Consider for example Shapiro’s
case from “Philosophy of Mathematics — structure and ontology [151]:
“Consider an imaginary economist who, while at work, speaks an impov-
erished version of (technical) English, a language that does not have the
resources to distinguish between two people with the same income. Any-
thing she says about a person P applies equally well to anyone else Q
who has the same income as P. If she notes that P cannot afford the tu-
ition at Harvard and that P is likely to get audited, then the same goes
for Q. Someone who interprets the economist’s language might apply the
Leibniz principle and conclude that for those stuck with the impoverished
resources, P=Q. That is, from the standpoint of the economist’s scheme,
people with the same income are identified and treated as a single object.
To be fanciful, if the interpreter sees a certain woman, he might say (on
behalf of the economist), ’There is the $35.000’.”
My point is that the ways of seeing something is some kind of filter which
emphasizes certain properties or dispositions of concern in the current situation.
There are many different ways of seeing — at least on for each class of entities
being the denotations. Similar ideas are due to Galle and Bjørner [80, 27].
And we may go even further — claiming that physical objects can be syntactical
entities too. The distinction between representation and thing being represented
may be illusionary.
A design description is a representation of a potential artefact. However, many
ways of describing exists, including formal and informal textual descriptions,
scale models, drawings, and animations. Thus, a scale model of The Eiffel
Tower is a representation of that tower and it may have been used during the
design and construction of the tower. But how do we judge whether we have a
representation of something or that something itself? I believe that we cannot.
Thereby, the classification of entities being of denoting kind and entities being
of denoted kind seems to be on weak ground. My argumentation is as follows.
The difference in size between the scale model and The Eiffel Tower of which
it is a representation, is not the condition for that object to be the model
and not what it models. Neither is it constituting a condition as there is no
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such condition. The scale model might as well be a full–scale model, and its
construction concerning parts and material may be such that it is identical to
the original Eiffel Tower. The only way to decide that it is still just a model or
copy is that it is placed on a different spot, but that is also illusionary. Over
night, we might replace the real Eiffel Tower with its full–scale model without
anybody knowing it. Let us say that nobody would be able to tell the difference
— what is then the ontological distinction between representation and the entity
being represented? None, I believe.
9.5 Closing
Lately, it has come to my attention that new trends in philosophy points at the
possibility that denotation links span whole chain structures — an idea which
fits well in my ontological perspective. However, I did not manage to find any
suitable references yet. The traditional word–world dichotomy as an uncom-
promisingly and final (even universal) categorisation thus seems weak. I look
forward to see further elaboration on this matter; especially for the following
reason. The idea of denotation chains and the break–down of the traditional
word–world categorisation, is rooted in a question scheme which is common
to many different sciences: what does it mean to have p(x)? Sciences which
already pose such questions are those of ontology, design of programming lan-
guages, knowledge representation, and especially domain engineering. A cou-
pling between these and the area of civil engineering and design, I believe has
a lot of potential — some which may reveal design support possibilities that
we have not dreamt of. As a first step, the relation between requirements and
design should be incorporated in support tools. As a second step, other sorts
of knowledge should be included. Thereby, we are building up an ontology of
civil engineering and design and this ontology is based on denotational relations
between concepts — not on relations defined by convention.
Part V
Implementation
Chapter 10
A language–based design
tool
In addition to the work presented in Chapter 7, a small prototype system for
interpreting conceptual design models, has been developed. The system is a
prototype in the sense that it only aims a demonstrating the principle of semantic
parameterized interpretation. Design models are expressed in the language LM ,
and interpreted according to a semantics written in the language LS and a
calculus for a small subset of the language AutoLISP. We shall refer to this
subset language as AutoLISP−−.
The implementation is a collection of parser and interpreter mechanisms which
systematically process artefact models, semantics, and calculus semantics; and
produces a view.
However, we have made the following limitations compared to the specification
and presentation in Chapter 7.
• The calculus semantics only handles expressions in AutoLISP−−. How-
ever, extending this semantics or replacing it with another, makes it pos-
sible to produce many kinds of views.
• For conveniences with respect to the scanner of AutoLISP−− expressions,
we have made a distinction between unary minus and binary subtraction
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as used in LM and LS . Still, the views which are produced are valid in
conventional AutoLISP.
• The debug information is poor and simply raises exceptions if a parse error
or lexical error occurs.
• We have not made any effort for optimisation what so ever. Rather, we
have strived towards code which is close to the RSL specifications given
in Chapter 7.
The view that can be produced are command expressions for displaying lines
and rectangles in AutoCAD.
The implementation contains the following modules:
Common. Commonly used types and functions.
Lattice. Lattice operations.
MScan. Scanner for artefact models m:LM .
SScan. Scanner for semantics s:LS .
ALScan. Scanner for AutoLisp−− expressions t′:LAL.
Design. Parser for artefact models m:LM .
Sem. Parser for semantics s:LS .
AL. Parser for AutoLisp−−.
SPI. Interpreter mechanism.
These modules are ordered as shown on Figure 10.1.
The tool has been applied on a number of sample models and semantics. An
example is the following model of an entrance section for a building:
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Figure 10.1: Hierarchy of modules.
model
rsec : (sort={rwall},
width={450},
height={340},
thickness={70},
ld={4},
lw={10},
ih={40},
iv={30},
relx={325});
lsec : (sort={lwall},
width={450},
height={340},
thickness={70},
ld={4},
lw={10},
ih={40},
iv={30},
relx={-325});
csec : (sort={obeam},
length={280},
height={30},
thickness={70},
ld={4},
lw={10},
rely={155})
where ld and lw are attributes for lock depth and lock width properties respec-
tively, and ih and iv are the attributes for the horisontal and vertical measures
for holes in the wall sections respectively.
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The resulting view is a wireframe representation written in AutoLisp−−. Fig-
ure 10.2 and Figure 10.3 shows how AutoCAD displays two visualisations of this
wireframe.
Figure 10.2: Front visualisation of entrance section.
Future work has been discussed in Section 7.10.1.
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Figure 10.3: South–west isometric visualisation of entrance section.
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Part VI
Closing
Chapter 11
Thesis results
It is time to compare the overall hypothesis from Section 1.2 with the overall
results of the work presented. The individual chapters of the thesis make their
own conclusions and considerations for future work. These conclusions and
considerations are related to the subjects being treated in each chapter.
In this chapter, we shall consider the general conclusions of exercising the hy-
pothesis from the four angles À–Ã defined in Section 1.2. In the following, we
shall consider these angles in turn.
À Relating concepts of different incomparable kinds.
In Chapter 3, we have shown that the civil engineering concepts cost frames
and project plans can be related as a Galois connection. This means that
the concepts are not only related by their names but also by the mathema-
tical structure which models the concepts. This makes the relation strong
in the sense that its predicate can be given an explicit definition rooted in
the intrinsics of the domain.
This Galois approach seems promising in two ways: (i) It establishes the
formal foundation that civil engineering ontologies and concept systems
need, and (ii) it makes the process of defining such ontologies and concept
systems rigorous.
However, the approach is founded on the assumptions that:
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• domain concepts can be represented as formal models and that these
models capture the intrinsics of the real–world phenomena they ab-
stract. The former may not always be the case, and the latter may
be impossible to justify. Some domain concepts can only be modelled
in a highly abstract way which may reduce the models applicability
in a Galois connection.
• concepts in general relate to each other. However, there may be
concepts which do not, and it is not certain what the criteria are for
whether concepts do.
There is a great difference between stating a predicate for a relation, and
defining how values of one concept can be calculated from values of another
concept. The Galois approach does not deal with calculations in this sense.
The reason is that in many cases such calculations are not possible. The
approach is based on set–comprehension which are abstract specifications.
Calculating a set of values — e.g. a set of project plans — requires that
the abstract set–comprehensions are refined into algorithms for doing so.
There may be cases in which such refinements cannot be performed or
yields algorithms which are too complex to compute.
Á Relating representations of increasing cognitive significance.
In Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6, we have shown that formal design
models can be partially ordered in a lattice structure (a design lattice). Be-
sides the mathematical implications this gives, the notion of design lattices
opens up for new functionality in design tools. Such functionality includes
browsing facilities and handling distributed designing in a structured way.
However, the notion of design lattices is founded on the following restric-
tions and assumptions:
• We have restricted design information to consist of references to a
small set of basic ontological sorts: properties, values of properties,
relations, values of relations, objects, and object decompositions. It
may be that these ontological sorts are not significant, and that
there are other concepts which are essential to design. These may
include notions as knowledge, believes, and cross–discipline notions
like Schön’s seeing–as (see Section 2.3.1.1).
• Comparison of properties and relations respectively is based on set–
inclusion of values. Holistic perspectives may claim the existence
of more sophisticated notions. We have outlined this idea in other
chapters by showing that incomparable concepts can be related by
means of mediating ties. In Chapter 3, the ties were construction
notions; in Chapter 9, they were metaphysical notions related to
causation.
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Â Conceptual design models versus perspectives (views).
In Chapter 4 and Chapter 7, we have shown that it is possible to calculate
different views on conceptual design models. Such views can be repre-
sentations of visualisations, expressions for stress calculations, etc. The
relation between a conceptual model and the perspectives on that model
is an example of a relation for which we can calculate values of the latter
concept based on values of the former.
The study also clarifies the foundations for conceptual design tools that
facilitate certain desired dynamic facilities. The principle of separating
the semantics of design objects from the design program by turning the
semantics into a parameter for the program, yields a design program which
in a sense is generic. The semantics determines what can be designed and
what perspectives can be put on a model. Thus, the architecture of se-
mantic parameterised interpretation is a generic program. This program
can be specialised by applying a semantics to it. Constructing or revi-
sing design programs is then a matter of writing or revising a semantics.
Thereby, the principle of semantic parameterised interpretation “lifts” the
notion of design tools one level in abstraction. This level is a fix–point in
the sense that the generic design tool can be used to design anything —
it all depends on the semantics we apply.
However, the approach of semantic parameterised interpretation is founded
on the following restrictions and assumptions:
• The compositionality principle applied implies that there are perspec-
tives which cannot be defined in this way (cf. Section 7.9 and 7.10.1).
• We also have the limitation that design models need to be on formal
computable form. This may restrict a number of design ideas which
seem only expressible in natural language.
Ã On the relation between descriptions and artefacts.
We have — in two areas — outlined the philosophical problems and sug-
gested some solutions, concerning the relation between language and arte-
facts. In general, we have shown how philosophical problems and ap-
proaches are relevant when studying the foundation for the domain of
civil engineering and design.
In our study, we have considered the hypothesis in two contexts. One in
which descriptions involve part–whole information (Chapter 8), and one
in which we have been concerned with properties in context of design
(Chapter 9).
In Chapter 8, we have suggested a metaphysical notion — object aspects
— which we believe clarifies mereological issues in descriptions denoting
artefacts.
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In Chapter 9, we have shown how philosophical writings on properties and
language contribute to a clarification on three design related problems.
Both papers lead to considerations of the relation between representations
and the represented. In this context, we have shown in Chapter 9 that
notions like requirements and design can be related by means of properties
and causal dispositions. Thereby, the study of properties leads to similar
conclusions as our study of how to relate civil engineering concepts by
Galois connections.
We shall not try to falsify the philosophical perspectives presented. Phi-
losophy moves in small steps and is a study of foundations. Philosophical
perspectives are ideas of the world and not necessarily statements of which
the truth value can be decided through empirical experiments. Different
perspectives may explain different aspects of the world — also without
being contradictious. The value of the perspectives presented may be
measured on their theoretical or practical applicability as foundations for
further ontological studies.
Chapter 12
Future work
We shall shortly outline suggestions for future work for the four different angles.
À Relating concepts of different incomparable kinds.
Future work includes:
• relating more civil engineering concepts and building up a formal
ontology of civil engineering.
• putting such a formal ontology at work in computerized tools for
document management, knowledge deductions, etc.
• investigating the ontological criteria which determine what domain
concepts relate and which do not.
• exploring the mathematical and ontological properties of relations
established in Galois connections.
Á Relating representations of increasing cognitive significance.
Future work includes:
• applying the notion of design lattices in design tools.
• exploring the limitations of the presented languages, and the restric-
tions on ontological sorts which have been made.
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• designing mathematical calculi for design representation and relating
such calculi to existing object and function calculi.
Â Conceptual design models versus perspectives (views).
Future work includes:
• further exploration of formal design modelling languages and seman-
tics.
• incorporating the principle of semantic parameterised interpretation
in larger prototype design tools.
• gaining experience from real designing using such prototypes.
• generalising the interpretation mechanism such that any sort of target
expression can be produced, and such that relations are taken into
account.
• exploring the fix–point of design tool abstraction, and formulating
the interpretation principle as mathematical equations.
• introducing notions from causation in interpretation of design mo-
dels. Thereby, we combine results from Chapter 9 with ideas from
Chapter 7. The idea is to consider cause–effects as special kinds of
interpretations.
Ã On the relation between descriptions and artefacts.
The philosophical studies in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 can — as all philo-
sophical studies — always be considered in more detail. Therefore, we shall
not emphasize specific suggestions to future work for this angle. However,
we believe that there are interesting issues to be discovered in the area of
Shoemaker’s causation approach to properties, and in the idea of breaking
the word–world dichotomy as suggested in Section 9.4.7.
Appendix A
A short introduction to RSL
This is an ultra–short introduction to The RAISE Specification Language (RSL).
The introduction is a slight modification of a “recap” from chapters in [30], and
has kindly been lend out by its author, Prof. Dines Bjørner.
The “recap” is, alas, just an overview of the syntax of main aspects of The
RAISE Specification Language. It intends to show some abstraction — that
is model choices — possible in this language. For proper explanation of the
semantics and pragmatics of the language, we refer to [134, 135, 30].
A.1 Type expressions
RSL has a number of build–in types (Boolean, integer, natural numbers, etc.)
and type expressions (finite sets, infinite sets, Cartesian products, lists, maps,
etc.). Let A, B and C be any type names or type expressions, then:
306 A short introduction to RSL
type
[ 1 ] Bool
[ 2 ] Int
[ 3 ] Nat
[ 4 ] Real
[ 5 ] Char
[ 6 ] Text
[ 7 ] A-set
[ 8 ] A-infset
[ 9 ] A × B × ... × C
[ 10 ] A∗
[ 11 ] Aω
[ 12 ] A →m B
[ 13 ] A → B
[ 14 ] A ∼→ B
[ 15 ] (A)
[ 16 ] A | B | ... | C
[ 17 ] mk_id(sel_a:A,...,sel_b:B)
[ 18 ] sel_a:A ... sel_b:B
(save the [i] line numbers) are generic type expressions:
1. The Boolean type of truth values false and true.
2. The integer type on integers ..., -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, ...
3. The natural number type of positive integer values 0, 1, 2, ...
4. The real number type of real values, i.e., values whose numerals can be
written as an integer, followed by a period (“.”), followed by a natural
number (the fraction).
5. The character type of character values "a", "b", ...
6. The text type of character string values "aa", "aaa", ..., "abc", ...
7. The set type of finite set values, see below.
8. The set type of infinite set values.
9. The Cartesian type of Cartesian values, see below.
10. The list type of finite list values, see below.
11. The list type of infinite list values.
12. The map type of finite map values, see below.
13. The function type of total function values, see below.
14. The function type of partial function values.
15. In (A) A is constrained to be:
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• either a Cartesian B × C × ... × D, in which case it is identical to
type expression kind 9,
• or not to be the name of a built–in type (cf., 1–6) or of a type, in
which case the parentheses serve as simple delimiters, eg: (A →m B),
or (A∗)-set, or (A-set)list, or (A|B) →m (C|D|(E→m F)), etc.
16. The (postulated disjoint) union of types A, B, . . . , and C.
17. The record type of mk_id–named record values mk_id(av,...,bv), where
av, . . . , and bv, are values of respective types. The distinct identifiers
sel_a, etc., designate selector functions.
18. The record type of unnamed record values (av,...,bv), where av, . . . , and
bv, are values of respective types. The distinct identifiers sel_a, etc.,
designate selector functions.
A.2 Type definitions
A.2.1 Concrete types
Types can be concrete in which case the structure of the type is specified by
type expressions:
type
A = Type_expr
The grammar for writing type expressions is:
[ 1 ] Type_name =
Type_expr /∗ without | s or sub−types ∗/
[ 2 ] Type_name =
Type_expr_1 | Type_expr_2 | ... | Type_expr_n
[ 3 ] Type_name ==
mk_id_1(s_a1:Type_name_a1,...,s_ai:Type_name_ai) |
... |
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mk_id_n(s_z1:Type_name_z1,...,s_zk:Type_name_zk)
[ 4 ] Type_name :: sel_a:Type_name_a ... sel_z:Type_name_z
[ 5 ] Type_name = {| v:Type_name′ • P(v) |}
where a form of [2–3] is provided by combining the types:
Type_name = A | B | ... | Z
A == mk_id_1(s_a1:A_1,...,s_ai:A_i)
B == mk_id_2(s_b1:B_1,...,s_bj:B_j)
...
Z == mk_id_n(s_z1:Z_1,...,s_zk:Z_k)
A.2.2 Subtypes
In RSL, each type represents a set of values. Such a set can be delimited by
means of predicates. The set of values b which has type B and which satisfy the
predicate P , constitute the sub–type A:
type
A = {| b:B • P(b) |}
A.2.3 Sorts (abstract types)
Types can be sorts (abstract) in which case their structure is not specified:
type
A, B, ..., C
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A.3 The RSL predicate calculus
A.3.1 Propositional expressions
Let identifiers (or propositional expressions) a, b, ..., c designate Boolean values.
Then:
false, true
a, b, ..., c
∼a, a∧b, a∨b, a⇒b, a=b, a 6=b
are propositional expressions having Boolean values. ∼, ∧, ∨, ⇒, and = are
Boolean connectives (i.e., operators). They are read: not, and, or, if-then (or
implies), equal and not-equal.
A.3.2 Simple predicate expressions
Let identifiers (or propositional expressions) a, b, ..., c designate Boolean values,
let x, y, ..., z (or term expressions) designate non–Boolean values, and let i, j,
. . ., k designate number values, then:
false, true
a, b, ..., c
∼a, a∧b, a∨b, a⇒b, a=b, a 6=b
x=y, x 6=y,
i<j, i≤j, i≥j, i>j, ...
are simple predicate expressions.
310 A short introduction to RSL
A.3.3 Quantified expressions
Let X, Y, . . ., C be type names or type expressions, and let P(x), Q(y) and R(z)
designate predicate expressions in which z, y, and z are free. Then:
∀ x:X • P(x)
∃ y:Y • Q(y)
∃ ! z:Z • R(z)
are quantified expressions — also being predicate expressions. They are “read”
as: For all x (values in type X) the predicate P(x) holds; there exists (at least)
one y (value in type Y ) such that the predicate Q(y) holds; and: there exists a
unique z (value in type Z) such that the predicate R(z) holds.
A.4 Sets, Cartesians, lists, and maps
A.4.1 Set enumerations
Let the below as denote values of type A, then the below designate simple set
enumerations:
{{}, {a}, {a1,a2,...,am}, ...} ∈ A-set
{{}, {a}, {a1,a2,...,am}, ..., {a1,a2,...}} ∈ A-infset
The expression, last line below, to the right of the ≡, expresses set comprehen-
sion. The expression “builts” the set of values satisfying the given predicate. It
is highly abstract in the sense that it does not do so by following a concrete
algorithm.
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type
A, B
P = A → Bool
Q = A ∼→ B
value
comprehend: A-infset × P × Q → B-infset
comprehend(s,P ,Q) ≡ { Q(a) | a:A • a ∈ s ∧ P(a) }
A.4.2 Cartesian enumerations
Let e range over values of Cartesian types involving A, B, . . ., C (allowing
indexing for solving ambiguity), then the below expressions are simple Cartesian
enumerations:
type
A, B, ..., C
A × B × ... × C
value
... (e1,e2,...,en) ...
A.4.3 List enumerations
Let a range over values of type A (allowing indexing for solving ambiguity),
then the below expressions are simple list enumerations:
{〈〉, 〈a〉, ..., 〈a1,a2,...,am〉, ...} ∈ A∗
{〈〉, 〈a〉, ..., 〈a1,a2,...,am〉, ..., 〈a1,a2,...,am,... 〉, ...} ∈ Aω
〈 ei .. ej 〉
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The last line above assumes ei and ej to be integer valued expressions. It then
expresses the set of integers from the value of ei to and including the value of
ej . If the latter is smaller than the former then the list is empty.
The last line below expresses list comprehension.
type
A, B, P = A → Bool, Q = A ∼→ B
value
comprehend: Aω × P × Q ∼→ Bω
comprehend(lst,P ,Q) ≡
〈 Q(lst(i)) | i in 〈1..len lst〉 • P(lst(i)) 〉
A.4.4 Map enumerations
Let a and b range over values of type A and B, respectively (allowing indexing
for solving ambiguity); then the below expressions are simple map enumerations:
type
A, B
M = A →m B
value
a,a1,a2,...,a3:A, b,b1,b2,...,b3:B
[ ], [ a 7→b ], ..., [ a1 7→b1,a2 7→b2,...,a3 7→b3 ] ∀ ∈ M
The last line below expresses map comprehension:
type
A, B, C, D
M = A →m B
F = A ∼→ C
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G = B ∼→ D
P = A → Bool
value
comprehend: M×F×G×P → (C →m D)
comprehend(m,F ,G,P) ≡
[ F(a) 7→ G(m(a)) | a:A • a ∈ dom m ∧ P(a) ]
A.4.5 Set Operations
value
∈: A × A-infset → Bool
6∈: A × A-infset → Bool
∪: A-infset × A-infset → A-infset
∪: (A-infset)-infset → A-infset
∩: A-infset × A-infset → A-infset
∩: (A-infset)-infset → A-infset
\: A-infset × A-infset → A-infset
⊂: A-infset × A-infset → Bool
⊆: A-infset × A-infset → Bool
=: A-infset × A-infset → Bool
6=: A-infset × A-infset → Bool
card: A-infset ∼→ Nat
examples
a ∈ {a,b,c}
a 6∈ {}, a 6∈ {b,c}
{a,b,c} ∪ {a,b,d,e} = {a,b,c,d,e}
∪{{a},{a,b},{a,d}} = {a,b,d}
{a,b,c} ∩ {c,d,e} = {c}
∩{{a},{a,b},{a,d}} = {a}
{a,b,c} \ {c,d} = {a,b}
{a,b} ⊂ {a,b,c}
{a,b,c} ⊆ {a,b,c}
{a,b,c} = {a,b,c}
{a,b,c} 6= {a,b}
card {} = 0, card {a,b,c} = 3
• ∈ The membership operator expresses that an element is member of a set.
• 6∈: The non-membership operator expresses that an element is not member
of a set.
• ∪ The infix union operator. When applied to two sets, the operator gives
the set whose members are in either or both of the two operand sets
• ∩ The infix intersection operator. When applied to two sets, the operator
gives the set whose members are in both of the two operand sets.
• \ The set complement (or set subtraction) operator. When applied to
two sets, the operator gives the set whose members are those of the left
operand set which are not in the right operand set.
• ⊆ The proper subset operator expresses that all members of the left
operand set are also in the right operand set.
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• ⊂ The proper subset operator expresses that all members of the left
operand set are also in the right operand set, and that the two sets are
not identical.
• = The equal operator expresses that the two operand sets are identical.
• 6= The non–equal operator expresses that the two operand sets are not
identical.
• card The cardinality operator gives the number of elements in a (finite)
set.
The operations can be defined as follows:
value
s′ ∪ s′′ ≡ { a | a:A • a ∈ s′ ∨ a ∈ s′′ }
s′ ∩ s′′ ≡ { a | a:A • a ∈ s′ ∧ a ∈ s′′ }
s′ \ s′′ ≡ { a | a:A • a ∈ s′ ∧ a 6∈ s′′ }
s′ ⊆ s′′ ≡ ∀ a:A • a ∈ s′ ⇒ a ∈ s′′
s′ ⊂ s′′ ≡ s′ ⊆ s′′ ∧ ∃ a:A • a ∈ s′′ ∧ a 6∈ s′
s′ = s′′ ≡ ∀ a:A • a ∈ s′ ≡ a ∈ s′′ ≡ s⊆s′ ∧ s′⊆s
s′ 6= s′′ ≡ s′ ∩ s′′ 6= {}
card s ≡
if s = {} then 0 else
let a:A • a ∈ s in 1 + card (s \ {a}) end end
pre s /∗ is a finite set ∗/
card s ≡ chaos /∗ tests for infinity of s ∗/
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A.4.6 Cartesian operations
type
A, B, C
g0: G0 = A × B × C
g1: G1 = ( A × B × C )
g2: G2 = ( A × B ) × C
g3: G3 = A × ( B × C )
value
va:A, vb:B, vc:C, vd:D
(va,vb,vc):G0,
(va,vb,vc):G1
((va,vb),vc):G2
(va3,(vb3,vc3)):G3
decompostion expressions
let (a1,b1,c1) = g0,
(a1′,b1′,c1′) = g1 in .. end
let ((a2,b2),c2) = g2 in .. end
let (a3,(b3,c3)) = g3 in .. end
A.4.7 List operations
value
hd: Aω ∼→ A
tl: Aω ∼→ Aω
len: Aω ∼→ Nat
inds: Aω → Nat-infset
elems: Aω → A-infset
.(.): Aω × Nat ∼→ Â: A∗ × Aω → Aω
=: Aω × Aω → Bool
6=: Aω × Aω → Bool
hd〈a1,a2,...,am〉=a1
tl〈a1,a2,...,am〉=〈a2,...,am〉
len〈a1,a2,...,am〉=m
inds〈a1,a2,...,am〉={1,2,...,m}
elems〈a1,a2,...,am〉={a1,a2,...,am}
〈a1,a2,...,am〉(i)=ai
〈a,b,c〉̂〈a,b,d〉 = 〈a,b,c,a,b,d〉
〈a,b,c〉=〈a,b,c〉
〈a,b,c〉 6= 〈a,b,d〉
• hd Head gives the first element in a non–empty list.
• tl Tail gives the remaining list of a non–empty list when Head is removed.
• len Length gives the number of elements in a finite list.
• inds Indices gives the set of indices from 1 to the length of a non–empty
list. For empty lists, this set is the empty set as well.
• elems Elements gives the possibly infinite set of all distinct elements in a
list.
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• ℓ(i) Indexing with a natural number, i larger than 0, into a list ℓ having a
number of elements larger than or equal to i, gives the i’th element of the
list.
• ̂ Concatenates two operand lists into one. The elements of the left
operand list are followed by the elements of the right. The order with
respect to each list is maintained.
• = The equal operator expresses that the two operand lists are identical.
• 6= The non–equal operator expresses that the two operand lists are not
identical.
The operations can also be defined as follows:
value
is_finite_list: Aω → Bool
len q ≡
case is_finite_list(q) of
true → if q = 〈〉 then 0 else 1 + len tl q end,
false → chaos end
inds q ≡
case is_finite_list(q) of
true → { i | i:Nat • 1 ≤ i ≤ len q },
false → { i | i:Nat • i6=0 } end
elems q ≡ { q(i) | i:Nat • i ∈ inds q }
q(i) ≡
if i=1
then if q 6=〈〉 then let a:A,q′:Q • q=〈a〉̂q′ in a end else chaos end
else q(i−1) end
fq ̂ iq ≡
〈 if 1 ≤ i ≤ len fq then fq(i) else iq(i − len fq) end
| i:Nat • if len iq 6=chaos then i ≤ len fq+len end 〉
pre is_finite_list(fq)
iq′ = iq′′ ≡ inds iq′ = inds iq′′ ∧ ∀ i:Nat • i ∈ inds iq′ ⇒ iq′(i) = iq′′(i)
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iq′ 6= iq′′ ≡ ∼(iq′ = iq′′)
A.4.8 Map operations
value
• ( • ): M → A ∼→ B, m(ai) = bi
dom: M → A-infset [ domain of map ]
dom [ a1 7→b1,a2 7→b2,...,an7→bn ] = {a1,a2,...,an}
rng: M → B-infset [ range of map ]
rng [ a1 7→b1,a2 7→b2,...,an7→bn ] = {b1,b2,...,bn}
†: M × M → M [ override extension ]
[ a 7→b,a′7→b′,a′′7→b′′ ] † [ a′7→b′′,a′′7→b′ ] = [ a 7→b,a′7→b′′,a′′7→b′ ]
∪: M × M → M [merge ∪ ]
[ a 7→b,a′7→b′,a′′7→b′′ ] ∪ [ a′′′ 7→b′′′ ] = [ a 7→b,a′7→b′,a′′7→b′′,a′′′7→b′′′ ]
\: M × A-infset → M [ restriction by ]
[ a 7→b,a′7→b′,a′′7→b′′ ]\{a} = [ a′7→b′,a′′7→b′′ ]
/: M × A-infset → M [ restriction to ]
[ a 7→b,a′7→b′,a′′7→b′′ ]/{a′,a′′} = [ a′7→b′,a′′7→b′′ ]
=,6=: M × M → Bool
◦: (A →m B) × (B →m C) → (A →m C) [ composition ]
[ a 7→b,a′7→b′ ] ◦ [ b7→c,b′ 7→c′,b′′7→c′′ ] = [ a 7→c,a′7→c′ ]
• m(a) Application gives the element of which a maps to in the map m
• dom Domain/Definition Set gives the set of values which maps to in a
map.
• rng: Range/Image Set gives the set of values which are mapped to in a
map.
• † Override/Extend. When applied to two operand maps, it gives the map
which is like an override of the left operand map by all or some “pairings”
of the right operand map,
• ∪ Merge. When applied to two operand maps, it gives it gives a merge of
these maps.
• \: Restriction. When applied to two operand maps, it gives the map which
is a restriction of the left operand map to the elements that are not in the
right operand set
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• / Restriction. When applied to two operand maps, it gives the map which
is a restriction of the left operand map to the elements of the right operand
set.
• = The equal operator expresses that the two operand maps are identical.
• 6= The non–equal operator expresses that the two operand maps are not
identical.
• ◦ Composition. When applied to two operand maps, it gives the map from
definition set elements of the left operand map, m1, to the range elements
of the right operand map, m2, such that if a, in the definition set of m1
and maps into b, and if b is in the definition set of m2 and maps into c,
then a, in the composition, maps into c.
The map operations can also be defined as follows:
value
rng m ≡ { m(a) | a:A • a ∈ dom m }
m1 † m2 ≡
[ a 7→b | a:A,b:B •
a ∈ dom m1 \ dom m2 ∧ b=m1(a) ∨ a ∈ dom m2 ∧ b=m2(a) ]
m1 ∪ m2 ≡ [ a 7→b | a:A,b:B •
a ∈ dom m1 ∧ b=m1(a) ∨ a ∈ dom m2 ∧ b=m2(a) ]
m \ s ≡ [ a 7→m(a) | a:A • a ∈ dom m \ s ]
m / s ≡ [ a 7→m(a) | a:A • a ∈ dom m ∩ s ]
m1 = m2 ≡
dom m1 = dom m2 ∧ ∀ a:A • a ∈ dom m1 ⇒ m1(a) = m2(a)
m1 6= m2 ≡ ∼(m1 = m2)
m◦n ≡
[ a 7→c | a:A,c:C • a ∈ dom m ∧ c = n(m(a)) ]
pre rng m ⊆ dom n
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A.5 λ–calculus and functions
RSL support function expressions for λ–abstraction.
A.5.1 The λ–calculus syntax
type /∗ A BNF Syntax: ∗/
〈L〉 ::= 〈V〉 | 〈F〉 | 〈A〉 | ( 〈A〉 )
〈V〉 ::= /∗ variables, i.e. identifiers ∗/
〈F〉 ::= λ〈V〉 • 〈L〉
〈A〉 ::= ( 〈L〉〈L〉 )
value /∗ Examples ∗/
〈L〉: e, f, a, ...
〈V〉: x, ...
〈F〉: λ x • e, ...
〈A〉: f a, (f a), f(a), (f)(a), ...
A.5.2 Free and bound variables
Let x, y be variable names and e, f be λ-expressions.
• 〈V〉: Variable x is free in x
• 〈F〉: x is free in λy •e if x 6= y and x is free in e.
• 〈A〉: x is free in f(e) if it is free in either f or e (i.e., also in both).
A.5.3 Substitution
In RSL, the following rules for substitution apply:
• subst([N/x]x) ≡ N
• subst([N/x]a) ≡ a
for all variables a 6=x.
• subst([N/x](P Q)) ≡ (subst([N/x]P) subst([N/x]Q)).
• subst([N/x](λx•P)) ≡ λy•P.
• subst([N/x](λy•P)) ≡ λy•subst([N/x]P)
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if x 6= y and y is not free in N or x is not free in P.
• subst([N/x](λy•P)) ≡λz•subst([N/z]subst([z/y]P))
if y 6= x and y is free in N and x is free in P
(where z is not free in (N P)).
A.5.4 α–renaming and β–reduction
• α–renaming: λx•M
If x y are distinct variables then replacing x by y in λx•M results
in λy•subst([y/x]M): We can rename the formal parameter of a λ-
function expression provided that no free variables of its body M
thereby become bound.
• β–reduction: (λx•M)(N)
All free occurrences of x in M are replaced by the expression N pro-
vided that no free variables of N thereby become bound in the result.
(λx•M)(N) ≡ subst([N/x]M)
A.5.5 Function signatures
For some functions, we want to abstract from the function body:
value
obs_Pos_Aircraft: Aircraft → Pos,
move: Aircraft × Dir → Aircraft,
A.5.6 Function definitions
Functions — with body — can be defined explicitly:
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value
f: A × B × C → D
f(a,b,c) ≡ Value_Expr
g: B-infset × (D →m C-set)
∼
→ A∗
g(bs,dm) ≡ Value_Expr
pre P(dm)
or implicitly:
value
f: A × B × C → D
f(a,b,c) as d
post P1(d)
g: B-infset × (D →m C-set)
∼
→ A∗
g(bs,dm) as al
pre P2(dm)
post P3(al)
The symbol ∼→ indicates that the function is partial and thus not defined for all
arguments. Partial functions should be assisted by pre–conditions stating the
criteria for arguments to be meaningful to the function.
A.5.7 Let expressions
Simple (i.e., non–recursive) let expressions:
let a = Ed in Eb(a) end
is an “expanded” form of:
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(λa.Eb(a))(Ed)
Recursive let expressions are written as:
let f = λa:A • E(f) in B(f,a) end
is “the same” as:
let f = YF in B(f,a) end
where:
F ≡ λg•λa•(E(g)) and YF = F(YF)
Predicative let expressions:
let a:A • P(a) in B(a) end
express the selection of a value a of type A which satisfies a predicate P(a) for
evaluation in the body B(a).
Patterns and Wild Cards can be used:
let {a} ∪ s = set in ... end
let {a, } ∪ s = set in ... end
let (a,b,...,c) = cart in ... end
let (a, ,...,c) = cart in ... end
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let 〈a〉̂ℓ = list in ... end
let 〈a, ,b〉̂ℓ = list in ... end
let [ a 7→b ] ∪ m = map in ... end
let [ a 7→b, ] ∪ m = map in ... end
A.5.8 Applicative conditionals
Various kinds of conditional expressions are offered by RSL:
if b_expr then c_expr else a_expr end
if b_expr then c_expr end ≡ /∗ same as: ∗/
if b_expr then c_expr else skip end
if b_expr_1 then c_expr_1
elsif b_expr_2 then c_expr_2
elsif b_expr_3 then c_expr_3
...
elsif b_exprt_n then c_expr_n end
case expr of
choice_pattern_1 → expr_1,
choice_pattern_2 → expr_2,
...
choice_pattern_n_or_wild_card→ expr_n
end
A.5.9 Common operator/operand constructs
〈Expr〉 ::=
〈Prefix_Op〉 〈Expr〉
| 〈Expr〉 〈Infix_Op〉 〈Expr〉
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| 〈Expr〉 〈Suffix_Op〉
| ...
〈Prefix_Op〉 ::=
− | ∼ | ∪ | ∩ | card | len | inds | elems | hd | tl | dom | rng
〈Infix_Op〉 ::=
= | 6= | ≡ | + | − | ∗ | ↑ | / | < | ≤ | ≥ | > | ∧ | ∨ | ⇒
| ∈ | 6∈ | ∪ | ∩ | \ | ⊂ | ⊆ | ⊇ | ⊃ | ̂ | † | ◦
〈Suffix_Op〉 ::= !
A.6 Imperative constructs
Often, following the RAISE method, software development starts with highly
abstract–applicative which, through stages of refinements, are turned into con-
crete and imperative. Imperative constructs are thus inevitable in RSL.
A.6.1 Variables and assignment
0. variable v:Type := expression
1. v := expr
A.6.2 Statement sequence and skip
Sequencing is done using the ’;’ operator. skip is the empty statement having
no value or side–effect.
2. skip
3. stm_1;stm_2;...;stm_n
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A.6.3 Imperative conditionals
4. if expr then stm_c else stm_a end
5. case e of: p_1→S_1(p_1),...,p_n→S_n(p_n) end
A.6.4 Iterative conditionals
6. while expr do stm end
7. do stmt until expr end
A.6.5 Iterative sequencing
8. for b in list_expr • P(b) do S(b) end
A.6.6 Process channels
Let A, B and KIdx stand for a type of (channel) messages, respectively; then:
channel c:A
channel { k[ i ]:B • i:KIdx }
declare a channel, c, and a set of channels, k[i], able of communicating values of
the designated types.
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A.6.7 Process composition
Let P and Q stand for names of process functions, i.e., of functions which express
willingness to engage in input and/or output events, thereby communicating
over declared channels.
Let P() and Q(i) stand for process expressions, then:
P() ‖ Q(i) Parallel composition
P() ⌈⌉⌊⌋ Q(i) Non−−deterministic External Choice (either/or)
P() ⌈⌉ Q(i) Non−−deterministic Internal Choice (either/or)
express the parallel of two processes, respectively the non–deterministic choice
between two processes: Either external or internal.
A.6.8 Input/Output processes
Let c, k[i] and e designate a channels of type A and B, respectively; then:
c ?, k[ i ] ? Input
c ! e, k[ i ] ! e Output
expresses the willingness of a process to engage in an event that reads an input,
and respectively writes an output.
A.6.9 Process signatures and definitions
The below signatures are just examples. They emphasise that process functions
must somehow express, in their signature via which channels they wish to engage
in input and output events.
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value
P: Unit → in c out k[ i ] Unit
Q: i:KIdx → out c in k[ i ] Unit
P() ≡ ... c ? ... k[ i ] ! e ...
Q(i) ≡ ... k[ i ] ? ... c ! e ...
The process function definitions (i.e., their bodies) express possible events.
A.6.10 Simple RSL specifications
Often, we do not want to encapsulate small specifications in schemes, classes,
and objects; as often done in RSL. Not using schemes, classes, nor objects (see
[134, 135]), an RSL specification is simply a sequence of one or more types,
values (including functions), variables, channels and axioms:
type
...
variable
...
channel
...
value
...
axiom
...
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